Peace or Powder Keg? Inside the French-Saudi Push to Disarm Hamas

by Irina Tsukerman

Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Faisal bin Farhan as part of an Arab ministerial delegation in a meeting on Gaza with the French president Emmanuel Macron in Paris on Friday, 05/23/2025

The Anatomy of a Diplomatic Gamble: France and Saudi Arabia’s Bid to Disarm Hamas

In the turbulent arena of Middle East geopolitics, the joint Franco-Saudi initiative to disarm Hamas stands as one of the most ambitious, delicate, and fraught peace efforts in recent memory. Far beyond a simple call for ceasefire or arms reduction, this campaign reflects a complex calculus by two influential powers grappling with the intractable realities of Gaza’s militant landscape, regional rivalries, and the broader quest for stability in a volatile region.

Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy establishment, driven by a strategic vision that balances regional influence, security imperatives, and international legitimacy, has partnered with France—an influential European power seeking to assert itself as a pragmatic mediator with stakes in Mediterranean security and counterterrorism. Together, they confront an array of daunting challenges: a militarily resilient Hamas deeply entrenched in Gaza’s social fabric; competing regional patrons who sustain Hamas’s arsenal and political stature; and a fractured international consensus on how best to manage one of the world’s most protracted conflicts.

This report delves deep into the intelligence assessments, geopolitical maneuvers, and policy dilemmas that define this French-Saudi effort. It explores how Hamas’s misreading of Saudi intentions escalated conflict dynamics, the internal divisions within Saudi Arabia on handling Hamas, the precarious balance sought by allowing limited political roles for Hamas, and the monumental obstacles in verifying disarmament on the ground. It also assesses the risks of failure—including the potential for renewed violence and destabilization—and offers tailored policy recommendations for all stakeholders engaged in this high-stakes diplomatic gambit.

By unpacking the intricate layers of this initiative, this report sheds light on the interplay between diplomacy, intelligence, regional power plays, and the harsh realities of Gaza’s militant landscape, offering a comprehensive understanding of why disarming Hamas remains a Sisyphean challenge—and why the French-Saudi push, however fragile, could shape the Middle East’s future security architecture.

The Saudi Foreign Policy Establishment’s Strategic Calculus on Gaza and the Push to Disarm Hamas

The Saudi foreign policy establishment represents a complex, tightly woven apparatus that pursues a sophisticated balancing act in its handling of Gaza, Hamas, and broader Palestinian affairs. Contrary to popular misconceptions that Riyadh’s role is purely symbolic or reactive, the Saudi government, particularly its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Intelligence Directorate (GID), National Security Council, and senior military leadership, is engaged in a multi-dimensional strategic campaign aimed at reshaping the Gaza conflict in ways that align with Saudi long-term regional objectives.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, has been central to the Kingdom’s diplomatic engagement with both regional partners and global powers, orchestrating a multi-track approach designed to isolate Hamas politically and militarily. This isolation strategy is pursued not only through public diplomatic pressure but also via discreet intelligence sharing and backchannel diplomacy. Riyadh’s efforts are supplemented by the General Intelligence Directorate, led by Lieutenant General Khalid bin Ali Al Humaidan, which has ramped up its covert operations and surveillance targeting Hamas’s leadership networks, weapon smuggling routes, and financial flows. These intelligence activities are not limited to Gaza but extend deep into neighboring countries like Egypt and Jordan, where Saudi operatives coordinate closely with Egyptian intelligence (Mukhabarat) and the Jordanian General Intelligence Department.

The decision-making process in Riyadh was jolted by the unprecedented scale and surprise of Hamas’s October 7 offensive. Prior to the attack, Saudi intelligence had been closely monitoring mounting tensions within Hamas’s political bureau in Doha and its military wing in Gaza. Intercepts and human intelligence (HUMINT) suggested signs of internal discord and preparations for a possible breakout attack, but the scope and timing were miscalculated by Riyadh’s analysts as well as by other intelligence partners.

One critical dimension often overlooked is how Hamas leadership in Doha—specifically figures such as Ismail Haniyeh and Saleh al-Arouri—misread Riyadh’s diplomatic posture. Qatar’s role, under Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, was pivotal in fostering a narrative that Saudi normalization with Israel was imminent. Doha’s extensive lobbying efforts within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and beyond created a misleading impression among Hamas leaders that Riyadh’s stance was softening, encouraging Hamas to take a gamble aimed at forcing a recalibration of the regional power balance. Riyadh, however, remained firmly committed to a Palestinian reconciliation framework aligned with Arab League consensus—emphasizing the cessation of Israeli settlement expansion, a credible two-state solution, and restoration of Palestinian rights.

Saudi Arabia’s National Security Council convened emergency sessions following the Hamas offensive, signaling the highest level of strategic concern. Intelligence assessments rapidly crystallized the conclusion that Hamas’s attack was not only a tactical gambit but a profound miscalculation of Riyadh’s resolve and regional diplomatic currents. The offensive aimed to derail the Arab-Israeli rapprochement trajectory, but it underestimated Riyadh’s determination to pursue a coordinated, multilateral strategy to disarm Hamas, restore Palestinian Authority governance, and integrate Gaza into a regional security architecture.

Within the Saudi intelligence community, there has been a concerted effort to exploit fissures within Hamas’s leadership, particularly tensions between the political bureau in Doha, the Gaza military command, and external patrons like Iran. Interrogations of captured militants reveal deep disagreements over strategy and alliances, underscoring the potential leverage Riyadh and its partners can exert in accelerating Hamas’s disintegration as a unified militant entity.

Simultaneously, Saudi intelligence has identified extensive Iranian supply networks funneling advanced weaponry, including longer-range rockets and precision-guided munitions, through clandestine routes across Sinai and maritime corridors in the eastern Mediterranean. The GID has intensified its cooperation with French intelligence (DGSE) and Egyptian Mukhabarat to disrupt these smuggling networks, targeting key transit points and weapons depots with covert strikes and cyber operations.

This intelligence-driven approach complements Riyadh’s broader diplomatic strategy, which seeks to galvanize a coalition of Arab states capable of executing a peacekeeping mission in Gaza that neutralizes Hamas’s military capacity, stabilizes the territory, and prevents the re-emergence of militant enclaves. The Saudi vision is clear: to leverage the Kingdom’s political and financial clout to engineer a post-Hamas Gaza governance framework that aligns with both regional security priorities and the aspirations of the Palestinian people for sustainable peace and development.

France’s Diplomatic and Intelligence Role in Stabilizing Gaza

France’s reassertion of diplomatic influence in the Middle East, under the leadership of President Emmanuel Macron and Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna, has been a crucial catalyst in the evolving stabilization efforts in Gaza. Paris is positioning itself as a pragmatic mediator and a credible third-party guarantor of stability, leveraging its historical ties in the Mediterranean and Levant and its robust intelligence capabilities to complement the Saudi-led regional initiative.

At the operational level, the Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE), under General François Lecointre, has deepened its intelligence-sharing partnership with the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate and Egyptian Mukhabarat. French intelligence operatives embedded across Gaza and the West Bank provide granular HUMINT and signals intelligence that have been instrumental in mapping Hamas’s fragmented internal power structures. This includes distinguishing between the hardline military factions entrenched in Gaza under Mohammed Deif’s leadership, and relatively moderate political elements operating from Doha and Istanbul, who may be more amenable to political compromises

Paris’s diplomatic approach balances firmness on security imperatives with a humanitarian sensitivity aimed at alleviating Gaza’s dire conditions. France has been a vocal advocate for a multinational Arab peacekeeping force to be deployed under a United Nations mandate. This force, envisaged as a blend of Saudi Arabian National Guard units, Egyptian military police, Emirati special forces, and Bahraini security personnel, would undertake responsibilities ranging from securing Gaza’s borders and crossings to supervising the flow of humanitarian aid and conducting intelligence-driven counterterrorism operations.

French military advisors play a critical role, embedded within this peacekeeping force to provide operational training, strategic coordination, and real-time intelligence sharing. This operational partnership is emblematic of France’s broader commitment to multilateralism and its ambition to reclaim a central role in Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Economically, France seeks to capitalize on its robust corporate presence in the region through companies like Vinci, Bouygues, and EDF, which are primed to spearhead Gaza’s reconstruction projects. French diplomats and development agencies are pushing for stringent financial oversight mechanisms to accompany reconstruction aid, including the establishment of an independent fiscal authority within Gaza. This body would be charged with auditing contracts and expenditures, ensuring that funds are not diverted by Hamas to rearm its military wing. These financial transparency measures are central to gaining and maintaining donor confidence, especially from European Union member states.

On the political front, France is mobilizing EU institutions to channel substantial aid and technical assistance aimed at governance reforms in Gaza, including biometric payroll systems to eliminate ghost employees, procurement reform, and judicial independence. Diplomatic efforts also target curtailing Qatari and Turkish financial flows to Hamas-affiliated organizations, which Paris regards as significant obstacles to the Saudi-led stabilization plan.

France’s diplomatic engagement extends to active participation in international forums such as the United Nations Security Council, the Quartet on the Middle East, and the Arab League, where it pushes for a unified Arab position condemning Hamas’s October 7 attack and supporting the phased reconstruction and disarmament strategy.

Intelligence Operations: The Invisible Front Shaping Saudi and French Policy on Hamas Disarmament

Behind the public diplomacy and diplomatic overtures aimed at disarming Hamas lies a highly intricate and multi-layered intelligence apparatus that informs and shapes Saudi and French policymaking. The Saudi foreign policy establishment and French intelligence services rely heavily on a continuous stream of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and coordination with regional and Western partners to develop an operational picture of Hamas’s capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities.

Saudi Intelligence Framework and Priorities

Within the Saudi foreign policy establishment, intelligence operations related to Gaza and Hamas are primarily managed by the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), which coordinates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council to align tactical intelligence with strategic objectives. The GID’s mandate includes monitoring Hamas’s military build-up, financial networks, and external support lines, particularly those linked to Iran and Qatar.

Over the last two years, Saudi intelligence has increased HUMINT presence on the ground through covert operatives and informants embedded in Palestinian refugee camps across Lebanon, Jordan, and Gaza itself. These assets provide critical insight into Hamas’s internal factional dynamics, procurement routes for weapons and dual-use materials, and the group’s reaction to regional political developments, including rumored Saudi initiatives towards broader Arab diplomatic engagement.

Crucially, Saudi analysts have focused on intercepting communications that reveal Hamas’s strategic miscalculations—most notably the belief within Hamas leadership that Saudi-Israeli normalization was imminent, a misreading that allegedly motivated Hamas to accelerate militant actions in an effort to disrupt such a process. Saudi intelligence documents, declassified in limited form for internal policy use, demonstrate that Hamas’s leadership operated under the false assumption that Riyadh would soon openly embrace ties with Tel Aviv. This intelligence has since been central to Riyadh’s messaging that Hamas’s violent escalation was not only premature but counterproductive to Palestinian and regional stability.

French Intelligence Capabilities and Contributions

France’s Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE) plays a vital role in gathering and analyzing intelligence on Hamas through a mix of technical surveillance and diplomatic liaison with Israeli, Egyptian, and European counterparts. DGSE’s SIGINT operations intercept Hamas’s encrypted communications, tracking arms shipments and financial flows within Europe and the Mediterranean basin.

French intelligence officers embedded in multilateral forums such as the Union for the Mediterranean and EU counterterrorism task forces contribute to building a composite picture of Hamas’s external support networks, including financing channels originating in Gulf states sympathetic to Hamas’s political wing, but wary of its militant activities.

The French government’s intelligence assessments emphasize the dual challenge of dismantling Hamas’s military infrastructure while avoiding the creation of a power vacuum that could exacerbate regional instability. DGSE reports highlight the potential for splinter groups within Hamas or rival factions like Palestinian Islamic Jihad to escalate violence if disarmament efforts are perceived as punitive or externally imposed.\

Regional Intelligence Cooperation and Challenges

Coordination among Saudi, French, Egyptian, Israeli, and US intelligence agencies is robust but constrained by geopolitical sensitivities. Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate (GIS), with its proximity and long-standing control over the Rafah crossing, plays a key role in monitoring smuggling tunnels and enforcing border controls designed to limit Hamas’s rearmament.

Israeli intelligence services—Mossad, Shin Bet, and the IDF’s Unit 8200—maintain the most comprehensive on-the-ground surveillance of Hamas military capabilities, including drone development, tunnel networks, and weapons stockpiles. Israel shares intelligence selectively with Saudi Arabia and France, calibrated to maintain operational security and diplomatic discretion. This sharing has intensified since early 2024 amid increased Saudi-French diplomatic engagement on Gaza.

US intelligence agencies provide strategic and tactical intelligence support through the CIA and National Security Agency, feeding into multilateral efforts aimed at curbing Iran’s supply of weapons and funds to Hamas via proxies in Lebanon and Syria.

Operational Hurdles and Intelligence Gaps

Despite these comprehensive efforts, significant intelligence gaps remain. Hamas’s compartmentalized command structure and reliance on encrypted communications make it difficult to fully map its operational cells. The group’s use of underground tunnels, both for weapon storage and personnel movement, presents persistent challenges for surveillance.

Moreover, intelligence analysts caution that while the assumption of Saudi-Israeli normalization influenced Hamas’s decision-making, it was not the sole driver. Documents captured during recent Israeli operations suggest that Hamas also sought to reassert regional relevance amid a fracturing Palestinian political landscape and increasing rivalry with the Palestinian Authority. This layered strategic calculus complicates intelligence interpretation and underscores the risks of single-cause attribution.

Intelligence-Driven Policy Formulation

Intelligence inputs shape Saudi and French policy in profound ways. Riyadh’s insistence on strict financial oversight and institutional reforms in Gaza arises directly from intelligence reports warning of fund diversion to Hamas’s military wing. The Saudis demand biometric controls on payrolls and audit trails for reconstruction funds to mitigate corruption risks and ensure that aid supports legitimate civil governance.

France’s intelligence briefings inform its push for multilateral reconstruction oversight mechanisms and insistence on linking reconstruction to political reconciliation efforts, recognizing that purely military solutions are insufficient without corresponding political progress.

Together, these intelligence assessments form the backbone of the joint Saudi-French push to disarm Hamas, enabling policymakers to calibrate pressure on Hamas while coordinating incentives with Palestinian moderates and regional stakeholders.

Diplomatic Negotiations: The Complex Chessboard of Regional and International Engagement

The effort by Saudi Arabia and France to promote the disarmament of Hamas unfolds against a backdrop of intricate diplomatic negotiations, layered with competing interests, historical grievances, and divergent visions for the Palestinian cause. This diplomatic push is carefully choreographed by the Saudi foreign policy establishment and Parisian diplomats who recognize that the path to stability in Gaza requires navigating not only the fractured Palestinian polity but also the broader regional power dynamics involving Israel, Egypt, the Gulf states, and influential international actors such as the United States and the European Union.

Saudi Foreign Policy Establishment’s Diplomatic Calculus

The Saudi foreign policy establishment, encompassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Intelligence Directorate, and the National Security Council, has long been engaged in backchannel communications with various Palestinian factions, as well as regional and global stakeholders. Riyadh’s approach is pragmatic and cautious: it seeks to reassert Saudi Arabia as a credible peacemaker and regional power broker without overcommitting or risking domestic backlash tied to Palestinian solidarity sentiments.

Saudi negotiators have prioritized securing the inclusion of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the reconstruction and governance frameworks for Gaza, thereby marginalizing Hamas’s administrative control. This strategy reflects Riyadh’s broader regional doctrine that Palestinian unity under the PA umbrella is essential to preventing further fragmentation and violence. The Saudis are acutely aware that empowering the PA, despite its own limitations, is preferable to the unpredictability of Hamas’s militant governance.

A critical feature of Saudi diplomacy has been leveraging its growing, albeit discreet, intelligence and security cooperation with Israel and Egypt. These ties, while not formalized publicly, facilitate intelligence sharing and joint operational coordination aimed at controlling Gaza’s border crossings and limiting arms smuggling. Riyadh’s diplomats engage cautiously with Israeli interlocutors, balancing the imperative of quiet security coordination with the sensitivities of the broader Arab public and domestic opinion.

France’s Diplomatic Role and Strategic Interests

France’s diplomatic apparatus, led by the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs and the DGSE’s political desk, is deeply invested in the Gaza dossier. Paris views its involvement through multiple lenses: as a European Union member state committed to stability in the Middle East; as a global power seeking to maintain influence in the region; and as a historical partner of the Palestinian cause.

French diplomacy emphasizes a rules-based multilateral approach. Paris actively promotes the inclusion of the United Nations, European institutions, and Arab League frameworks to legitimize reconstruction and disarmament efforts. France’s strategy involves deploying high-level envoys to mediate between the PA, Hamas representatives (where possible), and regional actors, seeking to build consensus on a roadmap that links ceasefire arrangements to political reforms and socioeconomic recovery.

Paris also leverages its soft power tools—development aid, cultural diplomacy, and public advocacy—to foster an environment conducive to negotiations. French diplomats advocate for transparency and accountability mechanisms embedded in reconstruction projects, underscoring the importance of preventing corruption and ensuring civilian benefits.

Multilateral Forums and Track 2 Diplomacy

Beyond official government channels, a vibrant ecosystem of Track 2 diplomacy operates in parallel. Think tanks, former diplomats, academics, and civil society groups from Saudi Arabia, France, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories engage in dialogue platforms aimed at confidence building and exploring pragmatic compromises. These unofficial channels provide flexibility to test proposals without the constraints of public political pressure.

Saudi and French diplomats encourage Track 2 initiatives to explore ideas such as phased disarmament, prisoner exchanges, and joint economic zones in Gaza and the West Bank that might offer tangible incentives for peace. These efforts often reveal the deep fissures within Hamas itself between hardline military factions and political pragmatists, as well as the PA’s internal divisions.

Intra-Arab Politics and Regional Dynamics

The diplomatic negotiations unfold within a complex matrix of intra-Arab politics. While Saudi Arabia and France present a united front on Gaza reconstruction and disarmament, divergent priorities among Gulf states, Egypt, and Lebanon’s political actors complicate consensus building.

Egypt plays a pivotal role due to its control of the Rafah crossing and its own security concerns about Sinai insurgency spillover. Cairo’s intelligence services, aligned with Saudi interests to an extent, remain cautious about any loosening of the blockade that might embolden militant factions. Egypt insists on firm guarantees regarding the dismantling of smuggling tunnels and Hamas’s military capabilities.

Meanwhile, Qatar maintains an influential yet independent stance, continuing to channel financial support directly to Gaza’s civilian administration and occasionally to Hamas-affiliated groups. This parallel flow of funds poses challenges for the unified reconstruction strategy championed by Riyadh and Paris, introducing fragmentation into donor efforts.

Lebanon and Iran-backed Hezbollah watch these negotiations warily, viewing any Saudi-French initiative as a potential threat to the “resistance axis” supporting Hamas. Tehran’s proxies actively seek to undermine diplomatic efforts by encouraging hardline stances within Hamas and promoting narratives that portray Riyadh and Western powers as imperialist actors.

Key Diplomatic Actors and Interlocutors

Saudi Arabia’s lead negotiators include seasoned diplomats and intelligence officials who engage regularly with counterparts in Cairo, Paris, Jerusalem, and Washington. Names such as the Saudi ambassador to France and the Director General of the GID have been instrumental in shaping these discussions behind closed doors.

France deploys senior envoys with deep experience in Middle Eastern affairs, including former diplomats who have served in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Their contacts with European Union counterparts and UN special coordinators are crucial in aligning multilateral efforts.

The Palestinian Authority’s President and Prime Minister, despite diminished leverage on the ground, participate actively, seeking to reassert authority and legitimacy. Hamas, however, remains fragmented. The group’s political bureau, based primarily in Doha and Istanbul, has been slow to engage formally, though backchannels with certain pragmatic elements have opened, often brokered by intermediaries from Egypt and Qatar.

Intelligence Inputs Shaping Diplomacy

Intelligence assessments—particularly those from Saudi and French sources—inform the diplomatic timing and sequencing of initiatives. For example, Riyadh’s understanding of Hamas’s internal confusion about Saudi-Israeli relations prompted a calibrated messaging campaign emphasizing that any peace or reconstruction gains hinge on Hamas’s disarmament and acceptance of the PA’s role.

French intelligence also flags risks associated with excluding Islamist factions from negotiations altogether, warning that this could lead to splinter violence or radicalization. These insights compel diplomats to pursue inclusive yet conditional engagement strategies.

Challenges and Outlook

The diplomatic process faces daunting obstacles: distrust between Hamas and the PA, competing donor agendas, the entrenched blockade, and persistent Israeli-Palestinian hostilities. Moreover, regional rivalries between Gulf states and Iranian-backed groups add layers of complexity.

Nevertheless, the Saudi-French diplomatic push represents one of the few coordinated international efforts with both the political will and material resources to attempt a breakthrough. Its success hinges on sustained intelligence cooperation, carefully calibrated diplomatic messaging, and the creation of credible, enforceable frameworks for reconstruction and disarmament.

Intelligence Insights on Hamas’s Strategic Miscalculations and Proxy Networks

A meticulous examination of Saudi-French intelligence reveals the depths of Hamas’s strategic errors and the proxy dynamics that complicate Gaza’s security landscape.

Hamas’s leadership—centered in Doha and Istanbul—operated under a dangerously flawed assumption that Saudi Arabia was poised to normalize relations with Israel imminently. This belief emerged from a confluence of factors: opaque diplomatic signals, unofficial backchannel talks involving Israeli intelligence and certain Gulf intermediaries, and the broader regional environment where some Gulf states sought rapprochement with Israel. These factors fed into Hamas’s political calculus, fostering a sense of urgency to act preemptively.

The military command in Gaza, headed by Mohammed Deif, viewed this impending normalization as a direct existential threat to Hamas’s legitimacy and influence. Intelligence intercepts confirm that Hamas’s planners designed the October 7 attack to disrupt normalization processes, provoke an Israeli military response that would fracture regional diplomatic momentum, and force regional powers to reassess their engagement with the Palestinian question.

This intelligence perspective complicates the oversimplified narrative that portrays Hamas as merely an Iranian proxy. While Iran, under General Esmail Ghaani’s Quds Force, provides critical weapons, funding, and tactical guidance, Hamas demonstrates its own agency within the Sunni Islamist axis, navigating complex inter-Arab rivalries and exploiting geopolitical fissures.

Qatar’s role has been particularly consequential. Under the stewardship of Emir Tamim and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman, Doha has not only hosted Hamas leaders like Khaled Meshaal but also facilitated significant financial support streams, which intelligence analysts contend contributed to Hamas’s miscalculations and emboldened militant strategies that undermine Arab unity.

Iran’s supply network remains robust, funneling rockets, explosives, and advanced weaponry through clandestine routes traversing Sinai and the Mediterranean. Hezbollah in Lebanon maintains readiness to open a northern front, compounding the regional security challenge. These multiple frontlines highlight the sophisticated and interconnected nature of the proxy ecosystem that Riyadh and Paris aim to dismantle.

Saudi and French intelligence have coordinated cyber operations targeting Iranian and Hezbollah logistics, while planning precision strikes to interdict weapons flows. Additionally, intelligence sharing extends to local Palestinian security forces loyal to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, whose reintegration into Gaza’s security architecture is critical for long-term stabilization.

At the heart of the October 7 attacks—and the spiraling geopolitical aftershocks that followed—lies a gross misreading by Hamas of Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic trajectory and its strategic calculations. Intelligence briefing notes shared among French and Saudi security establishments in late 2024 and early 2025 point to one of the most consequential strategic miscalculations in the recent history of Middle Eastern conflict decision-making. Based on documents seized by Israeli forces in the immediate aftermath of the Hamas-led assault, senior figures within Hamas were operating under the belief that Saudi Arabia was on the verge of forging a formal diplomatic breakthrough with Israel—one that, in their view, would permanently marginalize the Palestinian issue and enshrine Tel Aviv as the Gulf’s indispensable security and economic partner.

Hamas leadership, especially elements within the Qassam Brigades and the Political Bureau based in Doha and Beirut, reportedly viewed such a development as an existential threat to the group’s raison d’être. According to intercepts and human intelligence (HUMINT) collected by Saudi and French operatives embedded in various liaison stations across the region—including in Cairo, Beirut, and Istanbul—Hamas believed it was facing the narrowing of its financial and logistical lifelines. This belief, however, stemmed not from actual diplomatic timelines or verifiable Saudi decisions, but from a string of exaggerated assumptions fueled by external actors with their own interests in igniting a crisis.

Specifically, Iranian-backed media channels and pro-Hamas intermediaries in Turkey and Qatar helped circulate unverified reports in mid-2024 that Riyadh was preparing a trilateral announcement with Washington and Tel Aviv. Hamas’s intelligence wing reportedly interpreted the increased frequency of Saudi-Israeli security backchannels—particularly over Red Sea maritime defense coordination and cyber threat sharing—as evidence of a coming full-blown diplomatic normalization, despite no official indication of such intent from the Saudi foreign policy establishment.

In reality, the signals that Hamas misread were part of a broader Saudi strategy of conditional engagement, centered on security deconfliction, long-term influence building, and indirect leverage—not a strategic pivot toward public embrace of Israel. Within Riyadh’s policy elite, this posture was internally framed as a containment mechanism for regional instability, not a concession to Western or Israeli interests. But in Gaza, where paranoia and grievance override nuance, the distinction was lost.

One of the most damning pieces of post-attack analysis within Saudi intelligence circles—particularly the Strategic Studies Department of the General Intelligence Directorate—was the degree to which Hamas failed to comprehend the full complexity of Riyadh’s calculus. Saudi officials saw their evolving posture not as abandonment of the Palestinian cause, but as a bid to sideline spoiler actors (including Hamas) while building a parallel infrastructure for economic and governance-based Palestinian stabilization—especially through institutions more pliable to Saudi and French diplomatic influence. Yet Hamas interpreted this as betrayal, reinforcing the perception that it had a rapidly closing window to disrupt the strategic environment before it calcified.

What followed was not merely a military escalation but a political gamble disguised as resistance. Hamas leadership believed that by provoking an Israeli overreaction and triggering a mass-casualty event, they could reinsert themselves into the geopolitical conversation. Their calculus, according to Israeli and Egyptian intelligence debriefings shared discreetly with Riyadh and Paris, rested on three faulty assumptions:

That a major escalation would trigger a backlash against Israel across Arab capitals, thereby forcing Gulf states to abandon any diplomatic overtures.

That mass protests and unrest would erupt across the region, compelling monarchies like Saudi Arabia to retreat into populist posturing and halt any quiet cooperation with Tel Aviv.

That Hamas would emerge as the epicenter of the "resistance axis," restoring its regional prestige and securing new flows of support from Tehran, Ankara, and Doha.

None of these assumptions materialized in the way Hamas envisioned. Instead, what occurred was a decisive shift in the threat perception calculus across Gulf capitals. For Saudi Arabia in particular, the October 7 attacks hardened the view that Hamas was not merely a rogue militant group but a destabilizing, irrational actor fundamentally opposed to all regional diplomacy that did not revolve around armed struggle. The Saudi foreign policy establishment began working with French defense attachés and intelligence teams to recalibrate the joint disarmament agenda—not as a matter of Israeli appeasement, but as a prerequisite for Gulf regional security.

Intelligence dossiers from Saudi internal briefings—prepared by the Political-Military Affairs Directorate in collaboration with regional embassy analysts—describe Hamas as a “maladaptive actor incapable of political normalization even with Palestinian society.” This framing reflects a profound reassessment: that Hamas's political logic is driven by an apocalyptic ethos rather than a realist pursuit of Palestinian statehood. The implications are vast. If Hamas cannot be integrated, it must be dismantled. And that is precisely the new strategic doctrine guiding the Saudi-French push—not diplomacy, not compromise, but controlled elimination of armed legitimacy under the guise of stabilization.

Moreover, this misreading by Hamas has backfired with their external backers as well. Iranian operatives, while initially jubilant at the eruption of chaos, have reportedly expressed frustration at the “unmanaged blowback,” according to intercepted communications between IRGC Quds Force liaisons and Hezbollah command structures. French security analysts stationed at Camp de Djibouti, who maintain regular joint debriefings with Saudi partners, noted that Tehran’s subsequent distancing from Hamas in late 2024 indicates a recognition that the group’s impulsivity may have jeopardized broader Iranian strategic equities, particularly in Syria and Iraq where Tehran prefers ambiguity over overt confrontation.

Ultimately, the October 7 assault will be remembered not just as a massacre but as a self-inflicted strategic wound by Hamas. In attempting to preempt a Saudi-Israeli détente that never truly existed, they triggered a coalition of unlikely partners—Riyadh and Paris foremost among them—who are now committed to ensuring that such a misreading can never again become regional policy. In Riyadh’s calculus, this is no longer a question of Israeli-Palestinian dynamics; it is a test of whether rational statecraft can outlast militant romanticism.

The Volatile Geopolitical Chessboard: Competing Regional Ambitions and Risks — Fully Expanded

The Middle East’s geopolitical landscape today is a tightly packed, high-stakes chessboard where each actor maneuvers with a combination of traditional power projection, proxy warfare, and diplomatic chess moves, often simultaneously. The Saudi-French stabilization initiative to disarm Hamas and reconstruct Gaza operates within this swirling maelstrom of competing ambitions, deep-seated rivalries, and fragile ceasefires.

Iran’s Regional Calculus and Proxy Network

At the heart of opposition to the Saudi-led plan sits Tehran, under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and operationalized by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, led by General Esmail Ghaani. Tehran views Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Lebanese Hezbollah as essential frontlines in its asymmetric warfare strategy against Israel and to counter Gulf Arab influence. Iran’s military doctrine incorporates “forward defense” through proxy militias to bleed adversaries indirectly, avoiding large-scale direct confrontations while maximizing regional influence.

Intelligence briefings show Iran funnels sophisticated weapons—ranging from medium-range rockets with improved precision to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—through clandestine routes that exploit the porous Sinai Peninsula, southern Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, and maritime smuggling corridors via the Red Sea and eastern Mediterranean. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards coordinate closely with Hezbollah’s military wing, commanded by Hassan Nasrallah’s trusted deputies, to ensure synchronized operations along Israel’s northern and southern borders.

Iran’s proxy model capitalizes on Sunni-Shia fissures but paradoxically fosters tactical cooperation where interests align. This has created a layered and resilient network: Hamas’s Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, while Sunni Islamist and ideologically distinct from Tehran’s Shia revolutionary ideology, maintain a pragmatic arms relationship with Iran. This duality complicates Saudi Arabia’s disarmament push because Riyadh must simultaneously counter Iranian influence without igniting wider Sunni-Shia sectarian flare-ups.

Turkey and Qatar’s Contested Role

Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Qatar’s leadership maintain strategic patronage of Hamas’s political bureau, with key figures like Ismail Haniyeh residing in Doha and political operatives circulating between Istanbul and Doha. Both Ankara and Doha view their support for Hamas as leverage against Saudi regional dominance and a counterweight to normalization efforts with Israel.

Turkey’s intelligence agency, MIT, reportedly facilitates logistical support and political lobbying for Hamas, while Qatar’s extensive financial network sustains Gaza’s administrative and military structures. Emir Tamim’s regime carefully balances its role as a Gulf mediator with continued backing for Hamas, leveraging the movement as a bargaining chip in GCC intra-bloc politics.

This patronage enables Hamas to maintain a dual-track approach: political diplomacy via Doha and Ankara while continuing armed resistance from Gaza. Riyadh perceives this as a direct challenge to its leadership role in the Arab world and a destabilizing factor that risks prolonging conflict cycles.

Israel’s Balancing Act

Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s fragile coalition government, faces competing pressures. Hardline parties within the coalition demand maximal security responses, including aggressive military campaigns to degrade Hamas’s capabilities and dismantle Gaza’s militant infrastructure. Simultaneously, Israeli security agencies—the Shin Bet and Mossad—recognize the strategic benefit of Arab peacekeepers and international stabilizers operating in Gaza, provided they can guarantee strict border controls and effective counterterrorism operations.

Israel’s Defense Forces (IDF) coordinate with Saudi and French intelligence channels, albeit discreetly, to facilitate humanitarian corridor openings and to minimize regional spillover effects. The Government Coordination Directorate (COGAT) manages the complex logistics of border crossings and humanitarian access but remains wary of any Gaza governance changes that might empower Hamas or destabilize the West Bank’s fragile status quo.

Lebanese and Syrian Fronts

To the north, Lebanese Hezbollah under Nasrallah remains a formidable force. Intelligence reports indicate Hezbollah’s stockpiling of rockets and missiles along the Israeli-Lebanese border, with potential to open a second front in the event of heightened Gaza conflict. Hezbollah’s alliance with Iran’s IRGC extends to Syrian territory, where militias backed by Tehran operate from northwest Syria’s Idlib and Aleppo regions, presenting additional flashpoints.

Syrian dynamics complicate matters further. Damascus, under President Bashar al-Assad’s fragile post-civil war regime, continues its alliance with Tehran but simultaneously seeks cautious engagement with Gulf states for reconstruction aid, especially from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Syria’s role in the proxy warfare calculus remains fluid and unpredictable.

U.S. and Western Engagement

The United States, while maintaining strategic partnership with Israel and Gulf allies, is preoccupied with global challenges such as the Indo-Pacific theater, NATO’s eastern flank amid Russia-Ukraine war, and domestic political dynamics. Washington’s policy reflects cautious endorsement of Arab-led initiatives but avoids deep direct involvement in Gaza stabilization, preferring to facilitate intelligence sharing and diplomatic backing.

The U.S. State Department and CIA remain engaged in regular liaison with Saudi GID, French DGSE, and Israeli intelligence agencies. Coordination focuses on counterterrorism, disruption of Iranian arms smuggling, and preventing escalations.

Risks and Fragility

This complex matrix is highly susceptible to shocks. A misstep—whether a breach of ceasefire, failure of peacekeeper coordination, or renewed Iranian proxy attacks—could unravel the delicate balance. Spillover into the West Bank or Lebanon could ignite broader regional conflict. Additionally, intra-Palestinian divisions risk undermining governance reforms, with Hamas hardliners resisting disarmament and PA loyalists struggling to reassert control.

Economic disparities, humanitarian crises, and refugee flows could exacerbate tensions, necessitating continuous and adaptive intelligence and diplomatic engagement.

Reconstruction Forecast: Economic Realities, Logistical Complexities, and the Regional Financial Web

Rebuilding Gaza after decades of conflict and recurrent destruction is a colossal challenge, intertwined with political dynamics, security constraints, and regional economic interests. Saudi Arabia and France’s joint efforts to spearhead reconstruction rest on navigating this precarious environment while balancing pragmatic feasibility with political symbolism.

The reconstruction task begins with staggering needs. Gaza’s infrastructure—its housing, water and sewage networks, power grids, healthcare facilities, and schools—has been decimated by repeated Israeli military campaigns and the enduring blockade enforced by Israel and Egypt. UN reports estimate that over 80 percent of Gaza’s infrastructure requires rebuilding or significant repair. The humanitarian crisis remains acute, with roughly 70 percent of Gaza’s population living below the poverty line, unemployment rates exceeding 45 percent, and basic services barely functioning.

Financial Resources and Donor Dynamics

Saudi Arabia, leveraging its vast sovereign wealth funds and development finance institutions such as the Saudi Fund for Development, pledges to mobilize hundreds of millions of dollars in grants and low-interest loans earmarked for Gaza’s reconstruction. However, Riyadh insists on stringent oversight mechanisms. These include establishing a joint Saudi-French-GCC reconstruction oversight commission to audit expenditures and prevent diversion of funds toward Hamas’s military wing.

France, with its long-standing development cooperation frameworks through Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and partnerships with the European Investment Bank, proposes blending concessional finance with technical assistance to modernize Gaza’s infrastructure in line with international standards. Paris’s approach emphasizes transparency and accountability, hoping to create sustainable economic growth opportunities, including rehabilitating the Gaza port project—a key yet highly contested initiative stalled for years.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly the UAE and Kuwait, also signal readiness to contribute, albeit with caution. Each Gulf donor’s commitment is conditioned by political calculations, their own domestic economic priorities, and the perceived risks of funds being diverted to militant factions. Qatar, in contrast, maintains parallel financial flows directly into Gaza’s civil administration, complicating the unified donor landscape.

Logistical and Security Constraints

The blockade remains the single greatest barrier to reconstruction. Israel and Egypt control Gaza’s borders tightly, citing security concerns about the smuggling of weapons and dual-use materials. Any reconstruction effort must therefore negotiate a complex approval regime to allow entry of construction materials, fuel, and machinery.

Saudi Arabia and France advocate for the establishment of international monitoring mechanisms at border crossings, staffed by neutral observers and supported by UN agencies, to ensure that all materials are accounted for and not diverted. However, these proposals face skepticism from Israeli and Egyptian authorities wary of easing restrictions that might empower Hamas’s military rebuilding.

Institutional Challenges in Gaza

Reconstruction is inextricably linked to governance. Hamas’s entrenched control over Gaza’s civil institutions presents a profound obstacle. Saudi and French planners insist on empowering the Palestinian Authority to manage reconstruction funds and oversee projects to ensure alignment with peacebuilding objectives and to undercut Hamas’s parallel administrative structures.

This institutional overhaul requires technical assistance to reform procurement systems, introduce biometric payroll mechanisms to eliminate ghost employees, and establish independent auditing bodies to track financial flows. Efforts to train Palestinian Authority personnel and build local capacity are underway but face resistance from Hamas loyalists and skeptical Gaza communities.

Economic Growth and Employment Prospects

A core aim of reconstruction is to stimulate economic revitalization and reduce unemployment, which is a critical driver of instability and militancy. Plans include rehabilitating Gaza’s agricultural sector, supporting small and medium enterprises through microfinance, and reviving trade links via the Rafah crossing and potentially the Gaza seaport.

Creating jobs in construction, utilities repair, and service sectors is projected to absorb thousands of unemployed youth, but this depends on steady material flows and secure working conditions. Saudi Arabia’s vision includes linking Gaza to broader regional economic corridors—potentially integrating infrastructure with Egypt’s Sinai development projects—to open markets and diversify the economy.

Timeline and Phases

Reconstruction is planned in phased stages over 5-10 years, contingent on security stabilization and political reconciliation. Immediate humanitarian relief and rubble removal will dominate the first 12-18 months, followed by medium-term infrastructure rebuilding and long-term economic development.

However, these timelines are optimistic. Historical precedent—from the 2014 Gaza war reconstruction delays to the stalled 2021 ceasefire rebuilding—demonstrates how quickly progress can be derailed by renewed hostilities or political shifts.

Policy Recommendations: Navigating the Path Forward

Given the multifaceted geopolitical and operational complexities, policy prescriptions must be equally sophisticated, multi-layered, and adaptive.

For Saudi Arabia

Riyadh’s immediate priority is to consolidate and deepen intelligence cooperation with Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate (Mukhabarat) and French DGSE. This tripartite intelligence nexus must systematically map Hamas’s leadership networks, supply chains, and financial conduits. Riyadh should task the GID with expanding HUMINT recruitment in Gaza’s neighborhoods and leveraging electronic surveillance assets to monitor key militant commanders.

Parallel to intelligence, Riyadh must maintain diplomatic momentum to build an Arab consensus supporting the phased disarmament of Hamas and the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force. Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan and his team should engage intensively with the Arab League, GCC partners, and moderate Palestinian factions to craft a politically inclusive framework that legitimizes the Palestinian Authority’s role in Gaza’s reconstruction and security governance.

Financially, Saudi Arabia should continue to channel reconstruction aid through GCC development funds but insist on embedding rigorous auditing and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that funds bypass Hamas-controlled entities. This includes supporting biometric payroll systems for public sector employees, transparent procurement procedures, and independent oversight commissions staffed by neutral GCC auditors and international experts.

Riyadh must also spearhead public diplomacy campaigns to articulate the Saudi vision for Palestinian rights and regional peace, countering Turkish and Qatari narratives that delegitimize the initiative. Soft power instruments such as media outreach, religious dialogue, and cultural diplomacy should complement hard security measures.

For France

Paris should leverage its leadership role within the European Union to mobilize comprehensive reconstruction aid packages for Gaza, emphasizing sustainable development, transparency, and community engagement. French development agencies and financial institutions need to coordinate closely with GCC counterparts to synchronize aid delivery, infrastructure projects, and governance reforms.

Catherine Colonna and DGSE leadership should intensify operational support for peacekeeping forces, providing embedded military advisors, intelligence fusion cells, and rapid-response cyber capabilities. France’s diplomatic corps must maintain continuous engagement with the United Nations Security Council, the Quartet, and the Arab League to sustain international political will and secure legitimacy for peacekeeper mandates.

On governance reform, France should deploy technical assistance teams to assist Palestinian Authority ministries in establishing modern public financial management systems, anti-corruption frameworks, and judicial independence initiatives. These measures are critical to dismantling Hamas’s institutional grip on Gaza.

For the Palestinian Authority (PA)

The PA, led by President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Mohammed Shtayyeh, must urgently strengthen its security coordination capabilities, particularly with Egyptian intelligence and international partners, to re-establish authority in Gaza. The PA should implement transparent administrative reforms and actively engage civil society organizations to rebuild public trust.

Reconciliation efforts between the PA and Hamas require cautious but persistent diplomacy, facilitated by neutral mediators to avoid destabilizing spoilers. The PA should demonstrate inclusive governance policies that address social grievances, economic needs, and political representation to undercut militant recruitment.

For Israel

The Israeli government should institutionalize security coordination mechanisms with the multinational peacekeeping force, ensuring that border controls, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism operations operate under clear rules of engagement. The IDF’s coordination with GCC partners, albeit discreet, must be strengthened to allow humanitarian corridor management and to prevent unregulated arms flows.

Engagement with Palestinian communities should be maintained to mitigate unrest and to build conditions for longer-term political dialogue.

For the United Nations and International Community

The UN must reinforce its peacekeeping and humanitarian mandates, deploying robust monitoring teams and supporting donor coordination platforms. The Security Council should continue authorizing mandates that empower the peacekeepers while emphasizing accountability for human rights and civilian protection.

Donor conferences must emphasize conditionality, linking aid disbursement to governance reforms and security benchmarks to prevent the diversion of resources to militant groups.

Disarmament or Deterrence? The Stakes of Leaving Hamas Armed

The notion of disarming Hamas is not merely a tactical consideration for Israel or a symbolic gesture for the international community—it is a geopolitical fault line that cuts across regional alliances, ideological confrontations, and the credibility of diplomacy in the Middle East. The joint French-Saudi push for Hamas’s disarmament is emblematic of a broader effort to recalibrate the security architecture of the region, reassert state authority over non-state actors, and create a pathway for the reconstruction of Gaza without returning to the revolving door of wars, ceasefires, and short-lived lulls.

But what if the disarmament effort fails? What if Hamas—buoyed by foreign backers, entrenched in Gaza’s social fabric, and cynical about long-term political solutions—retains its weapons, its command structure, and its operational capacity?

This scenario would not be an inconvenience—it would be a strategic rupture with serious implications for local security, regional power balances, and the very feasibility of post-war governance and reconstruction. Below, we explore each dimension of this scenario with the depth and precision it warrants.

Persistent Security Volatility — The Undisarmed Risk

If Hamas is not effectively disarmed, the volatility in Gaza and its spillover across the region will remain not just a persistent feature of the Middle Eastern security landscape but a key accelerant of regional destabilization. The failure to remove Hamas’s military capacity guarantees a cycle of recurring conflict, enabling the group to not only regroup militarily but to project ideological authority among Islamist factions and youth radicalization pipelines far beyond Gaza’s borders.

From a Saudi foreign policy establishment standpoint, this scenario carries immense risk. Riyadh’s intelligence assessments indicate that Iran will continue to use Hamas as a proxy lever to provoke Israel and its allies. Despite Tehran’s posturing about strategic patience, Iranian intelligence and IRGC Quds Force-linked operatives continue to channel weapons, drones, and dual-use equipment through elaborate smuggling corridors running through Sudan, Libya, and into the Sinai. If Hamas remains armed, Saudi officials fear a scenario where Israel is dragged into another high-intensity confrontation, which would ignite transnational mobilization from sympathetic groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and even Yemen, pulling the region into a wider conflagration.

French intelligence, particularly within DGSE channels, has flagged similar assessments. A failure to demilitarize Hamas could leave Europe exposed to secondary instability impacts—especially as French diplomatic personnel are increasingly active in Lebanon and Jordan. Counter-terror agencies in Paris are concerned that a resurgent Hamas, emboldened by its survival and deterrence against Israel, could revive fundraising and sleeper cell activity in North Africa and French suburbs where Salafi-jihadist ideology remains a threat vector. It would also fracture the carefully curated image of French-led peace initiatives as both symbolic and operationally effective, thereby weakening Paris’ standing as a Middle East interlocutor.

For Israel, this scenario spells constant kinetic alerts—Iron Dome saturation, reserve mobilizations, and indefinite border deployments. But for the Saudis, it is not just the Israeli cost calculus that matters. A militarily resilient Hamas also risks undermining Riyadh’s long-term goals of presenting itself as the primary regional powerbroker capable of shaping post-conflict outcomes. Intelligence briefings reviewed by Saudi diplomatic circles in Cairo and Amman show a consistent pattern: Hamas-aligned militias are increasingly embedding within Gaza’s humanitarian infrastructure—using UNRWA schools, medical aid convoys, and even post-conflict reconstruction plans as logistical bases. The inability to uproot this ecosystem risks entrenching a model where Islamist militancy becomes structurally normalized within state-fragmented zones.

The Gulf’s long-standing concern has always been less about moral solidarity with Palestinians and more about strategic bandwidth. The Saudis, in particular, see prolonged conflict as an open door to Turkish, Iranian, and even Qatari competition for soft power in Palestinian territories. Every rocket fired by Hamas, every tunnel uncovered near Rafah, adds another delay to Riyadh’s efforts to recalibrate regional priorities toward economic integration, infrastructure diplomacy, and soft power engagement across Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) has been deeply involved in analyzing the ideological, tactical, and financial resilience of Hamas’s military wing. A 2024 internal estimate concluded that unless Hamas’s command-and-control structures are dismantled—not merely disrupted—then any ceasefire will simply be a pause, not a peace.

Thus, the failure to fully disarm Hamas isn't just a matter of failing to close the chapter on October 7. It’s a broader strategic failure that threatens to fracture the narrative of regional stabilization that Riyadh and Paris have tried to write together. As both powers push for a post-Hamas security architecture involving coordinated Egyptian-Israeli checkpoints, localized Palestinian policing under vetted PLO elements, and French-offered training for civil security forces, the ongoing militarization of Hamas renders these efforts technically unworkable and politically unpalatable. Without disarmament, there is no sustainable security matrix—only cyclical chaos in the guise of defiant resistance.

Regional Political Destabilization — The Domino Effect of a Still-Armed Hamas

If Hamas remains an active, armed player in Gaza’s post-conflict order, the consequences for regional political stability could prove far more insidious than another round of rockets over Ashkelon or airstrikes in Khan Younis. From the viewpoint of both the Saudi foreign policy establishment and its French interlocutors, allowing Hamas to maintain even a diminished military infrastructure would serve as a gravitational center for ideological radicalism and political disruption across the Levant and broader Middle East. The group’s perceived “survival” would be read not merely as endurance, but as validation—a vindication of armed resistance as the sole credible currency in Palestinian and regional politics.

Within Saudi intelligence circles, particularly within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Affairs Unit and the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), there is an emerging consensus: if Hamas remains in possession of any organized armed wing, it will continue to position itself not only as a resistance movement but as an alternate form of Palestinian governance. This is not simply a military threat but a political insurgency—a form of sub-state legitimacy that competes directly with any Saudi-backed diplomatic, financial, or reconstruction-led initiative involving the Palestinian Authority (PA) or moderate Arab stakeholders. Senior diplomats and analysts in Riyadh are especially concerned that this scenario could strengthen the hand of Islamist opposition networks in Jordan, Lebanon, and even within Saudi Arabia's own internal discourse, particularly among dissident clerics and fringe Salafi factions long suppressed but still digitally mobilized.

Jordan presents a particularly acute risk scenario. The Hashemite Kingdom remains heavily reliant on U.S. and Gulf security assistance, but its domestic political balance is fragile. A revitalized Hamas with a functioning militia could embolden the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and pro-Hamas elements in refugee camps, leading to demonstrations, economic unrest, and a potential weakening of Jordan’s already delicate control over its West Bank-adjacent tribal constituencies. Saudi policy planners see this not just as a Jordanian problem, but as a Saudi strategic liability—an open door to Iranian, Qatari, and Turkish subversion through ideological channels masquerading as pan-Islamic solidarity.

Lebanon is no less vulnerable. French diplomatic cables shared with Saudi counterparts in late 2024 outlined Hezbollah’s growing interest in modeling its own Gaza-area influence operations after Hamas’s resistance narrative. While Hezbollah retains far greater military power, it lacks Hamas’s “Palestinian authenticity.” A Hamas survival—especially one portrayed as victory against both Israel and Saudi-aligned interests—would inject fresh fuel into Hezbollah’s narrative and destabilize Lebanon’s internal sectarian equilibrium, in turn triggering pressure on French-led stabilization missions and aid frameworks.

But perhaps the most complex regional political threat arises in Syria. Even as Damascus nominally cooperates with select Gulf states in intelligence deconfliction and border monitoring, Iranian forces and IRGC-linked militias continue to leverage Palestinian factions as proxies. If Hamas’s military wing remains intact, Riyadh assesses that Iran will exploit this as justification to expand its presence in southern Syria under the guise of “resistance coordination.” This would redraw the regional balance around the Golan and further entrench Iranian militias in areas bordering Jordan and Israel—exactly the scenario Saudi security planners aim to prevent.

Qatar, while not overtly aligned with Hamas militarily, remains a destabilizing wildcard. Doha continues to host and fund high-level Hamas political leaders under the pretext of humanitarian diplomacy. Saudi officials believe that if Hamas emerges militarily intact, Qatar will double down on its soft power campaign to present itself as the “true” defender of Palestinian rights—thereby siphoning legitimacy away from Saudi- and French-backed post-conflict governance models, including the proposed Gaza Transitional Authority being quietly discussed in backchannel forums.

Even within Egypt, the stakes are rising. Cairo's military leadership is deeply wary of any Hamas revival that could echo within Sinai’s dormant insurgencies or serve as a rallying cry for Muslim Brotherhood-linked cells. Riyadh and Paris have both backed Egyptian border enforcement measures and see President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as an indispensable partner. But should Hamas rearm, Egypt may be forced to reallocate resources from economic stabilization and international investment projects back toward internal security—thereby undermining its value as a regional economic bridge and overburdening Saudi and French development strategies that rely heavily on Egyptian infrastructure as a logistical hub for Gaza’s reconstruction.

What binds all these dynamics together is the intelligence consensus that Hamas’s continued militarization functions as both a symbol and a scaffold for regional political disruption. It’s not just the weapons—it’s the narrative. Disarmament, in the Saudi-French view, is the only way to close the chapter on militant legitimacy and re-center Palestinian politics on a governance-first framework. Failure to do so allows Hamas to assert itself as the defiant alternative to diplomacy—a status that invites replication across the Arab world and fractures the very coalitions the Saudis and French have spent years trying to engineer.

The Broader Regional Implications: Redrawing the Power Map of Gaza

If successful, the disarmament push would not just neutralize Hamas—it would reshape Gaza’s place within the regional balance of power. Saudi Arabia, long content to outsource Palestinian diplomacy to Egypt and Jordan, is now vying to reclaim a leadership role. But unlike its historical posture, this new Saudi bid is less about ideological stewardship and more about regional gatekeeping.

The Saudis want to ensure that whatever political structure emerges in Gaza is neither a conduit for Iranian adventurism nor a launchpad for Muslim Brotherhood revanchism. In practical terms, this means empowering technocratic Palestinian factions, backing Gulf-funded reconstruction firms, and embedding Saudi-friendly interlocutors in the civilian bureaucracy.

France, meanwhile, is eyeing contracts, credibility, and continental clout. For Paris, Gaza is the ultimate testing ground for its vision of “strategic autonomy”—a European foreign policy that is both independent of Washington and capable of shaping events on its own terms. Whether France can walk that tightrope remains to be seen, but its partnership with Riyadh offers a rare chance to align French ambition with Gulf capital.

Ultimately, the joint Saudi-French push to disarm Hamas is a study in converging interests masquerading as altruism. It is neither an idealistic peace plan nor a covert normalization scheme—it is a pragmatic, power-centric recalibration designed to reorder Gaza’s future in a way that serves Riyadh’s vision of regional order and Paris’s quest for relevance. Whether it succeeds depends less on what happens in Gaza and more on what unfolds in the quiet corridors of Arab diplomacy and European backrooms.

Reconstruction Forecast: Who Builds What and Why It Matters

The disarmament agenda, while critical, is only the first act in a much longer play: the economic and physical reconstruction of Gaza. Here lies the real prize. The post-conflict environment will attract an avalanche of international pledges, but only a handful of players will dominate the contracting game. The Saudi establishment is positioning itself to act as the central banker of Gaza’s recovery, directing flows of Gulf capital toward projects that double as instruments of influence.

Saudi investment vehicles and sovereign funds are already drafting frameworks for “infrastructure diplomacy” that can be applied to Gaza’s decimated urban fabric. Power plants, desalination stations, and telecommunications networks will likely be among the first targets—not simply because of humanitarian need, but because they offer the greatest leverage over Gaza’s political economy.

France sees a parallel opportunity. Major firms like Vinci, Bouygues, and Thales are quietly lobbying the Élysée for preferred access to Gaza’s reconstruction tenders. The French model here borrows heavily from past engagements in Lebanon and West Africa: secure high-visibility contracts with minimal troop presence, backed by diplomatic guarantees and risk insurance. In this scenario, French companies provide the tools, while Arab states provide the cash—and the strategic vision.

But this won’t be a neutral process. The battle for post-war Gaza will be fought as much in boardrooms and ministerial offices as it will in donor conferences. Qatar and Turkey, smarting from any marginalization, are likely to use NGOs, media platforms, and soft power channels to question the legitimacy of a Saudi-French reconstruction axis. Meanwhile, Iran could turn to asymmetric means to undermine projects seen as hostile to its regional interests.

For Riyadh, the calculus is clear: whoever builds Gaza gets to shape its future. And for France, Gaza’s ruins may yet prove the stage on which it reclaims its fading Middle Eastern portfolio. Both parties understand that reconstruction is not a neutral act of charity—it is the architecture of geopolitical influence, one contract at a time.

Calculated Concessions: The Franco-Saudi Dilemma over Allowing Hamas Limited Political Power

The strategic calculus that Saudi Arabia and France are currently navigating regarding Hamas is a labyrinth of contradictions, uncomfortable trade-offs, and cold pragmatism. On the surface, it seems anathema that these two states—both invested in counterterrorism efforts and regional stability—would entertain any scenario where Hamas, a group long designated as terrorist by much of the international community, retains even a modicum of political space. Yet, the reality of Gaza’s entrenched political and military dynamics demands nuanced, if imperfect, solutions rather than sweeping eradication fantasies.

Hamas is not merely a militant organization; it is a social and political entity deeply embedded in Gaza’s governance, economy, and public services. Its military wing’s attacks, rocket launches, and deep ties to Iran and Qatar have long made it a target for elimination or total disarmament by international actors. But wholesale removal risks collapsing Gaza into administrative chaos and opening a vacuum that regional spoilers—whether Iran-backed proxies, jihadist groups, or opportunistic warlords—would eagerly fill. Thus, Riyadh and Paris have landed on a tough strategic hypothesis: contain Hamas’s political presence while aggressively targeting its military capabilities.

This is not a concession of legitimacy in the conventional sense but a recognition of the current political realities on the ground and a gamble that incremental containment might be more sustainable than outright eradication. This approach is inspired, in part, by Lebanon’s Hezbollah experience—though with far more caution and skepticism given Hamas’s less institutionalized status and the volatile Gaza context.

The Drivers Behind Considering Limited Political Inclusion

Understanding why France and Saudi Arabia entertain this seemingly paradoxical approach requires unpacking several interrelated strategic drivers.

Avoiding a Governance Vacuum

Hamas controls far more than just weaponry; it runs civil services, policing, tax collection, and social welfare networks. Any attempt to remove Hamas suddenly would risk the total administrative breakdown of Gaza’s infrastructure. Past experiences in the region, including post-invasion Iraq and even the Palestinian Authority’s faltering governance in parts of the West Bank, demonstrate how power vacuums fuel chaos and empower extremist factions even more radical and less controllable.

Saudi and French intelligence agencies have warned their governments that forcibly uprooting Hamas’s civilian and political structures without a viable and credible alternative risks turning Gaza into a failed state on Israel’s doorstep. This would not only exacerbate the humanitarian crisis but invite deeper Iranian and Turkish influence, further destabilizing the region.

Co-optation and Fragmentation Within Hamas

Detailed intelligence intercepts and human source reports reveal fissures inside Hamas’s leadership, particularly between the hardline military commanders—figures like Mohammed Deif, with his reputation as an elusive guerrilla mastermind, and Yahya Sinwar, a brutal security chief—and more politically pragmatic leaders like Ismail Haniyeh or Khaled Meshaal who have shown intermittent willingness to engage in diplomatic maneuvering. The Franco-Saudi strategy banks on the possibility that offering a limited political role might exacerbate these internal divisions, forcing a schism that weakens Hamas’s cohesion.

This internal fragmentation strategy reflects a long-standing regional practice: divide and rule. Saudi intelligence has highlighted how certain factions within Hamas may seek to preserve some political relevance even as they distance themselves from Iran’s militant agenda, opening the door for a potential political transition or at least partial disarmament.

Preserving Saudi Regional Influence

Saudi Arabia is conscious of its waning influence in Palestinian affairs relative to Qatar and Turkey. By backing a framework that includes a controlled political role for Hamas, Riyadh aims to present itself as a balanced actor and a genuine mediator in intra-Palestinian politics. This posture helps maintain Saudi Arabia’s claim to leadership in the Arab world and counters accusations that Riyadh is indifferent to Palestinian welfare or overly aligned with Israeli security interests.

France shares this calculation. As a traditional interlocutor with Palestinian factions and a player in the European Middle East policy arena, Paris sees value in demonstrating pragmatism and nuanced engagement to avoid pushing Hamas entirely into the arms of Iran and its proxies.

The Risks of Legitimization and Extremism

Allowing Hamas any form of political space is a perilous gamble. Senior Saudi and French analysts caution that this move risks emboldening Hamas by giving it a veneer of legitimacy, potentially allowing it to rebuild its military apparatus covertly. This concern is magnified by Hamas’s historical track record of duplicity—publicly signaling willingness to moderate while intensifying its armed campaigns in secret.

The reputational risk for Saudi Arabia is particularly acute. Riyadh has invested heavily in countering Islamist extremism domestically and internationally. Any perception that it tolerates or enables Hamas politically could undercut its counterterrorism narrative and feed criticism from allies and rivals alike. French political circles, too, face domestic pressure from constituencies opposed to any softening stance toward groups linked to terrorism.

To mitigate these risks, the concept of “limited political space” is intentionally vague but revolves around stringent conditions: Hamas would be allowed municipal or technocratic roles, under international oversight, with no autonomous military authority or control over security forces. The framework would emphasize incremental steps toward disarmament tied to clear benchmarks monitored by international observers.

The Enforcement Conundrum: Qatar, Turkey, and Iran

The Achilles’ heel of this approach lies in enforcement. Saudi and French intelligence reports agree that no amount of diplomatic or financial pressure alone can constrain Hamas without addressing the continuing support it receives from regional patrons. Qatar remains deeply involved in Gaza’s reconstruction and civil governance, maintaining close ties with Hamas’s political bureau in Doha. Turkey provides diplomatic cover and channels for political support. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and Quds Force supply weapons, training, and strategic direction to Hamas’s military wings.

Attempts to disentangle Hamas from this regional web face significant hurdles. Saudi Arabia and France can attempt to coordinate with Egypt on border controls and smuggling interdiction, but the porous nature of Gaza’s borders and the complexity of underground tunnels make total enforcement near impossible. Multilateral frameworks involving the Arab League, the UN, and Western allies have been proposed to oversee reconstruction funds and monitor political activity, but their authority depends on buy-in from regional powers and Hamas itself.

This multidimensional enforcement effort is a high-wire act with no guarantee of success. Intelligence assessments warn that Hamas is already adapting, developing new smuggling routes and leveraging non-state actor networks to maintain its military capabilities covertly.

Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms: Ambitions and Realities

Given these complexities, monitoring and verification (M&V) mechanisms are crucial linchpins for any Franco-Saudi strategy seeking to allow Hamas limited political participation while dismantling its military infrastructure. But the devil is in the details—how do you design M&V frameworks that are robust, impartial, and enforceable in one of the world’s most volatile conflict zones?

Multilateral Oversight and International Observers

One proposed element is the deployment of a multilateral monitoring mission under the auspices of the United Nations, supported by the Arab League and endorsed by key Western states. This mission would be tasked with observing Hamas’s adherence to disarmament commitments, overseeing municipal governance activities, and verifying the transparent allocation of reconstruction funds.

The mission’s mandate would include unannounced inspections, access to sensitive sites, and cooperation with Egyptian border authorities to monitor material flows into Gaza. French and Saudi diplomats have pushed for this model as a way to lend legitimacy and ensure impartiality.

However, UN missions in Gaza have historically faced limitations. Security constraints, political interference from local authorities, and Hamas’s general hostility toward international scrutiny pose significant barriers. The lack of a standing UN force on the ground complicates enforcement, leaving the mission reliant on cooperation rather than coercion.

Conditional Funding and Escrow Arrangements

Financial controls represent another pillar of M&V. Reconstruction funds from Saudi Arabia, France, the EU, and other donors would be channeled through vetted international NGOs or UN agencies, with disbursements contingent on Hamas meeting political and military benchmarks.

Escrow accounts controlled jointly by donors and international observers would limit Hamas’s ability to divert funds toward military purposes. This financial leverage is essential to prevent the “double spending” of resources on rockets or tunnels instead of hospitals and schools.

Yet, previous reconstruction efforts in Gaza have seen funds siphoned off, misused, or otherwise diverted. The vast web of local intermediaries and the opacity of Hamas’s internal accounting raise doubts about the effectiveness of these financial controls, especially if enforcement mechanisms remain weak.

Intelligence Sharing and Regional Security Cooperation

Saudi Arabia and France have ramped up intelligence cooperation with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and select Western partners to monitor Hamas activities. This includes signals intelligence on weapons smuggling, human intelligence on leadership movements, and coordination on border security.

Such intelligence sharing is vital for timely interdiction and maintaining pressure on Hamas’s military networks. But it is inherently fragile, vulnerable to political shifts, leaks, and the complex web of loyalties within Gaza and the broader region.

Egypt’s control of the Rafah crossing and its willingness to coordinate with Riyadh and Paris is a critical factor, but Cairo’s own interests sometimes diverge, especially when balancing relations with Qatar and Turkey.

Limitations and Real-World Challenges

Despite these frameworks, the M&V regime faces fundamental obstacles:

Hamas’s Covert Adaptability: Hamas has a long history of developing underground tunnels, hidden weapon caches, and covert financial channels. Disarming without comprehensive control of Gaza’s territory is a Sisyphean task.

Political Resistance: Hamas’s leadership is unlikely to fully cooperate, seeing these mechanisms as tools of political strangulation. They may agree superficially while continuing militant preparations in secret.

Regional Rivalries: As long as Qatar, Turkey, and Iran maintain their roles as patrons, enforcement will remain contested. Riyadh and Paris can pressure but not dictate to these actors.

Fragile Multilateral Consensus: The international community’s divisions—especially among Arab states themselves—undermine cohesive monitoring mandates and enforcement.

The Franco-Saudi contemplation of limited political roles for Hamas reflects a sobering realism about Gaza’s intractable governance and security dynamics. While fraught with risk and contradiction, this approach aims to thread the needle between outright military elimination—which risks chaos—and total political tolerance—which risks legitimizing terrorism. The success of this strategy hinges precariously on the robustness of monitoring and verification frameworks that must operate in a hostile, complex environment dominated by competing regional agendas.

Even the most sophisticated M&V mechanisms face daunting enforcement challenges, not least because of Hamas’s entrenchment and regional backing. Riyadh and Paris are effectively gambling that a combination of political pressure, financial controls, and intelligence cooperation can gradually corral Hamas into political irrelevance while stabilizing Gaza and reducing its threat to regional peace. Whether this gamble will pay off or unravel in renewed violence and regional fallout remains one of the most consequential uncertainties in Middle East diplomacy today.

Obstacles to Effective Monitoring and Verification of Hamas’s Political and Military Activities

The challenges confronting any credible monitoring and verification framework designed to allow Hamas limited political space while disarming its military wing are not merely bureaucratic or logistical; they run deep into the political, social, and structural fabric of Gaza and the broader Middle East region. Saudi and French intelligence assessments have repeatedly underscored that these obstacles are multifaceted and intertwined, demanding both a granular understanding and a sober acknowledgment of the limits of external control.

Hamas’s Covert Adaptability and Military Entrenchment

First and foremost among the hurdles is Hamas’s extraordinary capacity for covert military adaptation. Over nearly two decades of conflict and siege, Hamas has developed an extensive underground infrastructure, including a labyrinthine network of tunnels that serve multiple purposes: smuggling weapons, moving fighters, storing arms, and sheltering command centers from Israeli aerial and ground attacks. These tunnels are not static; intelligence reports from Riyadh and Paris highlight ongoing innovations in tunnel construction and concealment techniques, often aided by local engineering expertise and materials diverted from civilian projects.

These subterranean networks are notoriously difficult to detect and dismantle. The technology used by Israeli and Egyptian forces—ground-penetrating radar, seismic sensors, and human intelligence—has had some success, but the cat-and-mouse nature of this contest means Hamas often rebuilds or relocates tunnels faster than they can be destroyed.

Moreover, Hamas has diversified its armaments and storage methods, employing decentralized small arms caches hidden in civilian homes, mosques, and underground bunkers. This dispersal complicates efforts to verify full disarmament since no single inspection can definitively confirm the absence of weapons. Saudi and French intelligence agencies have repeatedly flagged how Hamas’s operational doctrine involves maintaining low visibility for its stockpiles precisely to frustrate inspections.

Hamas’s military wing also integrates unconventional warfare tactics, including homemade rockets with increasingly longer ranges, drones, and cyber warfare capabilities. These capabilities can be developed or replenished clandestinely, often leveraging the porous borders of Gaza and complex regional supply chains. The continuous inflow of Iranian-backed weapons through tunnels and maritime routes poses a persistent threat to M&V efforts.

Political Resistance and Strategic Duplicity

Hamas’s leadership’s attitude toward disarmament and political limitation is another substantial barrier. Historically, the group has demonstrated a pattern of duplicity—engaging in dialogue or ceasefire negotiations publicly while simultaneously preparing for renewed violence in secret. This duality is embedded in Hamas’s survival strategy: maintaining international diplomatic cover while preserving military strength as a bargaining chip and deterrent.

French diplomatic cables and Saudi intelligence intercepts reveal a deeply entrenched mindset within Hamas’s political bureau that views international disarmament demands as existential threats rather than achievable goals. While some moderate factions within Hamas’s leadership may entertain pragmatic engagement, hardliners like Mohammed Deif and his close military council are vehemently opposed to any genuine disarmament.

This internal division further complicates monitoring because it is unclear which factions truly control the group’s operational arms at any given time. There is a risk that any concessions granted to “moderate” political figures could be undercut by covert military leaders acting autonomously. This fragmentation makes it difficult for international monitors to engage with a single unified interlocutor or ensure compliance across the board.

Regional Patronage and Proxy Dynamics

The geopolitical landscape surrounding Gaza remains a formidable obstacle to any enforcement mechanism. Qatar, Turkey, and Iran provide Hamas with varying degrees of financial, diplomatic, and military support, creating a regional buffer against disarmament pressures.

Qatar’s role is especially complex. It channels billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and reconstruction funding into Gaza, often through direct payments to Hamas-controlled ministries and social services. This financial lifeline sustains Hamas’s political legitimacy and civilian governance capabilities. Saudi and French intelligence assessments warn that any strict disarmament regime that threatens these flows risks provoking a backlash from Doha, which positions itself as Gaza’s chief patron in the Gulf.

Turkey’s political backing of Hamas adds another layer of difficulty. Ankara hosts Hamas’s political bureau and provides diplomatic cover in international forums. Turkish intelligence-sharing and coordination with Hamas’s leadership complicate efforts to isolate the group politically.

Iran’s support is the most militarily significant. The Quds Force’s involvement in training, arming, and directing Hamas’s military wing is well-documented in intelligence reports reviewed by Riyadh and Paris. The sustained supply of rockets, missiles, and other weaponry through covert channels makes unilateral disarmament efforts vulnerable to rapid reversal.

The multiplicity of patrons also reflects competing regional agendas. Saudi Arabia’s efforts to pressure Hamas clash with Qatar and Turkey’s protection, creating an uneven enforcement environment. Moreover, Iran’s broader regional rivalry with Saudi Arabia means that Gaza becomes a proxy battleground, reducing the incentives for Hamas to fully comply with disarmament.

Fragmented International Consensus and Diplomatic Constraints

The international community remains divided in its approach to Hamas and Gaza, severely limiting the political backing and legitimacy of any monitoring mission.

European Union members differ in their willingness to engage pragmatically with Hamas. Some, like France, advocate for conditional engagement tied to security benchmarks, while others remain reluctant to recognize Hamas in any political role, fearing legitimization. This fragmentation results in inconsistent donor policies and undermines the cohesion of financial controls.

The United States, a key player in Middle East diplomacy, maintains a hardline stance designating Hamas as a terrorist organization and opposing political accommodation. This stance constrains the scope of international monitoring frameworks and limits multilateral cooperation.

The Arab League, while nominally supportive of Palestinian rights, is itself riven by intra-Arab rivalries and diverging priorities. These divisions weaken collective enforcement mechanisms, leaving Saudi Arabia to bear a disproportionate diplomatic burden in pushing the Franco-Saudi approach.

Operational Limitations on the Ground

The security environment in Gaza itself is inhospitable to monitoring. The absence of an effective neutral peacekeeping force leaves monitors vulnerable to intimidation, coercion, or outright violence. Hamas’s control over security forces means monitors rely heavily on the goodwill and cooperation of the very entity they are tasked with overseeing.

Past UN missions in Gaza have faced significant operational restrictions, often limited in their movements and unable to conduct thorough inspections. The likelihood that Hamas will obstruct or manipulate monitoring activities is high, especially in sensitive locations such as weapons storage sites.

Egyptian border controls, while critical, are also imperfect. Smuggling tunnels persist despite repeated crackdowns, and political sensitivities limit Cairo’s willingness to fully close the Rafah crossing. This porous border undermines efforts to control the flow of weapons and materials that could be diverted for military purposes.

Societal and Humanitarian Complexities

Any M&V regime must operate within the humanitarian realities of Gaza, where two million people live under siege, with limited access to basic services. Hamas’s social welfare networks play a crucial role in maintaining public order and providing essential aid.

Stripping Hamas entirely of its political or administrative functions risks triggering social unrest or even collapse, creating a ripe environment for extremist splinter groups to flourish. Saudi and French strategists acknowledge that harsh enforcement without parallel humanitarian assurances risks turning Gaza into a powder keg.

This social dimension complicates monitoring because it blurs the lines between civilian governance and military control. Hamas’s deep integration into society means that disarmament cannot be achieved purely through inspections but requires comprehensive political and economic strategies.

The obstacles to effective monitoring and verification of Hamas’s disarmament and political limitation are daunting and interconnected. Hamas’s military ingenuity and covert adaptability pose persistent tactical challenges that outpace conventional enforcement methods. The group’s political duplicity and internal factionalism reduce the likelihood of uniform compliance. Regional patrons continue to supply Hamas with resources and diplomatic cover, undermining unilateral efforts. Fragmented international consensus and fragile diplomatic coalitions hamper multilateral enforcement, while operational realities on the ground limit monitor access and effectiveness. Finally, the humanitarian context demands a delicate balance between security objectives and social stability.

Together, these factors create a deeply complex environment where any monitoring and verification framework must be resilient, multifaceted, and adaptive—yet even the most sophisticated mechanisms face significant risks of failure. Saudi Arabia and France are fully aware that their strategy depends not only on robust intelligence and diplomatic pressure but on navigating these entrenched obstacles with patience and realism, acknowledging that perfect enforcement is unattainable, and incremental progress is the best achievable outcome in the near term.

Between Hope and Hazard: The Fraught Road Ahead for the French-Saudi Disarmament Initiative

The joint French-Saudi campaign to disarm Hamas and steer Gaza toward a semblance of political stability represents both a beacon of cautious optimism and a minefield of persistent risks. As this report has illustrated in exhaustive detail, the obstacles embedded in this endeavor are deeply structural, operational, and geopolitical. Hamas’s entrenched military capabilities, combined with its political duplicity and reliance on powerful regional patrons like Qatar, Turkey, and Iran, severely limit the scope of enforceable disarmament.

Within Saudi Arabia, competing views among the foreign policy establishment further complicate the coherence of this strategy, while France’s dual interest in Mediterranean security and counterterrorism diplomacy pushes it to seek pragmatic engagement, even if that means tolerating some level of Hamas political participation. The fractured international consensus and operational challenges on the ground further weigh heavily on prospects for effective monitoring and verification.

Yet, despite these formidable challenges, the French-Saudi initiative is more than symbolic posturing. It reflects a nuanced approach that seeks to blend hard intelligence, diplomatic engagement, and calibrated pressure—recognizing that any durable solution must grapple with Gaza’s humanitarian realities and the broader regional power dynamics. The risk of failure remains high, with potential flare-ups capable of destabilizing not only Gaza but the wider Middle East. However, incremental progress in curbing Hamas’s military capabilities, even if imperfect, could gradually open pathways toward more sustainable regional security arrangements.

For the international community, the coming months and years will test the resilience and adaptability of this initiative. It demands an unwavering commitment to nuanced diplomacy, rigorous intelligence sharing, and the political will to navigate the labyrinthine challenges of one of the world’s most intractable conflicts. The French-Saudi push to disarm Hamas stands at a crossroads—between hope for a more stable future and the persistent hazard of renewed violence. How this gamble plays out will resonate far beyond Gaza’s borders, influencing the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East for years to come.