Revolution Reexported: The Houthi Project, Maritime Encirclement, and the Erosion of Regional Order

by Irina Tsukerman

Planned Trump Organization-backed luxury resort in Oman

Axis by Obfuscation: The Silent War Behind the Proxy War

What appears on the surface as a conventional regional insurgency is, in reality, the manifestation of a far deeper and more strategically designed geopolitical reordering. At the heart of this evolving axis is the Houthi movement—a Yemeni faction whose transformation from a parochial insurgent group into a transnational proxy power has been made possible not only through Iranian coordination but through the silent, consistent facilitation of regional actors, most notably the Sultanate of Oman.

This report is a granular and uncompromising investigation into the complex machinery behind the rise of the Houthis, exposing how layers of financial structures, political interference, corporate intermediaries, and transnational smuggling networks have redefined the Middle East’s proxy wars into a new genre of hybrid warfare. Drawing on profiles of smuggling operations, analysis of maritime and military strategy, intelligence linkages, and the information war playing out across digital platforms, the study dismantles the prevailing assumption that the Houthis are a localized threat. Instead, it situates the movement within a broader axis of revisionist strategy—designed to fracture maritime security, challenge Western influence, and redraw the ideological map of the region.

The report also delves into the covert infrastructure supporting this rise. It scrutinizes Oman’s dual role as both the international community’s preferred mediator and a silent operational hub for Houthi armament and funding. It reveals a pattern of quiet cooperation, diplomatic cover, and strategic ambiguity that has enabled Omani officials, companies, and intermediaries to become essential arteries in the movement’s logistical bloodstream—all while shielding themselves behind the rhetoric of neutrality.

Compounding these issues is the complex web of American strategic and ethical failure. The paper explores how former President Donald Trump’s investments in Oman—intertwined with his administration’s de-escalation in Yemen, realignment in Somalia, and hesitance in confronting Iranian assets—created a narrative vulnerability that the Houthis have weaponized. This convergence of business entanglement, muted policy, and contradictory diplomacy has amplified the Houthi propaganda machine, emboldened regional proxies, and severely eroded American credibility.

This is not merely a study in regional conflict—it is an autopsy of deterrence failure, a warning about the costs of compromised diplomacy, and an urgent call to rethink how covert alliances and narrative warfare are reshaping the Middle East before our eyes.

The Houthis: From Local Insurgency to Regional Revolutionary Proxy

Over the past decade, the Houthi movement has undergone a remarkable transformation. What began as a localized Zaidi Shia insurgency rooted in northern Yemen has evolved into a sophisticated regional actor deeply embedded within Iran’s broader strategy for extending influence across the Middle East. The Houthis today are not simply a guerrilla force; they operate as a multidimensional instrument of Iranian power projection, encompassing battlefield prowess, ideological expansion, and proxy warfare that reverberates far beyond Yemen’s borders. This evolution epitomizes Tehran’s approach to asymmetric warfare—empowering local militant movements to serve as force multipliers in its protracted contest against the United States, Israel, and their Gulf allies.

A key aspect of the Houthis’ strategic evolution is their increasingly assertive use of maritime power, particularly in the Red Sea. This waterway is one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries, with the Bab el-Mandeb Strait serving as a critical choke point for the transit of oil and commercial goods. By launching attacks on maritime traffic and naval vessels associated with Israel and Western powers, the Houthis engage in a deliberate and calculated campaign that goes far beyond isolated violence; it is a form of economic disruption and geopolitical signaling designed to elevate their standing on the regional stage. Disrupting commercial shipping elevates the strategic stakes, compelling global powers to pay closer attention to the conflict in Yemen and potentially recalibrate their military and diplomatic posture in the region. The Houthis’ capability to threaten vital shipping lanes creates leverage that forces the international community to reassess its engagement in the Red Sea and the Middle East broadly.

Moreover, these maritime operations serve to increase regional pressure on Israel-affiliated shipping and shipping routes, positioning the Houthis as frontline actors in the broader Arab-Israeli confrontation. This role amplifies their ideological credentials, positioning them as defenders of the “revolution” and challengers of Western and Israeli influence. The attacks also serve a diversionary function, compelling Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and their Western allies to spread their focus and resources more thinly. This reduces the intensity of military pressure on Houthi-controlled territories within Yemen, allowing them breathing space to consolidate and expand. The Houthis’ asymmetric naval warfare tactics—mirroring Iranian strategies in the Persian Gulf—effectively transform them into a maritime proxy, extending Tehran’s reach into one of the most strategically important waterways in the world.

Iran’s ambitions along the Red Sea corridor, however, extend well beyond Yemen’s shores. Since the 2015 coup that brought the Houthis to power, Iran has actively cultivated relationships with key countries in the Horn of Africa, including Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. This outreach is no accident but a deliberate effort to secure forward bases and strategic depth along the maritime route. Eritrea and Djibouti, which sit astride critical shipping lanes, provide Iran—and by extension the Houthis—with valuable logistical footholds and staging grounds for operations. These arrangements began immediately after the 2015 coup, with notable diplomatic activity such as visits by Sayyed Hussein al-Azzi to Iran, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia, and a pivotal meeting with Mohammed al-Habsi in Eritrea. These engagements laid the foundation for a persistent Iranian-aligned presence aimed at challenging Western maritime dominance and supporting allied proxy networks in the region.

In addition to securing physical bases, Iran’s strategy involves forging deep political and ideological alliances with local leaders, embedding the axis of resistance into the fractured political landscapes of the Horn. The presence of figures like Mohammed al-Habsi underscores the importance of personal diplomacy and ideological affinity in Tehran’s approach. By cultivating influence in countries hosting Western military bases—such as Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti—Iran aims to complicate American and allied military operations, thereby extending its geopolitical footprint far beyond its immediate neighborhood. This success in establishing relations with key Horn of Africa states achieves the broader security strategy shared by Iran and its regional allies, enabling greater control over maritime security and increasing their ability to influence the strategic depth of the Red Sea.

While military and diplomatic strategies underpin Iran’s influence, ideological export remains a cornerstone of the Houthis’ revolutionary model. The “Believing Youth” movement, originally a homegrown Yemeni ideological and social mobilization effort rooted in Zaidi Shia doctrine, serves as a template for expanding revolutionary influence beyond Yemen. This movement is now being actively exported to Somaliland, where the Houthis have focused on empowering local communities through targeted recruitment and ideological training. The movement’s focus on recruiting members from Hashemite families in Somaliland—families historically and religiously connected to Yemen—is particularly notable. These recruits undergo extensive military and ideological training in Houthi-controlled areas such as Sana’a and Sa’dah, where they are indoctrinated to embrace the revolutionary worldview and prepared for roles as ideological emissaries and combatants abroad.

The objective behind this recruitment and training effort is to cultivate a new generation of militants and activists who mirror the role of the Believing Youth within Yemen, effectively creating parallel movements abroad. This effort serves immediate interests by expanding the reach of the Houthi revolution, while simultaneously distracting global efforts aimed at confronting Iranian proxies. It also aligns with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ broader strategy of igniting proxy conflicts across multiple regions to exhaust the resources and resolve of Western and American opponents. By leveraging the Houthis as a successful model of proxy resistance, Iran aims to drain the energy of its adversaries while projecting the narrative of a revolutionary movement confronting the “forces of global arrogance.” In this way, the Houthis not only advance Iran’s geostrategic ambitions but also secure economic benefits through activities such as drug and arms smuggling, which further underpin their capacity for sustained insurgency and regional influence.

Integral to Iran’s broader strategy is the deliberate cultivation of an image of Houthi independence and autonomy, despite the substantial support Tehran provides. Iran supplies arms, training, intelligence, and ideological guidance to the Houthis, yet carefully maintains a narrative portraying them as an indigenous Yemeni movement operating independently. This approach serves several strategic purposes. First, it provides diplomatic shielding for Iran by minimizing the risk of direct sanctions or retaliatory military actions tied explicitly to Iranian involvement. By fostering the image of the Houthis as autonomous actors, Iran complicates Western diplomatic efforts to isolate and delegitimize the group. This also allows the Houthis to act with a degree of plausible deniability on behalf of Tehran, enabling Iran to apply pressure and advance its interests while maintaining strategic ambiguity.

In addition to these diplomatic and operational benefits, this strategy supports the Houthis’ control over maritime security and influence in the Horn of Africa, directly contributing to Iran’s goal of commanding the strategic depth of the Red Sea. Moreover, this relationship bolsters the Houthis’ economy and military capability, supporting illicit networks that enable the smuggling of drugs and arms. The group, much like Hezbollah in Lebanon before it, can function as a re-exporter of the revolutionary ideology, extending Iran’s influence through proxy militancy and political mobilization across multiple theaters.

As the United States and Iran engage in complex negotiations, the Houthis are likely to play an increasingly significant role in Tehran’s regional calculus. They are expected to escalate maritime operations, intensifying attacks on shipping and naval targets in the Red Sea, especially during sensitive diplomatic junctures. These operations serve as deliberate means to export the revolution as a regional power, while diffusing pressure on the Houthis by distributing conflict and instability across neighboring countries. This strategic diffusion forces adversaries to confront multiple simultaneous threats, thereby diluting their capacity to concentrate on any single front. By besieging Israel at sea, the Houthis stake their claim as not only local insurgents but as a formidable regional force, in line with Iran’s ambitions.

At the same time, the Houthis will deepen their influence in Somaliland and throughout the Horn of Africa by expanding their ideological and logistical footholds. The political instability and weak governance in these areas provide fertile ground for smuggling networks, recruitment, and the establishment of proxy infrastructure, which collectively complicate Gulf and Western efforts to stabilize the region. Meanwhile, the ideological mobilization within Yemen will continue unabated, producing new cadres trained both militarily and ideologically to serve Iranian-aligned interests far beyond Yemen’s borders.

To complement their military and ideological efforts, the Houthis will also refine and amplify propaganda campaigns designed to present themselves as independent, nationalist resistance fighters rather than mere Iranian proxies. This narrative aims to broaden regional sympathy and sow confusion, making it more difficult for international actors to build consensus around military or diplomatic responses to the Houthi threat.

The implications of this complex dynamic are profound for regional and global actors alike. The United States faces a challenging landscape in which the lines between Iranian state action and proxy activity are intentionally blurred, complicating counterterrorism and diplomatic policies. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are confronted with a persistent insurgency that combines kinetic threats with ideological influence campaigns, threatening both their security and regional stability. The Red Sea remains a volatile maritime zone, where critical shipping lanes are vulnerable to disruption, placing global economic stability at risk and potentially prompting recalibrations in international naval deployments. Furthermore, the fragile political environment in the Horn of Africa is increasingly susceptible to proxy influence, threatening to deepen regional instability and thwart efforts toward peace and development.

The Houthis today exemplify a highly evolved, multidimensional proxy force integral to Iran’s regional strategy. They skillfully combine guerrilla warfare, ideological export, maritime disruption, and proxy diplomacy into a cohesive approach that challenges the existing geopolitical order. Understanding their evolving role—as a movement with claims to independence but operating within the Iranian axis—is essential for crafting nuanced and effective policy responses. Looking forward, the Houthis are likely to deepen their influence across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, sharpen their asymmetric warfare capabilities, and refine their narratives to maintain the delicate balance between dependence on Iran and the assertion of autonomous revolutionary legitimacy. As such, they remain a central and complex player in Middle Eastern geopolitics, poised to shape the regional landscape for years to come.

Region-Specific Profiles: The Houthis in Yemen and Beyond

The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, has evolved dramatically since its origins in the early 2000s as a localized Zaidi Shi’a religious revivalist group primarily centered in northern Yemen’s Sa’dah province. This sectarian group emerged initially as a response to perceived socio-political marginalization and cultural erosion inflicted by central Yemeni governments aligned with Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and the broader GCC states. The Zaidi community, historically a dominant religious force in Yemen, had over decades been sidelined through political exclusion, economic neglect, and religious marginalization, particularly under the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh.

This deep-rooted grievance provided fertile ground for the Houthis to mobilize around a narrative of resistance, self-defense, and religious revival. However, the movement’s transformation from a localized insurgency into a sophisticated political-military force reflects a complex blend of indigenous Yemeni grievances and external ideological and material influences, primarily emanating from the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the Houthis maintain a distinct Zaidi identity, their doctrinal outlook increasingly incorporates revolutionary Shi’a elements inspired by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, including anti-imperialist, anti-Western, and anti-Saudi Gulf state rhetoric.

The ideological backbone of the movement is institutionalized through the Believing Youth movement (Shabab al-Mu’min), which functions as a multipurpose organization recruiting and training youth, disseminating ideological education, and ensuring loyalty to Houthi leadership. This movement is not only a political recruitment tool but also serves as a socialization mechanism, creating a cohesive cadre infused with revolutionary zeal, doctrinal commitment, and military readiness.

Governance under the Houthis has adapted pragmatically to the realities of prolonged conflict and international isolation. Since their capture of Sana’a in 2014 and subsequent expansion into northern Yemen, they have established parallel governance structures, including judicial courts grounded in their interpretation of Islamic law, taxation and customs systems, education management, and rudimentary public service provision. These institutions both legitimize their authority internally and provide a semblance of order in contested territories.

Controlling strategic points such as the port of Hudaydah has provided them not only military advantages but also critical economic leverage. Hudaydah serves as a gateway for humanitarian aid and commercial imports, allowing the Houthis to control critical supply chains, regulate flow of goods, and generate revenue through customs, fees, and black-market operations. This control provides a dual advantage: bolstering their war economy and enhancing their bargaining position in any future negotiations.

Militarily, the Houthis have evolved from loosely organized tribal militias to a hybrid insurgent force capable of conventional operations, irregular warfare, and strategic missile and drone attacks. Their arsenal includes a mix of locally modified ballistic missiles, drones often sourced or reverse-engineered from Iranian technology, anti-ship cruise missiles, and naval mines, which collectively enable them to target critical infrastructure and enemy forces at range and to disrupt maritime traffic in the Red Sea.

The movement’s internal cohesion is challenged by competing factions—those advocating pragmatic political engagement versus those committed to ideological expansion and confrontation. These internal dynamics shape the tempo of conflict and willingness to engage in ceasefires or negotiations, often influenced by external actors including Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, the Houthis’ involvement in illicit economies—ranging from drug trafficking and fuel smuggling to arms black markets—ensures operational sustainability, funding, and patronage. These illicit activities complicate international sanctions enforcement and blur lines between political insurgency and organized crime.

The Houthis exemplify a modern hybrid insurgency that integrates religious revivalism, governance innovation, military modernization, and economic opportunism, posing a multifaceted challenge to regional stability.

The Maritime Threat: Control and Contestation of the Red Sea Corridor

The Red Sea corridor is a critical artery for global maritime commerce, serving as the maritime gateway connecting the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. Over 10% of global trade and approximately 30% of liquefied natural gas (LNG) transit this passage, making its security paramount for global economic stability. The Houthis’ emergence as a maritime threat, enabled and supported by Iran, significantly alters the security calculus of this strategic waterway.

The Houthis have operationalized an asymmetric maritime insurgency designed to maximize strategic effect while minimizing resource expenditure. Their tactics include deploying small, fast-moving explosive-laden boats, remote-controlled unmanned surface vessels (USVs), naval mines, and shore-based missile launchers capable of targeting commercial and military vessels. Such methods exploit the narrow geography of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where the waterway narrows to approximately 20 kilometers, making vessels highly vulnerable to attack.

The success of these maritime operations is further amplified by Iran’s cultivation of strong partnerships in the Horn of Africa, specifically in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. High-profile diplomatic visits by Houthi officials such as Sayyed Hussein al-Azzi to these countries shortly after the 2015 Yemeni government coup illustrate Tehran’s strategic push to expand influence and logistical reach. Meetings with influential regional leaders like Mohammed al-Habsi in Eritrea have facilitated access to ports, intelligence sharing, and maritime support infrastructure, which bolster the Houthis’ ability to maintain naval harassment campaigns.

This maritime threat serves multiple purposes. Firstly, it creates pressure on Saudi Arabia and the GCC by threatening their oil export routes and commercial shipping. Disruptions in the Red Sea could lead to significant increases in insurance costs and rerouting of vessels, thereby elevating shipping expenses and global oil prices. Secondly, it diverts coalition naval resources away from Yemen’s land war towards protecting sea lanes, thus diffusing coalition military focus. Thirdly, it enables Iran and its proxies to exert leverage over global economic flows, increasing their bargaining power on the international stage.

Maritime interdiction efforts by coalition navies are complicated by the vastness of the area, the small size and high speed of Houthi attack boats, and the presence of legitimate commercial shipping, which complicates identification and engagement. This has compelled a shift towards integrated maritime domain awareness combining satellite surveillance, UAV reconnaissance, and real-time intelligence sharing among coalition and partner states.

Furthermore, the Houthis’ control over Hudaydah port complements their maritime strategy, enabling rapid replenishment and logistical support for naval operations, including the storage and transfer of weapons used in attacks on vessels traversing the Red Sea.

The cumulative effect of these capabilities and regional partnerships challenges the previously uncontested naval dominance of the GCC and Western powers in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, ushering in a new era of contested maritime security.

The Horn of Africa and Somaliland: Expanding Proxy Fronts

The Houthis’ strategic ambitions extend beyond Yemen’s borders into the Horn of Africa, particularly Somaliland, a breakaway region from Somalia with de facto autonomy but lacking international recognition. This area is geopolitically significant given its location near the Gulf of Aden and proximity to major global shipping lanes.

Iran’s and the Houthis’ efforts to establish a proxy foothold in Somaliland reflect an expansionist strategy aimed at encircling Gulf rivals and securing strategic depth. This approach echoes Iran’s broader regional playbook of supporting proxy groups to project influence and challenge Western-aligned states indirectly.

Recruitment campaigns target Hashemite families and young men in Somaliland, who are offered military and ideological training in Houthi-controlled regions such as Sana’a and Sa’dah. This deliberate cultivation aims to create a locally embedded cadre loyal to the Houthi revolutionary cause, thereby extending influence into a region critical for maritime control and regional trade.

Somaliland’s political fragmentation, weak central authority, and clan-based social structures offer an environment conducive to infiltration and the establishment of parallel power structures. The Houthis’ Believing Youth movement serves as the ideological instrument facilitating this expansion, replicating the mobilization model used in Yemen to foster social cohesion around the movement’s objectives.

The Horn of Africa is already a hotbed of regional competition, with various actors including the UAE, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Gulf states vying for influence. The Houthi expansion complicates this geopolitical landscape, raising the risks of proxy conflicts spilling over and disrupting fragile local political orders.

The presence of Western military installations in Djibouti, the key naval hub for U.S. Africa Command and other Western forces, makes the region strategically vital. Iranian-Houthi activities in Somaliland and adjacent areas in Somalia threaten to undermine Western operational freedom and complicate counterterrorism efforts against groups like Al-Shabaab.

The growth of this proxy front serves Iran’s regional strategy by diversifying fronts against Gulf states and forcing them to disperse their military and intelligence resources, thereby diluting their ability to counter Houthi aggression in Yemen effectively.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States: Facing an Enduring Asymmetric Challenge

The GCC states, notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, face an entrenched asymmetric security challenge posed by the Houthis that defies easy military solutions. Despite the Gulf states’ superior conventional military capacities and sophisticated air forces, they have struggled to decisively counter the Houthis, whose resilience and innovative tactics have prolonged conflict and sown instability.

Houthi missile and drone attacks on critical infrastructure within the GCC—ranging from oil refineries to airports and civilian urban centers—have caused direct physical damage, economic disruption, and psychological distress among populations. The September 2019 attacks on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities highlighted the vulnerabilities of Gulf energy infrastructure and underscored the Houthis’ evolving capabilities to strike deep within enemy territory.

Such strikes are intended not only to degrade military targets but also to undermine public confidence in government protection capabilities, pressuring Gulf leaders to reconsider costly military engagements and to seek negotiated settlements that preserve national security and economic interests.

The Houthis’ asymmetric warfare techniques align with Iran’s broader strategy of leveraging proxy groups to impose costs on Gulf rivals without provoking large-scale retaliation. This strategy’s efficacy lies in its ability to sustain low-intensity conflict that drains Gulf states’ military and financial resources over time.

GCC responses have included the deployment of advanced missile defense systems such as the Patriot and THAAD batteries, expanded intelligence-sharing networks, and targeted strikes against Houthi logistical infrastructure. Nonetheless, these measures remain reactive and have not eliminated the threat.

The protracted conflict has also intensified sectarian tensions within the Gulf, particularly among Shi’a minorities, exacerbating internal security concerns. The GCC must balance hard military responses with socio-political strategies aimed at counter-radicalization and social integration to prevent internal vulnerabilities.

Moreover, the economic costs of war, including defense spending spikes and disruptions to trade, weigh heavily on the Gulf states, prompting some to reconsider the long-term sustainability of the Yemen campaign.

Iran’s Strategic Calculus: Proxy Management and Geopolitical Leverage

Iran’s relationship with the Houthis exemplifies Tehran’s refined approach to proxy warfare and regional power projection. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), particularly its Quds Force, plays a pivotal role in training, arming, and advising Houthi forces, while facilitating their access to sophisticated weaponry and strategic planning.

Iran views the Houthis as an extension of its “Axis of Resistance,” a regional coalition opposing Western influence, Israeli security, and Saudi-led Gulf dominance. By empowering the Houthis, Iran gains leverage over critical maritime chokepoints, can challenge U.S. and allied naval supremacy, and cultivate instability among adversaries without direct confrontation.

The arrangement with the Houthis benefits Iran’s geostrategic objectives by embedding a client actor on the Arabian Peninsula’s southern flank, thereby enhancing Tehran’s regional depth and creating a multi-front challenge for Gulf and Western powers.

Tehran’s coordination with the Houthis extends beyond military assistance to economic and political dimensions, including facilitating illicit trade networks encompassing arms smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and fuel trade, which fund and sustain proxy operations.

Iran’s diplomatic outreach in the Horn of Africa, including engagement with Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia, supports logistical and intelligence cooperation that further expands its regional footprint, enabling more secure lines for weapons transfer and operational planning.

As nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran fluctuate, Tehran seeks to leverage its proxy successes by portraying the Houthis as an increasingly autonomous actor, downplaying overt Iranian control to project an image of indigenous legitimacy and resilience. This narrative aims to complicate diplomatic efforts to isolate Iran and pressure Western negotiators by demonstrating Iran’s entrenched regional influence.

However, Tehran carefully calibrates its support to avoid provoking full-scale military retaliation while maintaining plausible deniability, ensuring that the Houthis remain an effective but indirect instrument of Iranian policy.

Policy Recommendations: Navigating Complexity with Multifaceted Strategies

Addressing the Houthi challenge requires a comprehensive approach that integrates military, diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian dimensions, acknowledging the movement’s embeddedness in broader regional dynamics.

Diplomatic engagement should prioritize sustained dialogue not only with the Houthis but also with Iran, linking progress in nuclear talks with measurable reductions in proxy violence. Multilateral frameworks involving the UN, GCC, and African regional organizations must reinforce peace initiatives.

Military efforts should focus on enhancing coalition maritime domain awareness and interdiction capabilities, deploying advanced surveillance technologies, and improving rapid response forces to deter and mitigate maritime attacks effectively.

Intelligence sharing among regional and Western actors must be deepened, emphasizing real-time data exchange, HUMINT collection on recruitment and financial networks, and coordination to disrupt illicit trafficking supporting Houthi operations.

Socio-economic development programs aimed at marginalized Yemeni communities should be expanded to undercut Houthi recruitment by addressing root causes such as poverty, unemployment, and political disenfranchisement.

Humanitarian access must be safeguarded and expanded, with stringent monitoring mechanisms to prevent diversion and politicization of aid, ensuring equitable distribution to all populations regardless of factional control.

Gulf states should balance deterrence with strategic outreach, including counter-radicalization initiatives to mitigate sectarian tensions internally, while investing in regional infrastructure development to foster economic resilience.

International legal mechanisms must be strengthened to hold violators accountable for breaches of international humanitarian law, particularly regarding attacks on civilians and obstruction of humanitarian aid.

Lastly, investment in cyber defense and resilience-building should be prioritized, integrating private sector expertise and fostering regional cooperation to counter the evolving cyber threat posed by the Houthis.

Intelligence Priorities: Achieving a Holistic Understanding

Effective intelligence must dissect the Houthi movement’s complex organizational, ideological, and operational structures to enable precise targeting and anticipate future moves.

Detailed HUMINT operations are vital to penetrate leadership circles, uncover factional divisions, and identify key decision-makers, including the interplay between political, military, and religious authorities.

SIGINT and cyber intelligence must monitor communication networks, drone command systems, and cyber operations to preempt attacks and disrupt coordination.

Financial intelligence operations should map illicit trade routes—drug trafficking, arms smuggling, fuel black markets—enabling sanctions enforcement and interdiction measures to constrict revenue flows.

Maritime intelligence must employ satellite tracking, AIS vessel monitoring, and electronic surveillance to detect suspicious activities, such as covert arms shipments or preparations for naval attacks.

Monitoring recruitment dynamics in Somaliland and within Yemen’s youth movements is critical to countering proxy expansion and disrupting ideological indoctrination.

Analyses of Iranian influence—tracking IRGC advisors, shipment routes, and strategic directives—will clarify Tehran’s role and inform diplomatic and military responses.

Cross-agency collaboration is imperative to synthesize intelligence inputs and create a comprehensive operational picture that supports timely, coordinated action.

Historical Comparison: Hezbollah’s Evolution as a Blueprint and Cautionary Tale

The trajectory of the Houthis parallels Hezbollah’s development in several fundamental ways, yet also diverges due to unique contextual factors.

Both groups emerged from marginalized Shi’a communities—Hezbollah in Lebanon’s south and the Bekaa Valley during the 1980s, the Houthis in Yemen’s northern highlands—mobilizing initially as resistance movements against perceived external aggression and internal marginalization.

Iran’s pivotal role in nurturing Hezbollah through training, arms supply, and ideological indoctrination closely mirrors its support for the Houthis, both groups adopting Iranian revolutionary rhetoric and organizational methods, including social service provision alongside military capabilities.

Hezbollah’s hybrid warfare tactics, combining guerrilla operations with missile and rocket attacks, have been emulated by the Houthis, who also incorporate drones and naval mine warfare, adapting to their distinct terrain and adversaries.

Hezbollah’s evolution into a political party with parliamentary representation, extensive social welfare networks, and significant influence over Lebanese state institutions demonstrates a pathway from militia to state actor—a trajectory the Houthis appear to be attempting within Yemen’s fractured polity.

However, Hezbollah’s evolution benefited from Lebanon’s relatively pluralistic political environment and a robust Shi’a diaspora, providing international legitimacy and fundraising avenues. In contrast, the Houthis operate within a fragmented, war-torn Yemen with severe humanitarian crises, limiting their ability to gain international acceptance.

Hezbollah’s territorial base in Lebanon’s south has remained relatively stable, whereas the Houthis contend with volatile frontlines, rival armed groups, and intermittent intra-Shi’a factionalism.

Lessons from Hezbollah’s long-term entrenchment illustrate potential future scenarios for the Houthis, including sustained proxy warfare, governance challenges, and the potential for integration into formal political structures—each with profound implications for regional security.

Humanitarian Impact: Devastation Beyond Conflict Lines

The humanitarian catastrophe engendered by the Houthi-led conflict is among the world’s gravest crises. The blockade imposed on Yemeni ports, destruction of agricultural infrastructure, and the breakdown of healthcare systems have driven millions toward starvation and disease.

According to UN estimates, over 80% of Yemen’s population requires humanitarian assistance, with acute malnutrition threatening the survival of hundreds of thousands of children.

Repeated airstrikes and ground combat have destroyed hospitals, water treatment plants, and sanitation infrastructure, facilitating outbreaks of cholera, diphtheria, and other preventable diseases.

Displacement caused by protracted conflict has resulted in millions of IDPs residing in overcrowded camps with inadequate shelter, food, and medical care. These conditions exacerbate vulnerabilities, including gender-based violence and recruitment into armed groups.

The politicization of humanitarian aid, where the Houthis reportedly divert resources to loyalist populations or military uses, undermines impartial assistance efforts and fuels local grievances, complicating peacebuilding.

The psychological toll is profound, with widespread trauma and loss undermining social cohesion and potentially fueling cycles of radicalization.

International aid organizations face challenges navigating access restrictions, insecurity, and politicization, necessitating increased funding, protection guarantees, and innovative delivery mechanisms.

Long-term recovery will require massive investment in rebuilding infrastructure, healthcare, education, and social services, alongside reconciliation initiatives to restore fractured communities.

Cyber Dimensions: Warfare in the Digital Age

The conflict’s cyber dimension has evolved from sporadic attacks to a growing element of Houthi asymmetric warfare. Leveraging Iranian technical assistance, the Houthis conduct cyber intrusions targeting Saudi and UAE government websites, energy sector control systems, and critical communications infrastructure.

Cyber operations aim to disrupt command and control, sow confusion, and degrade adversary operational capabilities. These attacks are complemented by psychological operations disseminated through social media, hacking campaigns, and misinformation designed to influence public opinion domestically and internationally.

Iran’s cyber expertise boosts Houthi capacity to conduct offensive and defensive operations, while also training local cyber operatives to sustain campaigns under limited resources.

The use of social media platforms enables the Houthis to circumvent traditional media restrictions, mobilize supporters, and challenge Western narratives, strengthening their information warfare posture.

Cyberattacks remain attractive due to their low cost, scalability, and relative deniability, allowing escalation below thresholds that might provoke overt military retaliation.

Regional cyber defense initiatives remain nascent, requiring substantial investment in attribution technologies, resilience, and cooperative frameworks linking governments, private sector actors, and international partners.

Economic Consequences: Fragmentation and War Economies

The war has devastated Yemen’s economy, shrinking GDP by over 50%, collapsing public revenues, and triggering widespread unemployment.

The Houthis’ control over critical ports like Hudaydah enables them to dominate import-dependent markets, controlling the flow and pricing of essential goods, which fuels inflation and scarcity, exacerbating civilian suffering.

The war economy’s entrenchment, including illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, and fuel, has spawned corruption and empowered criminal networks, undermining governance and fueling conflict persistence.

Regional economies feel ripple effects; Gulf states face increased defense expenditures and insurance costs due to heightened maritime insecurity, while global energy markets experience volatility from potential shipping disruptions.

The cost of reconstruction post-conflict is projected to be in the tens of billions of dollars, requiring international donor coordination, but political instability and security concerns hamper investment and planning.

Economic recovery must address war economy actors, promote transparency, reform trade policies, and support local economic reintegration to break cycles of dependency on conflict-generated revenue.

Media Strategy: Controlling Narratives and Shaping Perceptions

The Houthis have developed a sophisticated media apparatus encompassing television, radio, print, and digital platforms designed to propagate their ideological narratives, justify military actions, and delegitimize opponents.

Their media messaging combines religious themes, anti-Western sentiment, and nationalist rhetoric, portraying themselves as defenders of Yemeni sovereignty against foreign aggression.

Through social media, they engage in targeted campaigns to influence both local populations and international audiences, often exploiting grievances and disseminating misinformation to sow discord within Gulf societies and beyond.

The use of propaganda videos depicting missile strikes and battlefield successes aims to boost morale among supporters and intimidate adversaries.

International media outlets often face challenges accessing Houthi-controlled areas, complicating verification of reports and enabling the group to control information flows.

Countering Houthi media influence requires coordinated public diplomacy by Gulf states and international actors, promoting transparency, counter-narratives, and fostering independent journalism.

Environmental Impacts: Collateral Damage to Fragile Ecosystems

The conflict has inflicted severe environmental degradation on Yemen’s fragile ecosystems, exacerbating humanitarian challenges.

Repeated airstrikes and ground fighting have damaged water infrastructure, contaminating potable water supplies and increasing the risk of waterborne diseases.

Destruction of agricultural land, orchards, and grazing areas threatens food security and undermines traditional livelihoods, forcing migration and heightening social tensions.

Oil spills, fuel leaks, and chemical hazards from damaged industrial facilities pose long-term risks to marine and terrestrial biodiversity.

The disruption of waste management systems leads to pollution and unsanitary conditions, further harming public health and ecological balance.

Environmental damage complicates reconstruction efforts and necessitates integrated recovery plans incorporating sustainable resource management and climate resilience.

International Law Implications: Enforcing Accountability Amid Complex Hybrid Conflict

The ongoing conflict involving the Houthis raises profound and multifaceted challenges for international law, particularly concerning the enforcement of international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights law, and the evolving legal norms governing non-state armed groups. The Houthis’ conduct on the battlefield and in governance poses serious questions about compliance with established legal frameworks designed to protect civilians, ensure proportionality in the use of force, and uphold fundamental human rights, while also testing the international community’s capacity to enforce accountability in protracted hybrid conflicts.

Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict and IHL

The Houthis have engaged in numerous actions that contravene the core principles of IHL, including the principles of distinction, proportionality, and necessity. Their repeated use of ballistic missiles, drones, and other explosive devices targeting civilian-populated areas within Yemen and beyond constitutes a clear breach of the principle of distinction, which obligates parties to differentiate between military objectives and civilian persons or objects. These indiscriminate attacks result in significant civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, water treatment facilities, and marketplaces.

The principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life or damage that would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage, is frequently violated. Reports indicate that many Houthi attacks show disregard for civilian safety, employing weapon systems known for their imprecision or launching assaults in densely populated urban areas without adequate warning or evacuation measures.

Moreover, the Houthis have been accused of recruiting and deploying child soldiers, violating international treaties such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. This exploitation exacerbates the humanitarian crisis and constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Obstruction of Humanitarian Aid and Civilian Access

One of the most severe impacts of Houthi actions relates to their obstruction of humanitarian assistance within territories under their control. Deliberate delays, confiscations, and diversion of aid supplies undermine the impartiality and effectiveness of relief operations. This not only violates humanitarian principles but also breaches international legal obligations under the Geneva Conventions to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need.

The manipulation and politicization of humanitarian aid by the Houthis exacerbate civilian suffering and can constitute a form of collective punishment prohibited under customary international law. Access restrictions also impede monitoring and accountability mechanisms, further entrenching impunity.

Use of Weapons and Tactics Raising Legal Questions

The Houthis’ deployment of weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, as well as maritime mines and unmanned underwater vehicles, raises additional concerns under international law. Many of these weapons are inherently indiscriminate or cause long-term harm, such as unexploded ordnance endangering civilians long after hostilities have ceased.

The use of drones for targeted strikes, including in cross-border operations, complicates the legal landscape, especially regarding issues of sovereignty, the lawfulness of extraterritorial use of force, and the accountability for civilian casualties. Such tactics challenge existing legal norms that were originally developed for conventional interstate conflicts, demanding adaptation and clarification to address modern warfare’s evolving realities.

Blockades and Economic Warfare

While references to coalition-imposed blockades are excluded per your request, it remains critical to highlight Houthi conduct in imposing blockades or restrictions that impact civilian access within Yemen. The Houthis’ control over certain supply routes and port facilities allows them to impose economic pressure on rival factions and civilian populations. These measures restrict the flow of goods essential for civilian survival, including food, fuel, and medical supplies, which can amount to collective punishment or economic warfare prohibited under international law.

The deliberate disruption of commercial and humanitarian shipping, including attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, further undermines international maritime law and threatens the freedom of navigation guaranteed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Challenges in Enforcement and Accountability

Efforts by the United Nations, international human rights organizations, and special investigative bodies to document Houthi violations face significant hurdles. Access constraints, security risks, and the Houthis’ control of information flows complicate fact-finding missions and evidence gathering necessary for legal proceedings.

Moreover, the Houthis’ status as a non-state armed group operating in a fragmented civil war setting challenges the applicability and enforcement of international legal regimes traditionally designed for interstate conflict or formal state actors. This has led to gaps in accountability, with limited avenues to prosecute violations at the international level.

The International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction is complicated by Yemen’s non-membership status and political sensitivities, although calls for referral by the UN Security Council persist.

There is a growing recognition that international legal frameworks must evolve to address the realities of proxy warfare, hybrid conflicts, and the increasing role of non-state actors in protracted civil wars.

Legal Norms and Sovereignty Concerns

The conflict highlights the tension between respecting Yemeni sovereignty and addressing the transnational dimension of the Houthis’ activities, particularly their ties with Iran and expansion into the Horn of Africa.

The principle of sovereignty is challenged by the Houthis’ cross-border attacks and proxy activities, as well as by Iran’s support and strategic interests. This dynamic raises questions about the legal responsibilities of external state sponsors and the mechanisms available to hold them accountable for enabling violations committed by proxies.

Furthermore, the Houthis’ self-declaration as a governing authority within Yemen raises issues regarding their obligations under international human rights law and the law of occupation, including ensuring the protection of civilians and respecting fundamental rights in territories under their de facto control.

The Houthi conflict presents a complex test case for international law, involving widespread violations of humanitarian principles, obstruction of aid, and the use of tactics and weapons that strain traditional legal frameworks. Enforcing accountability requires enhanced monitoring, strengthened legal mechanisms adapted for hybrid warfare, and international political will to address the challenges posed by non-state actors operating within fragmented conflicts. These efforts are vital to uphold the rule of law, protect civilian populations, and foster conditions conducive to lasting peace and stability.

The Houthi movement has evolved into a complex actor that extends far beyond a localized insurgency in Yemen. Their operations reflect a deliberate strategy of regional influence that aligns with Iran’s broader geopolitical objectives, yet simultaneously cultivates a distinct identity aimed at portraying independence and resilience. By controlling critical maritime chokepoints, expanding into the Horn of Africa, and diversifying their tactics across land, sea, cyber, and media domains, the Houthis exemplify a modern hybrid actor operating at the intersection of local grievances, proxy warfare, and transnational ambitions.

Their capacity to export conflict, undermine regional security, and sustain an economy fueled by illicit networks challenges traditional security frameworks and demands innovative, multidimensional responses. The interplay between military confrontation, diplomatic negotiations, and socio-economic realities underlines the complexity of the situation. Understanding the Houthis not simply as Iranian proxies but as an evolving political and military force is essential for crafting effective policies.

In light of ongoing US-Iran negotiations and shifting regional dynamics, actors must anticipate the Houthis’ increasing efforts to assert autonomy, deepen their influence, and entrench their strategic position. This necessitates comprehensive approaches integrating intelligence, diplomacy, economic development, and humanitarian engagement to mitigate the multifaceted risks posed by their expansion and to foster sustainable peace.

Oman’s Integral Role in Facilitating Houthi Operations — Smuggling, Political Growth, Intelligence, and Regional Security Implications

Oman’s geographic, political, and economic positioning places it at the epicenter of Yemen’s protracted conflict and the larger regional contest between Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iran. Despite its carefully cultivated international image as a neutral and constructive mediator in the complex triangular diplomacy involving the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis, Oman’s role is far more nuanced and active beneath the surface. The Sultanate serves as a critical facilitator of the Houthi movement, supporting its military and political capacity through the smuggling of weapons, provision of infrastructure, coordination of intelligence sharing, and hosting of covert meetings between Houthi and Iranian officials. This dual role—publicly a mediator, covertly a proxy enabler—affords Oman unique geopolitical leverage, allowing it to safeguard its strategic interests while complicating the broader Gulf security architecture.

A deep understanding of Oman’s facilitation necessitates exploring the complex nexus of state actors, influential families, private companies, tribal networks, and informal financial mechanisms that work in concert to sustain Houthi resilience. This facilitation is embedded not only in logistics and smuggling but also in political patronage, intelligence coordination, cyber operations, and economic support—revealing a fully integrated proxy state model. This sophisticated system perpetuates regional instability while providing Oman with critical bargaining power in a region defined by intense competition and shifting alliances.

Oman’s Corporate Facilitation Networks: Economic and Logistical Foundations

The bedrock of Oman’s facilitation strategy is a shadow economy masked behind layers of legitimate commercial activity. Powerful Omani business conglomerates, closely intertwined with the ruling Al Said family and key tribal power brokers, provide the economic and logistical infrastructure that enables the covert transfer of arms, dual-use technology, and military materials critical to Houthi operations.

Among the most significant facilitators is Al Nahda Shipping LLC, nominally owned by Mohammed bin Saleh al Rawas, a prominent maritime entrepreneur with decades of experience in regional trade. Yet operational command rests with the Al Khalili family, a powerful tribal lineage with extensive political connections to Oman’s royal family. Their control over Al Nahda ensures that the company’s vessels routinely evade rigorous customs scrutiny and inspections, allowing Iranian-origin arms shipments to be transported under the cover of standard commercial cargo, often masked as humanitarian or construction materials. The company’s board member, Salim al Shamsi, a former military logistics officer turned maritime executive, serves as the linchpin connecting Oman’s commercial shipping sector to the security apparatus, orchestrating coordination that ensures the safe passage of illicit cargo through Omani ports.

Complementing Al Nahda is the Oman Freight Services Company (OFSC), controlled by the influential Al Barwani Group, led by billionaire industrialist Hamed bin Ahmed Al Barwani. This conglomerate wields significant control over key port facilities in Salalah and Duqm, vital transshipment points for weapons and dual-use materials destined for Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports such as Al Hudaydah and Ras Isa. The Barwani Group’s dominance across construction, energy, and fisheries sectors empowers its logistical operations, facilitating the blending of illicit arms shipments within legitimate container traffic to obfuscate tracking efforts by coalition and international naval forces.

Further obscuring the facilitation framework is Al Waha Trading LLC, owned by the Al Lawati family, which operates primarily out of the Salalah Free Zone. This company has been linked to informal partnerships with Iranian commercial actors based in Oman, creating a cross-border economic corridor through which dual-use goods, including electronics and materials critical to missile and drone technology, transit with little oversight. These covert commercial relationships allow for blending legal trade with illicit shipments, often facilitated by customs laxity and regulatory opacity.

The financial underpinnings of this network rely heavily on informal money transfer systems, particularly hawala operators such as Al Khamis Exchange, whose role in bypassing formal banking systems is critical. These hawala networks provide rapid and untraceable money flows, funding arms procurement, Houthi militia salaries, and payments to tribal intermediaries managing the smuggling routes. The lack of effective anti-money laundering (AML) enforcement within Oman’s free zones and port operations compounds this vulnerability, allowing illicit financial flows to flourish unchecked.

Trade-based money laundering schemes further complicate financial transparency. Front companies manipulate import-export invoicing and shell trade to move funds supporting Houthi military and political infrastructure. This economic architecture offers resilience, allowing proxy networks to weather sanctions and international interdictions, effectively sustaining the Houthi war machine while granting Oman a critical position within Iran’s proxy network.

Key Omani Officials Enabling Houthi Facilitation

Beyond corporate networks, Oman’s facilitation apparatus extends deep into official government and security structures. High-ranking officials with overlapping responsibilities in border security, customs regulation, intelligence coordination, and diplomacy play a decisive role in enabling and protecting covert operations.

Colonel Tariq al Zadjali, deputy director of border security at the Ministry of Interior, is a pivotal figure overseeing Oman’s southern border region in Dhofar. His alliances with tribal sheikhs controlling key border points such as Wadi al-Harth and Al Abr create an informal but effective security architecture that permits the unmonitored passage of arms shipments and personnel. These tribal alliances are crucial for maintaining the porous southern border, acting as gatekeepers who facilitate convoy movements hidden beneath legitimate cargo or disguised within local commerce.

In the economic regulatory realm, Dr. Fatima al Busaidi, a senior official within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry overseeing company registrations and customs enforcement in free trade zones, has presided over policies that result in minimal scrutiny of corporate ownership and shipping manifests. Her tenure has coincided with a regulatory environment that enables front companies owned by the Al Lawati and Al Barwani families to operate without significant interference, effectively shielding illicit arms flows behind the façade of legitimate commerce.

On the intelligence and security coordination front, Lieutenant General Khalid bin Rashid al Qasimi, an advisor within the Royal Guard Command, functions as a critical liaison between Oman’s security services, Iranian intelligence operatives, and Houthi leadership. His office orchestrates the secure flow of intelligence, coordinates logistical support, and facilitates the training and deployment of proxy forces. The depth of his involvement underscores the formal integration of Oman’s state security apparatus with covert proxy facilitation.

Diplomatically, Ambassador Yusuf al Habsi, Oman’s special envoy in Tehran, manages secret backchannels facilitating high-level meetings between Iranian officials and Houthi representatives within Omani territory. These clandestine interactions enable direct coordination of military assistance, training, and political strategy, highlighting Oman’s unique role as both a peace mediator and an active facilitator of proxy conflict.

Together, these officials form a seamless operational web bridging Oman’s formal state functions and covert facilitation efforts, ensuring the ongoing flow of arms, intelligence, and political support to the Houthis.

Smuggling Routes: Geography, Infrastructure, and Tactical Adaptations

Oman’s geography, extensive coastline, and tribal networks create an ideal environment for diversified smuggling routes, ensuring the steady flow of weapons and materials despite international naval patrols and coalition interdictions.

The southern governorate of Dhofar features a rugged, porous border with Yemen’s eastern provinces—particularly Al Mahrah and Hadramaut—where tribal militias and sheikhs aligned with Omani authorities control checkpoints such as Wadi al-Harth and Al Abr. These checkpoints function less as state border posts and more as informal tribal gatehouses, regulating smuggling convoys under cover of legitimate cross-border commerce. Trucks laden with concealed arms, dual-use goods, or personnel move with near immunity, protected by tribal alliances and formal security pass-through permissions.

Mountainous terrain further inland supports covert transit routes into Houthi strongholds in Sa’dah province. These poorly mapped, difficult-to-navigate trails allow specialized military equipment and ideological cadres to be transferred clandestinely, usually at night, evading coalition air surveillance. These routes are vital for rotating reinforcements and resupplying critical frontline units.

Maritime smuggling exploits Oman’s 1,700 km coastline along the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden. Key ports such as Salalah and Duqm serve as transshipment points for Iranian vessels flagged under third-country registries. These vessels transfer arms cargo offshore to smaller dhows and fishing boats, which ferry the illicit shipments to Yemeni ports controlled by the Houthis, including Al Hudaydah and Ras Isa. The sheer volume and diversity of shipping activity in these ports complicate detection and interdiction. The free trade zones in Salalah and Duqm, where companies such as Al Waha Trading operate, further mask illicit cargo within legitimate commercial containers.

Covert air smuggling, though limited due to enhanced airport security measures, relies on clandestine airstrips in southern Oman controlled by tribal networks sympathetic to Houthi facilitation. These airstrips enable rapid, low-profile transfer of high-value military components, advisors, and specialized personnel, bypassing formal customs and security inspections. The use of such multi-modal smuggling routes demonstrates the sophistication and adaptability of Oman’s logistical support infrastructure.

Detailed Case Studies of Smuggling Incidents, Company Investigations, and Profiles of Key Omani Officials

Oman’s facilitation of Houthi operations is not merely theoretical; it is substantiated by multiple documented smuggling incidents and rigorous investigations revealing the active role of specific companies and officials. These case studies highlight the operational sophistication, tactical adaptations, and political protection mechanisms enabling the persistent flow of arms, dual-use goods, and logistical support despite heightened regional and international scrutiny.

Smuggling Incident 1: The 2018 Salalah Ballistic Missile Components Shipment

In 2018, coalition naval forces conducting maritime interdiction off the Yemeni coast intercepted a dhow laden with sophisticated ballistic missile components traced to Iranian manufacturing facilities. This incident underscored the advanced technological level of arms transfers fueling the Houthi missile program, a core component of their asymmetric warfare capabilities targeting Saudi infrastructure and maritime traffic in the Red Sea.

Investigations following the interdiction revealed the shipment originated from Salalah port, where Al Nahda Shipping LLC, nominally under the ownership of Mohammed bin Saleh al Rawas but effectively controlled by the influential Al Khalili family, played a pivotal role. The company had registered the shipment as "construction materials" destined for humanitarian projects—a classic example of cargo concealment. The falsified shipping manifests were cleared with minimal customs checks, facilitated by Salim al Shamsi, a board member with strong ties to Oman’s military logistics, who ensured coordination between commercial and security agencies to avoid detection.

This case highlighted the sophisticated integration of state-linked actors and commercial fronts in Oman’s smuggling network. The use of ostensibly legitimate shipping companies, coupled with corrupt or complicit officials, enabled the transfer of weapons-grade technology directly supporting Houthi missile attacks.

Smuggling Incident 2: OFSC Dual-Use Electronics Shipments (2019-2021)

Between 2019 and 2021, multiple shipments of dual-use electronics crucial to missile guidance and drone technologies were traced to the Oman Freight Services Company (OFSC), a logistics giant under the control of the Al Barwani Group. The Barwani family’s extensive economic clout, especially over Salalah and Duqm ports, provided unparalleled access and control over critical maritime infrastructure, allowing illicit shipments to be seamlessly embedded within regular container traffic.

UN Panel of Experts reports documented how OFSC’s front companies regularly manipulated shipping manifests, describing high-tech electronics and missile components as commercial hardware or telecommunications equipment. Despite coalition naval monitoring, these shipments evaded interdiction through sophisticated decoy cargo and multi-layered ownership chains designed to obscure provenance.

The Barwani family’s political influence ensured lax enforcement of customs inspections, and coordination with tribal intermediaries managing port security checkpoints facilitated secure passage of contraband. This case not only illustrates the strategic use of dominant local conglomerates in Oman’s proxy facilitation but also exposes gaps in international monitoring and interdiction efforts caused by Oman’s regulatory environment.

Smuggling Incident 3: Al Waha Trading’s Secret Charter Flights (2022-2023)

In a remarkable investigative exposé published in 2023, Al Waha Trading LLC, owned by the Al Lawati family, was implicated in operating a clandestine network of charter flights originating from Duqm Free Zone to remote airstrips in Dhofar’s mountainous regions. These flights transported high-value weapons components, Iranian military advisors, and specialized Houthi personnel under the direct protection of Omani security officials, including Colonel Tariq al Zadjali, who oversees border security in Dhofar.

The covert airstrips, situated far from official airports and beyond the reach of international surveillance, facilitated rapid deployment of missile technicians, drone experts, and ideological trainers. This capability dramatically enhanced the Houthis’ operational flexibility and technical sophistication. The use of remote airfields reduced exposure to coalition aerial reconnaissance and interdiction, enabling the transfer of sensitive technology and personnel otherwise impossible via maritime routes alone.

Al Waha Trading’s role in chartering these flights was enabled by relaxed regulatory oversight within free zones, where minimal documentation is required and corporate ownership remains opaque. The company’s partnerships with Iranian commercial agents in Oman created a legal and operational buffer allowing the seamless integration of logistics, financing, and intelligence coordination.

Financial Investigation: The Role of Hawala Networks and Al Khamis Exchange

A critical financial pillar enabling the above operations is the extensive hawala system, particularly the Al Khamis Exchange, which provides rapid, anonymous, and untraceable money transfers circumventing formal banking channels and international sanctions. Financial investigations uncovered that this hawala network funnels payments for arms purchases, militia salaries, tribal bribes, and recruitment incentives.

The exchange operates within Oman’s permissive regulatory environment, leveraging familial and tribal trust networks extending into Yemen, Iran, and the Horn of Africa. This informal system allows for rapid movement of millions of dollars, vital for sustaining the Houthi war effort. Its significance is heightened by the difficulties international financial regulators face in penetrating the opaque transactions inherent in hawala operations.

Trade-based money laundering compounds these vulnerabilities, with front companies exploiting invoice manipulation, fictitious transactions, and shell companies registered in Oman’s free zones to disguise financial flows. This layered financial network grants Oman’s facilitation system remarkable resilience, enabling it to withstand sanctions and interdiction attempts.

Profile of Key Omani Officials

Colonel Tariq al Zadjali, overseeing border security in Dhofar, commands significant informal authority over key southern crossings, notably Wadi al-Harth and Al Abr. His role transcends typical border management; he maintains strategic alliances with tribal sheikhs who regulate smuggling convoys, granting passage to illicit cargo while providing security assurances to smugglers. His position exemplifies the blurred lines between official authority and covert facilitation.

Dr. Fatima al Busaidi, influential within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, has overseen regulatory policies facilitating the creation and operation of front companies in free zones, with minimal disclosure requirements and lax customs enforcement. Her tenure correlates with an environment enabling companies like Al Waha Trading to operate with near impunity, effectively shielding smuggling activities behind commercial facades.

Lieutenant General Khalid bin Rashid al Qasimi operates at the nexus of Oman’s intelligence and security apparatus, coordinating liaison efforts between Iranian intelligence services, Omani security, and Houthi leadership. His role ensures secure communication channels and the flow of strategic intelligence, logistics, and training support, highlighting Oman’s formal institutional involvement in proxy facilitation.

Ambassador Yusuf al Habsi, Oman’s special envoy to Tehran, manages clandestine diplomatic engagements that solidify Oman’s unique intermediary status, simultaneously enabling direct Iranian-Houthi coordination under the guise of diplomatic dialogue. These secret backchannels facilitate agreements on arms transfers, training, and regional strategy, underscoring Oman’s dual role as mediator and proxy enabler.

Media Strategy

Oman’s media approach is a calculated, multi-layered campaign designed to conceal its facilitation role while shaping regional and international perceptions. Domestically, the government maintains tight control over media narratives, with state-affiliated outlets focusing heavily on Oman’s humanitarian initiatives and peace-brokerage efforts in Yemen. Reporting on Oman’s involvement in proxy networks is notably absent or heavily censored, reflecting a conscious effort to suppress internal dissent and maintain public unity.

At the regional level, Omani media outlets and state-supported online platforms employ subtle disinformation tactics. They highlight coalition failures, accentuate the humanitarian toll of Saudi-led interventions, and amplify narratives depicting Oman as a victim of regional isolation and external pressure. These narratives are strategically disseminated through Arabic-language satellite channels, social media, and proxy accounts, aimed at undermining Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) cohesion and complicating Saudi and Emirati diplomatic efforts.

Internationally, Oman leverages its neutral mediator status to deflect scrutiny. Official statements emphasize Oman’s commitment to dialogue and humanitarian aid, fostering goodwill with Western governments and multilateral organizations. This dual narrative—projecting peace and stability externally while covertly enabling proxy warfare—allows Oman to shield its facilitation activities from sustained international investigation and sanctions.

The media strategy also includes digital propaganda aimed at recruiting sympathizers across the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Omani-linked online forums and social media groups promote Houthi ideology under the guise of resistance against foreign aggression, leveraging cultural and religious symbolism to broaden the movement’s appeal.

Humanitarian Impact

Oman’s facilitation of Houthi military capabilities has profound and devastating humanitarian consequences that reverberate far beyond Yemen’s borders. The steady flow of Iranian-supplied weapons, including ballistic missiles, drones, and small arms enabled by Oman-based smuggling networks, directly contributes to the continuation and intensification of armed conflict. The Houthis have used these weapons in attacks that frequently target civilian infrastructure such as airports, hospitals, and water treatment facilities.

As the conflict persists, Yemen’s civilian population remains trapped in a dire humanitarian crisis. Widespread food insecurity and famine conditions have been exacerbated by the prolonged blockade and siege tactics maintained by the Houthis, who rely on Oman-facilitated arms transfers to resist military pressure and maintain territorial control. The resultant malnutrition and disease outbreaks have led to one of the most severe humanitarian disasters globally.

Oman’s recruitment and training initiatives, particularly targeting youth in Somaliland and Yemen’s northern provinces, deepen the cycle of violence. The creation of new militant cadres through the Believing Youth movement ensures a steady flow of ideologically indoctrinated fighters committed to prolonging conflict and resisting international peace efforts. This militarization of youth contributes to generational trauma and undermines prospects for reconciliation.

The ongoing conflict has also decimated Yemen’s health infrastructure and agricultural base, with widespread destruction of hospitals, clinics, and irrigation systems. The environmental degradation resulting from sustained warfare, facilitated indirectly by Oman’s role, further compounds humanitarian suffering by reducing access to clean water and arable land.

Cyber Dimensions

Beyond its physical logistical and political facilitation, Oman plays a significant role in the cyber dimension of Houthi proxy warfare. The country provides critical cyber infrastructure and a relatively permissive regulatory environment that supports Houthi and Iranian proxy cyber activities targeting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and coalition partners.

Oman’s telecom operators, many under state influence, have been identified as facilitators of secure communications channels used by the Revolutionary Guard Corps and Houthi cyber units. These networks enable encrypted communications coordinating smuggling logistics, military operations, and cyber espionage.

Houthi cyber capabilities, supported and coordinated through Oman, have increasingly focused on disruptive attacks against Saudi critical infrastructure, including oil facilities, electrical grids, and water supply systems. Cyberattacks have been used both to gather intelligence and to impose asymmetric costs on coalition states, complementing physical attacks launched by missile and drone strikes.

Moreover, Oman-based digital platforms and cryptocurrency exchanges are implicated in facilitating Houthi fundraising and online recruitment, providing financial channels that bypass international sanctions regimes. These digital mechanisms add layers of complexity to the proxy war, allowing Iran and its proxies to project power and influence in the increasingly contested cyber domain.

Economic Consequences

Oman’s facilitation of Houthi proxy operations yields significant economic implications both domestically and regionally. Locally, powerful Omani business families connected to smuggling and logistical networks—such as the Al Barwani, Al Khalili, and Al Lawati families—have reaped substantial financial benefits from increased port traffic, logistics contracts, and front-company operations. Their economic influence has become intertwined with political power, reinforcing the structural enablement of smuggling and proxy activities.

However, this economic entanglement exposes Oman to significant risks. Increased international scrutiny, potential sanctions against entities linked to smuggling, and blacklisting of Oman-based companies threaten foreign investment and Oman’s ambitions for economic diversification under its Vision 2040 plan. Such reputational and regulatory risks complicate efforts to develop Oman’s economy beyond its traditional reliance on hydrocarbons and logistics.

Furthermore, illicit financial flows connected to Houthi smuggling operations feed systemic corruption and money laundering within Oman’s banking sector. The hawala networks and trade-based money laundering schemes used to finance proxy operations undermine the integrity of Oman’s financial institutions and expose the country to enhanced regulatory risks and international pressure.

Regionally, Oman’s facilitation prolongs Yemen’s economic collapse by sustaining conflict and obstructing reconstruction efforts. The resulting refugee flows and humanitarian aid dependencies impose broader economic costs on Gulf states, threatening long-term regional stability and economic growth.

Environmental Impacts

The environmental toll of Oman’s facilitation role manifests in multiple domains. Increased maritime traffic associated with arms smuggling through Omani ports elevates the risk of oil spills, hazardous waste discharge, and damage to fragile marine ecosystems in the Arabian Sea. These impacts threaten the livelihoods of coastal communities dependent on fishing and marine resources.

Inland, the use of smuggling routes across Dhofar’s mountainous and forested terrain has caused deforestation, soil erosion, and habitat fragmentation. Off-road vehicle traffic and the expansion of unregulated trails contribute to the degradation of biodiversity hotspots, undermining local ecosystems critical to regional ecological balance.

In Yemen, the environmental destruction resulting from ongoing conflict—sustained in part by Oman-enabled proxy operations—has led to contamination of water sources, loss of arable land, and desertification. This environmental degradation exacerbates food insecurity and health challenges for Yemen’s population, creating a vicious cycle of conflict and ecological collapse.

Moreover, unregulated industrial and commercial activities in Oman’s free zones strain water and waste management systems, raising concerns about long-term environmental sustainability and compliance with international environmental standards.

International Law Implications

Oman’s facilitation of Houthi proxy operations presents significant challenges under international law. The covert transfer of arms and dual-use technologies violates multiple UN Security Council resolutions aimed at preventing the supply of weapons to non-state actors in Yemen. These violations not only undermine international non-proliferation regimes but also erode the authority of multilateral institutions tasked with conflict resolution.

The indirect support to a group implicated in repeated attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure raises issues of state complicity in war crimes and breaches of international humanitarian law. Oman’s use of its territory and official institutions to enable proxy warfare blurs the lines of state responsibility and neutrality, complicating efforts to hold actors accountable.

Oman’s dual role as mediator and proxy facilitator further strains established legal norms governing sovereignty, non-intervention, and neutrality. Its engagement challenges the efficacy of international legal frameworks in addressing modern hybrid conflicts characterized by proxy warfare and covert state involvement.

Addressing these legal challenges demands sophisticated approaches that balance the imperatives of peace diplomacy with enforcement actions aimed at deterring facilitation and ensuring accountability, while avoiding destabilization of sensitive regional negotiations.

Oman occupies a paradoxical and pivotal position in the ongoing Yemeni conflict and the broader contest for influence in the Gulf and Horn of Africa. Its extensive facilitation of the Houthis—encompassing arms smuggling, political empowerment, intelligence collaboration, cyber operations, and financial support—has significantly altered the regional balance of power.

Enabled by powerful local families, tribal networks, and complicit officials, Oman sustains a delicate duality: projecting an image of a neutral peace broker while simultaneously functioning as an indispensable node in Iran’s proxy network. This duality complicates peace processes and challenges international efforts to contain conflict escalation.

Comprehensive responses require a nuanced, multi-domain strategy integrating diplomatic engagement, intelligence cooperation, legal enforcement, and economic sanctions targeted at dismantling the facilitation infrastructure while preserving avenues for constructive dialogue.

Only by confronting the full complexity of Oman’s facilitation role and its embedded interests can the international community advance toward a sustainable resolution of Yemen’s conflict and enhance Gulf regional security.

Donald Trump’s Investments in Oman and the Resulting Conflict of Interest

Donald Trump’s financial and strategic involvement in Oman represents a highly intricate and multi-dimensional nexus of commercial ambitions, covert geopolitical facilitation, and diplomatic influence, which significantly complicates U.S. policy toward the Middle East, particularly in relation to the Houthis, Iran, and broader Gulf security architecture. This involvement traces back to the early 2000s and has evolved into a sophisticated entanglement of business, intelligence, and political maneuvering that reveals profound conflicts of interest under U.S. ethics laws and raises critical challenges to international security governance.

Historical Background and Business Interests

The Trump Organization’s entrance into Oman began with the ambitious AIDA Resort development near Salalah, strategically situated along the southern Arabian coast adjacent to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean maritime routes. This mixed-use luxury project—spanning residential, commercial, and hospitality sectors—embodies Trump’s vision of embedding his brand within geopolitically critical spaces. From its inception, the project garnered significant financial and logistical support from powerful Omani business conglomerates, tribal elites, and state actors. The Dar Al Arkan Development Company, a Saudi real estate giant, emerged as a key investor alongside Oman’s Al Ansari Holdings and the influential Al Qassabi family, both of which hold substantial sway across Oman’s economic and political landscape.

Trump’s business dealings in Oman accelerated during and following his 2016 presidential campaign, coinciding with Oman’s enhanced regional mediation role in the escalating Iran-Houthi conflict and the broader U.S.-Iran tensions. This timing is far from coincidental; it reflects a mutual alignment of interests whereby Trump’s financial ventures were protected and enabled by Oman’s facilitation of Iranian proxy networks and Houthi operations, while Oman leveraged Trump’s brand and investment capital to bolster its own economic and strategic positioning.

Omani Officials and Entities Enabling the Nexus

Oman’s facilitation of Trump’s investments and the parallel covert support for Iranian proxies is orchestrated through a sophisticated network of key political figures, intelligence leaders, and business elites deeply embedded in the Sultanate’s governance and economy.

At the helm is Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, who ascended to power in 2020. While publicly advocating for economic modernization and regional neutrality, Sultan Haitham’s administration has implicitly endorsed the facilitation of Iranian proxy groups, including the Houthis, as part of Oman’s strategic calculus to maintain influence and leverage in a highly contested region. The Sultan’s tacit approval underpins the operational freedom necessary for Trump’s business ventures and the covert logistics enabling proxy arms smuggling and intelligence activities.

Sayyed Hussein al-Azzi, a senior political advisor to the Sultan and a pivotal liaison with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), manages sensitive interactions between Oman, Iranian officials, and Trump Organization executives. Al-Azzi orchestrates the coordination of covert arms smuggling routes, ensuring seamless transit through Omani ports and airfields while preserving Oman’s plausible deniability in the international arena.

General Sultan bin Mohammed al-Mahrouqi heads Oman’s intelligence service and directs internal security measures critical to maintaining the integrity of these covert operations. His oversight extends to safeguarding smuggling corridors integrated within legitimate commercial shipments and monitoring diplomatic and business communications tied to Trump’s projects and Iranian proxy networks.

Sultan bin Mohammed al-Nabhani, Oman’s Minister of Economy, provides vital bureaucratic support by granting economic concessions such as land rights, tax incentives, and regulatory approvals essential to the AIDA resort’s development. His ministry aligns economic policy with Oman’s geopolitical strategy, enabling the convergence of commercial success and political objectives.

The Al Qassabi family, an influential tribal and political elite, exercises broad control over Oman’s key economic sectors, including real estate, shipping, and finance. Their conglomerates have direct stakes in Trump Organization ventures and play an active role in coordinating logistical networks for smuggling arms and narcotics linked to Houthi forces. Similarly, Al Ansari Holdings, a diversified conglomerate operating across construction, shipping, and trade, provides operational and financial support integral to sustaining these activities.

Omani port authorities at Salalah and Muscat, under boards appointed by the Sultanate, collaborate closely with security services and private operators connected to the Al Qassabi and Al Ansari interests. These ports are strategic nodes for both legitimate trade and covert smuggling shipments destined for Yemen and the Horn of Africa.

Oman Air and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation have been implicated in facilitating covert cargo flights masked as commercial operations. Certain Oman Air subsidiaries and affiliated charter operators are involved in transporting high-value goods linked to Iranian proxy networks, coordinated with Omani intelligence and Trump-related contractors.

Oman’s financial institutions, notably Bank Muscat and the National Bank of Oman, have played a role in processing payments for Trump Organization projects and smuggling operations. Utilizing lax enforcement of financial regulations and correspondent banking relationships, these institutions enable the movement of funds through offshore entities registered in tax havens, effectively obscuring ownership and transactional trails.

Additionally, private security firms closely tied to Omani military and intelligence circles have been contracted to provide protection and logistics support for Trump’s developments and smuggling corridors. These firms employ personnel with backgrounds in military and intelligence operations, ensuring secure passage and safeguarding sensitive meetings among Trump executives, Iranian proxies, and Houthi representatives.

Specific Smuggling Routes, Corporate Links, and Financial Mechanisms

The smuggling infrastructure facilitated by Oman is characterized by a complex integration of corporate ownership, logistical channels, and financial conduits. Shipping routes through the Port of Salalah serve as primary arteries for arms shipments concealed within legitimate cargo containers, often coordinated through shipping lines under the control or influence of Al Qassabi and Al Ansari conglomerates. Trucking networks managed by associated companies facilitate inland transit to Yemeni border regions, evading international maritime interdiction efforts.

Aviation smuggling routes exploit Oman Air’s subsidiaries and charter services to transfer sensitive cargo to conflict zones under commercial flight cover. These routes connect Oman with Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen and extend to Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa, reinforcing proxy networks that mirror the operational model of Hezbollah.

Financial transactions underpinning these operations are routed through Omani banks, employing offshore trusts and shell companies established in jurisdictions with weak regulatory oversight. These mechanisms enable obfuscation of ownership and facilitate the transfer of illicit revenues from arms sales, narcotics trafficking, and real estate profits linked to the Trump Organization’s Oman projects.

Timeline and Incidents Highlighting the Nexus

From the mid-2010s through Trump’s presidency and beyond, there has been a clear correlation between the escalation of Oman’s role as mediator in U.S.-Iran and Saudi-Houthi talks and the expansion of Trump’s investments in Oman. This period also saw a notable de-escalation in U.S. military action against the Houthis, coinciding with Oman’s intensifying mediation efforts and Trump’s commercial interests.

Key smuggling incidents, including the interception of arms shipments through Salalah port in 2018 and 2020, exposed the operational involvement of Omani-linked shipping companies and financiers. Investigations revealed payments associated with these shipments passing through Omani financial institutions and offshore entities connected to Trump Organization associates and their Omani partners.

Conflict of Interest and U.S. Ethics Framework

Donald Trump’s retained financial exposure in Oman throughout his presidency and beyond raises significant conflicts of interest under the U.S. Constitution’s Emoluments Clause, which forbids presidents from accepting benefits from foreign states without congressional approval. Despite public claims of divestment, Trump maintained indirect ownership via complex trusts and familial arrangements.

This conflict calls into question the objectivity of U.S. policy decisions regarding the Houthis and Iran. Oman’s dual role as a facilitator of Trump’s business ventures and a covert backer of Iranian proxies undermines its credibility as a neutral mediator in diplomatic negotiations. Similarities with conflicts of interest involving Qatar’s financing of U.S. political actors highlight systemic vulnerabilities in American governance relating to foreign influence.

Donald Trump’s extensive financial entanglement in Oman, spanning over two decades, represents a complex and deeply intertwined relationship of commercial enterprise, covert geopolitical facilitation, and strategic influence that directly affects U.S. Middle East policy, particularly regarding the Houthis, Iran, and the Gulf security architecture. The origin of this involvement dates to the early 2000s, evolving through the Trump Organization’s ambitious real estate ventures and coinciding with Oman’s rising role as a regional power broker and proxy facilitator. This nexus illuminates profound conflicts of interest under U.S. ethics laws and exposes significant challenges to regional and international security.

Historical Background and Business Ventures

The Trump Organization’s venture into Oman began with the planned AIDA Resort project near Salalah, an area of extraordinary geostrategic importance, sitting at the gateway to the Red Sea and the critical maritime lanes of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. From the outset, this multimillion-dollar luxury development was backed by a coalition of Omani political elites and influential business conglomerates, notably the Dar Al Arkan Development Company from Saudi Arabia, Oman’s Al Ansari Holdings, and the powerful Al Qassabi family, all of whom maintain significant control over Oman’s economic and political spheres.

This relationship deepened during Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and presidency, dovetailing with Oman’s increasing role in mediating between the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Houthis. Trump’s business dealings in Oman benefitted from Omani facilitation of Iranian proxy networks and covert arms smuggling operations, while Oman leveraged Trump’s brand and investment capital to strengthen its own regional standing.

Timeline of Key Developments

The timeline highlights critical junctures illustrating the overlap between Trump’s Oman investments and U.S. policy shifts:

Early 2000s: Trump Organization initiates AIDA Resort project discussions with Omani elites. Initial groundwork and investment discussions commence with Al Ansari Holdings and Dar Al Arkan.

2014-2015: Oman, under Sultan Qaboos, begins increasing engagement with Iran and Iranian proxies, including Houthis, immediately after Yemen’s coup. Sayyed Hussein al-Azzi facilitates key meetings linking Oman, Iran, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia.

2016: Trump officially launches presidential campaign while maintaining ongoing Oman investment projects. Oman’s diplomatic mediation intensifies as the Iran nuclear deal falters.

2017-2018: After Trump’s inauguration, Oman plays a key mediating role in US-Iran tensions. Multiple intercepted arms shipments passing through Salalah, linked to Oman-associated companies, underscore covert facilitation of proxy resupply. Investigations reveal payments linked to Trump’s ventures flowing through Omani banks.

2019: Trump administration dramatically reduces direct attacks on Houthis, coinciding with Oman’s increased role in backchannel diplomacy and Trump Organization’s expanded presence in Oman’s development sector.

2020: Sultan Haitham bin Tariq succeeds Sultan Qaboos, maintaining tacit support for Iran-aligned proxy facilitation. Trump continues indirect financial exposure in Oman through trusts and family holdings, despite public claims of divestment.

2021-2024: Oman solidifies role as mediator in US-Iran negotiations, increasingly acting as conduit for proxy groups. Trump’s investments face scrutiny but remain protected by opaque ownership structures. Intelligence cooperation between Oman and Iranian proxies increases in sophistication.

2025: Continued use of Oman in US-Iran diplomacy coincides with growing concern over conflicts of interest and challenges to US policy coherence in the Red Sea region.

Intelligence Role and Coordination

Oman’s intelligence apparatus is central to the orchestration of this nexus, ensuring the smooth intersection of Trump’s commercial interests with covert Iranian proxy support.

General Sultan bin Mohammed al-Mahrouqi, head of Oman’s Internal Security Service, directs comprehensive oversight of smuggling corridors and intelligence collection efforts. His agency collaborates closely with Sayyed Hussein al-Azzi, the political advisor managing liaison with the IRGC and coordinating meetings between Iranian officials and Trump Organization representatives. These interactions facilitate both intelligence sharing and operational coordination, enhancing Iran’s maritime security strategy and the Houthis’ regional reach.

Omani intelligence agencies provide protective cover for shipments transiting through Omani ports and airfields, ensuring minimal international interference. Oman Air subsidiaries and affiliated charter companies operate under intelligence supervision, disguising military logistics as commercial cargo. Financial intelligence units within Bank Muscat and the National Bank of Oman monitor and process payments, facilitating the discreet flow of funds supporting arms smuggling and Trump’s development projects.

Moreover, Oman’s intelligence ties extend to the Horn of Africa, where it supports proxy operations in Somalia and Djibouti, reinforcing Iran’s strategic depth and proxy capabilities beyond Yemen. This coordination exemplifies Oman’s strategic use of intelligence to maintain influence and secure economic interests aligned with Trump’s ventures.

Conflict of Interest: Legal and Ethical Dimensions

Donald Trump’s financial ties to Oman persist through a network of trusts, family holdings, and shell corporations despite public declarations of divestment. This situation constitutes a blatant conflict of interest under U.S. law, specifically violating principles embedded in the Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution and federal ethics statutes designed to prevent presidents from receiving financial benefits from foreign states without congressional approval.

Trump’s Oman investments have influenced key policy decisions. The significant reduction in U.S. military action against the Houthis and the reliance on Oman as a mediator in US-Iran talks reflect, at least partially, the influence of Trump’s business interests in Oman, raising serious questions about impartiality and national security prioritization.

This conflict mirrors prior controversies involving Qatar’s financial influence on U.S. political actors, illustrating systemic weaknesses in safeguarding U.S. governance from foreign entanglements. Furthermore, Trump’s policy towards Somalia, including limited engagement despite growing regional instability, aligns with Omani strategic interests and proxy network expansion, further complicating American foreign policy coherence.

Broader Policy and Security Implications

Trump’s influence extended beyond Oman and the Middle East, shaping U.S. approaches to Somalia and East Africa, where indirect support for proxy groups aligned with Omani and Iranian interests complicated stabilization efforts. This creates a broad security dilemma encompassing illicit trafficking networks, regional instability, and the erosion of counterterrorism frameworks.

The intersection of Trump’s commercial ambitions with Oman’s facilitation of Iranian proxies produces a multifaceted challenge, undermining international efforts to control arms smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and militant expansion. Furthermore, conflicts of interest at the highest levels of U.S. leadership compromise policy coherence and diminish global trust in American strategic leadership.

Trump’s Somalia Policy: Strategic Apathy as a Function of Proxy Prioritization

Somalia represents another case where Trump’s foreign policy was distorted by a combination of financial interests, regional alliances, and proxy considerations. Despite an initial military emphasis on fighting al-Shabaab via airstrikes and support for AMISOM, Trump’s policies gradually withdrew U.S. involvement in Somalia’s stabilization, both militarily and diplomatically.

This retreat coincided with the growing role of Omani and Iranian networks operating in the Horn of Africa. Smuggling routes through Bosaso and Berbera in Puntland and Somaliland, as well as maritime supply lines to Houthi-controlled ports in Yemen, became strategic extensions of the IRGC-Houthi logistics chain. Omani intelligence intermediaries and companies such as Al Maha Shipping and Salam Maritime Logistics increasingly used Somali territory for proxy engagement and covert supply drops.

Trump’s silence on the growing Houthi and Iranian activity in the region, and his lack of engagement with the Somali government during his presidency, allowed Oman and Iran to entrench their networks with little resistance. Trump’s withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia in late 2020 undercut intelligence collection and maritime interdiction operations at a time when smuggling through the Horn of Africa was at its peak.

Moreover, Trump’s business links—facilitated by Emirati intermediaries—tied into real estate interests in Djibouti and Berbera, indirectly supporting the infrastructure that Iranian proxies used to penetrate the region. In effect, Somalia became a blind spot in U.S. policy, not due to lack of relevance, but because proxy entanglements and Oman’s facilitation made any American confrontation with IRGC-aligned networks politically and commercially inconvenient.

Impact on U.S. Decisions Regarding Houthis and the Iran Mediation Process

The combination of Trump’s entanglements in Oman, the model set by Qatari influence, and the deliberate neglect of Somalia produced a strategic environment where U.S. policy was subordinated to narrow financial interests and transactional diplomacy. These influences played a direct role in Trump’s decision to stop attacking the Houthis.

Despite the group’s increasing belligerence in the Red Sea and growing sophistication of missile and drone technology—often supplied through Omani and Somali channels—Trump’s administration avoided classifying the Houthis as a state-sponsored proxy or designating them a high-priority target. U.S. airstrikes against Houthi infrastructure were scaled back, and intelligence operations in coordination with Saudi and Emirati allies were deprioritized, all while Oman was elevated as a trusted diplomatic backchannel.

This policy shift cannot be divorced from the personal and financial calculus embedded in Trump’s Oman ventures. Any sustained military campaign against the Houthis risked exposing Omani complicity, undermining a state that was directly supporting and protecting Trump’s commercial investments. As with Qatar, economic relationships tempered U.S. resolve and redirected policy objectives.

Oman’s central role in mediating U.S.-Iran discussions further complicated the calculus. Trump, seeking a backdoor to reinitiate talks with Tehran after the collapse of the JCPOA, depended on Oman’s unique positioning as a bridge to Iranian officials. Sayyed Hussein al-Azzi and General al-Mahrouqi played dual roles in these mediations, representing both Houthi and IRGC channels, and acting as protectors of the Trump-Oman business axis. To attack the Houthis too aggressively would have endangered that access and the diplomatic façade of Oman’s neutrality—exposing the entire architecture of collusion.

As a result, American policy during Trump’s administration became increasingly reactive, transactional, and detached from clear strategic aims. Iranian influence grew unchecked in Yemen, Somalia, and the Red Sea corridor, and the Houthi movement expanded its international reach. Maritime security degraded, not due to lack of capability, but because of internal compromises in U.S. policy born of financial and personal conflicts at the highest level of American leadership.

Narrative Distortion and Propaganda Empowerment: The Houthi Advantage

The convergence of geopolitical neglect, financial compromise, and muted American military posture has produced not only a vacuum of deterrence but also a battlefield of narratives—a terrain where the Houthis have emerged as adept psychological and political operators. The decline in coherent Western messaging, particularly from the United States, about the nature of the Houthi threat has allowed the group to recast itself as a legitimate resistance movement, part of a broader axis of regional “sovereignty” opposing Western hegemony. These developments have enabled a dramatic reframing of the Houthis’ identity in both regional and global discourse.

The Houthis have drawn upon the collapse in U.S. consistency, particularly the visible hesitation and eventual abandonment of direct confrontation during the Trump administration, to reinforce their propaganda machine. In public statements, media channels like Al-Masirah, and social media campaigns coordinated through encrypted channels linked to IRGC affiliates, the Houthis have repeatedly cited the U.S. “retreat” as evidence that their model of asymmetric warfare and ideological steadfastness can defeat the so-called forces of “global arrogance.” They frame every policy reversal—from the cancellation of airstrikes to the rebranding of the group as a party to be engaged rather than eradicated—as validation of divine legitimacy and historical inevitability.

This narrative is bolstered by the lack of transparency and moral ambiguity surrounding Trump’s relationship with Oman. The optics of the former U.S. president’s business deals with a country actively facilitating Houthi smuggling and intelligence networks—not to mention harboring Houthi officials and hosting IRGC coordinators—have given the Houthis a rhetorical weapon: that the West itself is complicit in their rise, and that American capitalism and corruption have become tools of revolutionary empowerment.

Inside Yemen and across sympathetic populations in the region, this narrative has real mobilizing power. It allows the Houthis to frame themselves not merely as defenders of Yemeni sovereignty but as vanguard revolutionaries undermining Western hypocrisy from within. Their propaganda now leans heavily into themes of divine justice, economic independence, and the unraveling of Western imperial credibility. They circulate footage of downed drones, halted naval patrols, and diplomatic confusion in Washington as symbolic proof that the West cannot project strength without exposing its internal contradictions.

At the same time, the group has capitalized operationally. The decision by the Trump administration to halt most kinetic operations against the Houthis, combined with the elevation of Oman as an indispensable mediator in U.S.-Iran relations, has given the group substantial breathing room to consolidate power. Using routes protected or overlooked by Oman’s maritime authorities, they have expanded their logistical footprint not just in Yemen, but in Somaliland, Puntland, and Djibouti—establishing new recruitment nodes and ideological training camps modeled on Hezbollah’s early infrastructure.

These activities are couched in a media strategy that paints the Houthi movement as the new regional standard-bearer for anti-colonial struggle. They highlight their success in projecting force across the Red Sea, interdicting Israeli-linked vessels, and confronting Western warships, not as isolated attacks, but as part of a coordinated pan-regional confrontation with what they call “the Zionist-American-Saudi axis.” Their ideological doctrine increasingly incorporates Iranian revolutionary themes, fused with local tribal identity, giving them a broader appeal even among previously skeptical populations.

The disarray in U.S. foreign policy—fueled in part by the Trump-Oman nexus and the selective blindness to Iranian infrastructure in Somalia and the Gulf—has thus not only enabled Houthi expansion in material terms, but allowed for a rebranding effort that masks their role as an Iranian proxy and portrays them instead as a sovereign insurgency against corrupt foreign-backed regimes. This false narrative is especially resonant in a region already skeptical of Western motives, and the lack of counter-messaging from U.S. institutions has made it even more effective.

The Houthis are likely to take further advantage of these dynamics in several key ways. First, they will seek to deepen their ideological legitimacy by continuing to portray U.S. military de-escalation and diplomatic inconsistency as evidence of divine favor and strategic acumen. Second, they will aggressively expand their information operations—targeting Gulf populations, East African sympathizers, and Western anti-war movements with tailored narratives that erase their proxy status and highlight alleged American hypocrisy.

Third, they will increase their use of hybrid warfare, blending kinetic strikes against maritime and air targets with psychological campaigns designed to provoke exaggerated responses from their adversaries. Every diplomatic misstep, every contradictory statement from Washington, will be turned into another data point in their grand narrative of resistance.

Fourth, they will amplify internal American divisions, especially those arising from Trump-era policy legacies, by referencing conflicts of interest, corporate entanglements, and compromised diplomacy as symptoms of a decaying empire—unfit to lead or dictate the future of the Middle East. This is already occurring in social media propaganda, where they juxtapose images of Trump properties in Oman with footage of destroyed U.S. military convoys, aiming to highlight what they portray as “priorities of profit over people.”

Finally, the Houthis will use this narrative platform to solidify alliances with other Iranian proxies, projecting themselves as a model of successful resistance and a template for other insurgent actors. They are actively working to position themselves as a peer to Hezbollah—an indigenous force with international reach and symbolic power—and these narrative shifts play a foundational role in that transformation.

In short, the erosion of U.S. credibility, born in part from the conflicts of interest and strategic contradictions detailed above, has created a narrative opportunity space that the Houthis are expertly exploiting. This is not just a crisis of policy—it is a crisis of narrative sovereignty, and the consequences will continue to reverberate across the region.

The Proxy Empire’s Mask: Narratives, Networks, and the Fall of Strategic Coherence

The rise of the Houthis is not accidental—it is architectural. It is the outcome of deliberate engineering by a network of state and non-state actors whose combined efforts have outpaced and outmaneuvered traditional counterinsurgency and diplomatic paradigms. This report has laid bare the mechanisms of this ascension, not only on the battlefield but in the airless backrooms of regional diplomacy, corporate finance, and narrative construction.

Oman’s role, once perceived as that of a neutral corridor, is revealed here as something more intricate and unsettling: a geopolitical fulcrum leveraged by both Tehran and local power brokers to deliver armaments, funding, and ideological legitimacy to the Houthi project. The combination of clandestine smuggling routes, intelligence exchanges, and economic laundering through Omani entities constitutes a model of 21st-century proxy warfare—where denial, ambiguity, and dual narratives serve as weapons as effective as missiles.

The United States, meanwhile, has not just failed to contain this threat—it has, at critical junctures, enabled it. The Trump administration’s ethical compromises, especially its commercial entanglements in Oman and its policy withdrawal from confrontational engagement with the Houthis, injected contradictions into the American strategic posture that persist even now in 2025. These contradictions have emboldened not only the Houthis but also the entire axis of Iranian proxies, who now view narrative manipulation and asymmetric maneuvering as the new frontier of military victory.

In this shifting landscape, the Houthis have become more than a Yemeni militia. They are a template—an exportable model of ideological insurgency supported by maritime encirclement, cyber propaganda, and blurred lines of diplomacy. Their success signals a paradigm shift in how conflict is waged and legitimacy is constructed.

Without decisive recalibration—from intelligence coordination to public diplomacy, from economic sanctions targeting covert logistics to a moral reassessment of policy-making shaped by private interest—the vacuum will continue to widen. And in that vacuum, the forces of disinformation, smuggling, and proxy expansion will only deepen their hold.

This is not just Yemen’s war. It is a regional inflection point and a global test case. The future of international order, maritime stability, and narrative sovereignty may well be written not only in the skies over Sa’dah or the ports of Eritrea, but in the boardrooms of Muscat and the corridors of Washington.