The Ambiguity Trap: How U.S. Policy Toward the Muslim Brotherhood Shapes the Future of Middle East Stability

by Irina Tsukerman

Between Pragmatism and Peril: The U.S. Dilemma on the Muslim Brotherhood

The United States finds itself at a crossroads in its approach to Islamist movements in the Middle East, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, whose complex role as both a political actor and a breeding ground for extremism challenges conventional counterterrorism paradigms. The Trump administration’s inconsistent stance—oscillating between cautious engagement and rhetorical opposition—has created a landscape rife with ambiguity, enabling Brotherhood-linked organizations to exploit legal gray areas and ideological narratives. This report examines the strategic consequences of this ambiguity, exploring how it influences the broader battle against extremist movements both abroad and within the U.S. homeland. It also analyzes the interplay of regional powers such as Qatar and Turkey, whose patronage further complicates U.S. efforts to counter the Brotherhood. Ultimately, the report offers actionable policy recommendations designed to reconcile pragmatism with principled clarity, aiming to restore American leadership in combating Islamist extremism and fostering long-term regional stability.

Deals Without Deterrence: The Mirage of Middle East Peace Without Confronting Extremism

Donald Trump’s second bid to reinvent American diplomacy in the Middle East comes at a time when traditional assumptions about power, ideology, and regional order are collapsing under the weight of insurgency fatigue, shifting alliances, and public disillusionment. In this volatile landscape, Trump proposes an unorthodox and deeply transactional pathway to peace—one that leans on bold diplomatic gambits, economic incentives, and elite bargains while deliberately avoiding the costly entanglements of ideological warfare. Yet beneath the surface of this streamlined vision lies a fatal omission: without a robust and sustained confrontation of extremist ideologies—both Islamist and ultranationalist, abroad and at home—any architecture of peace is built not on foundations but on illusions. In this context, Trump's model risks confusing the pageantry of normalization with the substance of stabilization, and in doing so, he may preside not over a durable peace, but over the incubation of future crises.

The Abraham Accords were heralded by the Trump administration as historic breakthroughs, effectively bypassing the Palestinian-Israeli stalemate and creating new patterns of Arab-Israeli cooperation. These agreements were underpinned by mutual concerns about Iran and the promise of American economic and technological investment. Yet the strategic logic of the Accords was not accompanied by any serious ideological effort to confront the militant ecosystems that fuel rejectionism, whether in the form of Sunni jihadist groups, Shi’a revolutionary networks, or secular populist extremists. Nor did the Trump administration put forward a regional counter-extremism doctrine, leaving local actors to navigate this threat piecemeal and inconsistently. By focusing on reshuffling elite alliances and minimizing America’s ideological footprint, the administration substituted deterrence for deconfliction and confrontation for choreography.

The result was a peace that could function in stable conditions but offered no answers to regional volatility. Extremist groups, far from being defeated, were merely displaced or temporarily marginalized. Al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria and Yemen, Islamic State remnants in Iraq and the Levant, and Iran-backed militias in Iraq, Lebanon, and now Syria’s southern front, all recalibrated their tactics to exploit the new geopolitical alignments. These groups do not require territorial control to undermine peace—they require only a narrative of betrayal and abandonment, and a permissive security environment in which to operate. Trump’s peace, by sidelining efforts to dismantle the ideological roots of these movements, gave them both.

Even more perilous is the resonance between foreign extremism and domestic radicalization within the United States. Trump’s presidency saw the growing mainstreaming of far-right extremist narratives, often cloaked in anti-government or ethnonationalist rhetoric. His refusal to consistently denounce these groups, coupled with a post-truth political culture and selective law enforcement responses, has weakened the moral authority of the United States when it seeks to broker moderation abroad. When American diplomats champion coexistence and denounce terrorism in the Middle East, while domestic political figures openly consort with conspiracy theorists and white supremacists, the hypocrisy is not lost on either allies or adversaries. This dissonance creates diplomatic drag and opens space for actors like Iran and Turkey to exploit anti-American sentiment across Arab and Muslim populations.

Iranian propaganda, for instance, seizes on these contradictions to depict Washington as an enabler of Zionist oppression abroad and racial injustice at home. The effect is twofold: it undermines U.S.-aligned Arab regimes who engage with Washington, and it offers extremist movements a unifying ideological framework that combines anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism, and social grievance. Without an assertive counter-extremism framework that reasserts America’s liberal-democratic values—and demonstrates them in practice—Trump’s diplomatic efforts risk empowering the very radical forces they intend to sideline.

This vulnerability is magnified by the populist tone of Trump’s approach, which privileges rapid, media-friendly outcomes over slow, institutional transformation. There is little evidence that Trump intends to promote judicial reform, inclusive governance, or civil society development in the Middle East as part of his peace framework. Yet these are precisely the domains where extremist ideologies take root when neglected. In Egypt, for example, the authoritarian clampdown on dissent has only strengthened the appeal of radical alternatives for alienated youth. In Jordan, economic crisis and political stagnation have reinvigorated Salafi recruitment. In the Palestinian territories, the absence of political renewal has left a vacuum filled by Islamist militants. Any peace initiative that ignores these structural drivers of radicalization may produce diplomatic handshakes in foreign ministries while insurgent cells metastasize in refugee camps and urban peripheries.

Furthermore, peace cannot be sustained without a credible threat of enforcement. Trump’s Middle East strategy—while rhetorically aggressive toward adversaries like Iran—has often lacked the consistency and follow-through necessary for true deterrence. The targeted killing of Qasem Soleimani demonstrated American military reach, but it was not backed by a long-term strategy to degrade Iran’s regional proxy infrastructure. Instead, it triggered cycles of retaliation and tactical de-escalation, with Iran adapting its playbook and deepening ties with non-state actors in Syria, Iraq, and now the Red Sea basin. Without persistent pressure on these networks, normalization deals are vulnerable to being sabotaged by missile barrages, terror attacks, or political assassinations. And as Hamas demonstrated in 2023 and Hezbollah continues to threaten from Lebanon, one well-timed act of violence can unravel years of diplomatic engagement if the political conditions remain brittle.

Finally, Trump’s attempt to separate peace from ideology is not only strategically flawed but historically naïve. The post-Oslo era showed that peace processes that fail to address competing national narratives and the ideological legitimacy of violence tend to collapse under their own contradictions. Extremist actors are not passive observers of diplomacy—they are agile disruptors who view every concession as treason and every agreement as an opportunity for provocation. If Trump does not build mechanisms to delegitimize and degrade the ideological networks that inspire violence, then each diplomatic win will be haunted by the specter of its own undoing.

A peace that ignores extremism is a peace that relies on silence—not security. It is a pause, not a resolution. Trump may craft stunning images and ink dramatic accords, but if these are not accompanied by an offensive against radical ideologies—whether in Gaza’s tunnels or in online militias in Texas—the Middle East will not be pacified. It will only wait for the next explosion.

From Crusades to Quiet Deals: Trump’s Counterterrorism Doctrine in Contrast

Donald Trump’s approach to counterterrorism cannot be fully understood without contrasting it with the sweeping, ideologically driven "Global War on Terror" of the George W. Bush era and the surgical, technocratic containment strategy of Barack Obama. Where Bush framed terrorism as a civilizational struggle requiring regime change and nation-building, and Obama shifted to a law enforcement-intelligence paradigm based on minimal military footprint and moral recalibration, Trump introduced a third vector—an ultra-pragmatic, anti-institutional, and often contradictory posture that married kinetic brutality with political disengagement, transactional diplomacy, and a deep aversion to ideological or normative commitments.

At its core, Trump’s counterterrorism was reactive, event-driven, and primarily concerned with spectacle, deterrence through intimidation, and domestic political optics. His administration eschewed long-term strategic planning in favor of high-impact operations designed to reinforce the perception of strength. This approach was most visibly embodied in two emblematic actions: the 2019 killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Syria, and the January 2020 drone strike that eliminated Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani near Baghdad International Airport. Both actions were carried out with maximum publicity, framed as total victories, and presented as validation of Trump’s assertion that American force projection could be precise, overwhelming, and final—without entangling the U.S. in messy regional dynamics.

However, unlike Bush, who launched full-scale invasions to eliminate perceived terrorist havens and sought to reengineer the Middle East through democratization, or Obama, who avoided large deployments but emphasized governance, stabilization, and transnational cooperation in the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia, Trump offered no guiding doctrine. His administration did release a National Strategy for Counterterrorism in 2018, but it merely codified pre-existing priorities (e.g., defeating ISIS, disrupting foreign terrorist organizations, and securing U.S. borders) without addressing evolving trends such as digital radicalization, hybrid insurgencies, or the convergence of transnational criminal and extremist networks. The document lacked institutional follow-through and was not supported by interagency coordination on the scale of previous administrations.

A critical contrast lies in Trump’s categorical rejection of the Bush and Obama belief that terrorism stemmed, at least in part, from systemic governance failures. Bush attempted (however imperfectly) to alter those conditions through military intervention and reconstruction. Obama invested heavily in civil society support, local governance, and CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) initiatives intended to address ideological recruitment and community resilience. Trump, in contrast, dismissed the notion that ideology or governance mattered. He treated terrorism not as a socio-political phenomenon with drivers and enablers, but as a finite threat posed by discrete, killable individuals.

This worldview had profound consequences for policy. Within months of taking office, Trump redirected CVE funding away from programs that addressed white supremacist or domestic extremism and toward those solely focused on Islamist terrorism. Grants that had been approved for Muslim-American nonprofits, academic researchers, and community-level initiatives were frozen or rescinded. In many cases, Trump’s political rhetoric directly undermined the credibility of U.S. engagement with Muslim communities, both domestically and abroad. His characterization of terrorism as inherently Islamic—exemplified by his repeated use of phrases like “radical Islamic terrorism,” and his administration’s push for a travel ban targeting several Muslim-majority countries—eroded the nuanced outreach strategies developed under his predecessors.

In the international arena, Trump favored a heavily transactional model. Rather than engaging multilateral counterterrorism structures like the Global Counterterrorism Forum or revitalizing NATO’s counterterrorism capacities, Trump emphasized bilateral partnerships with authoritarian regimes. These alliances were often built on implicit quid-pro-quos: security assistance and diplomatic cover in exchange for aggressive anti-Islamist crackdowns or normalization with Israel. For example, he provided unwavering support to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, branding him a “great guy” despite Egypt’s harsh repression of dissent under the guise of fighting extremism. Similarly, Trump shielded Saudi Arabia from congressional scrutiny over civilian casualties in Yemen, arguing that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was a bulwark against Iranian-backed militancy.

Such relationships allowed authoritarian regimes to conflate political opposition with terrorism, undermining the legitimacy of U.S. counterterrorism discourse. The de-linking of democracy and security was a hallmark of Trump’s approach: so long as a regime cracked down on jihadist threats, its methods—be they torture, mass incarceration, or extrajudicial killings—were either ignored or tacitly approved. This stood in stark contrast to Obama’s emphasis on human rights as a component of long-term stability and Bush’s more inconsistent but still ideologically framed democracy promotion.

On the battlefield, Trump authorized an expansion in the use of force across multiple theaters. In 2017, he lifted Obama-era constraints on drone strikes and special operations raids, delegating targeting authority to lower-level commanders in countries like Somalia, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Civilian casualties rose significantly, and rules of engagement were relaxed in favor of a “kill more, worry less” ethos. The results were tactically effective in degrading high-value targets, particularly in ISIS’s final strongholds. But they did not address the vacuum left behind, nor did they resolve the governance failures that birthed these threats. ISIS's territorial defeat, for example, did not translate into the eradication of its ideology or underground networks, as later insurgent resurgence in Syria and Iraq demonstrated.

Perhaps the most controversial element of Trump’s counterterrorism posture was his approach to Syria. In 2019, he abruptly ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from northeastern Syria, effectively abandoning the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who had been America’s frontline partner in the anti-ISIS campaign. This move was widely condemned by the Pentagon, Congress, and international allies as a betrayal, allowing Turkey to launch a cross-border offensive, Russia to fill the power vacuum, and ISIS remnants to exploit the chaos. Trump’s defense of the move—"We’re keeping the oil"—reduced U.S. engagement to mercantilist terms and reinforced the perception that America had no interest in stability, justice, or post-conflict reconstruction.

Domestically, Trump’s counterterrorism paradox deepened. While his Department of Homeland Security eventually acknowledged that white supremacist terrorism posed a growing threat, the administration consistently downplayed, politicized, or ignored warnings from career intelligence officials. After the 2017 Charlottesville rally, Trump’s infamous claim that there were “very fine people on both sides” undermined efforts to build a bipartisan consensus around combating right-wing violence. Federal counterterrorism resources remained disproportionately focused on jihadist threats, even as attacks by white nationalists, anti-government extremists, and conspiracy-motivated lone actors surged. This selective attention stood in contrast to Obama’s more balanced threat assessments and Bush’s post-9/11 messaging that “Islam is peace.”

Trump’s counterterrorism doctrine operated on a logic of episodic disruption rather than systemic prevention. He fused hard power tactics with political disengagement and prioritized loyalty, spectacle, and ideological purity over strategic continuity. While his administration did succeed in killing key terrorist leaders and reducing ISIS’s territorial footprint, it failed to institutionalize any meaningful framework for addressing long-term drivers of extremism. By withdrawing from multilateral structures, defunding CVE, enabling autocrats, and polarizing domestic discourse, Trump hollowed out many of the soft power tools essential to lasting counterterrorism success. His was a doctrine of enemies eliminated, not environments transformed.

Selective Silence: Trump’s Incomplete War Against the Muslim Brotherhood

From the outset of Donald Trump's first presidential campaign in 2015, the Muslim Brotherhood was portrayed by his inner circle and media surrogates as a global ideological threat to the United States—one that fostered the political climate for jihadist terrorism through civilizational subversion rather than direct violence. Trump’s rhetoric echoed the language of Middle Eastern regimes like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, which had already designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. His early speeches denounced the Brotherhood’s political agenda as “incompatible with Western values,” and key administration figures, including Michael Flynn and Steve Bannon, hinted that a formal U.S. terrorist designation was imminent. Yet despite this early alignment of tone and intent, the Trump administration never designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The Brotherhood’s American affiliates—chief among them the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)—continued operating openly, with no serious criminal prosecutions, financial sanctions, or Justice Department scrutiny of their leadership. This gap between political posture and policy execution reveals a deeper crisis of strategic coherence inside the Trump administration—one shaped by internal resistance, bureaucratic conservatism, and an increasingly transactional approach to Islamist movements.

During Trump’s first year in office, discussions around designating the Brotherhood centered primarily on a proposal advanced by then-Senator Ted Cruz and Representative Mario Diaz-Balart. The legislation, introduced as the “Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act,” drew on extensive documentation from the 2008 Holy Land Foundation (HLF) trial, in which the U.S. government presented evidence that Brotherhood-linked actors—including CAIR, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), and the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT)—had direct financial and ideological ties to Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The case led to the conviction of five HLF executives for funneling millions to Hamas, and the trial’s unindicted co-conspirator list included CAIR’s co-founder, Nihad Awad. Despite this, and despite internal pressure from certain Trump allies to revisit HLF-era evidence, the Justice Department under Jeff Sessions, and later Bill Barr, declined to initiate new prosecutions or pursue asset seizures under material support statutes.

One reason for this reluctance was the lack of bureaucratic consensus on the Brotherhood’s status. The State Department and CIA both argued that the Brotherhood was not a monolithic organization but rather a transnational movement with diverse political expressions. Brotherhood-linked parties in Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco participated in democratic processes and often moderated their rhetoric when in power. In internal National Security Council (NSC) meetings, these entities were contrasted with more overtly militant factions like Hamas, Egyptian Hasm, and Liwa al-Thawra, which were seen as independently designable. The Department of Defense also warned against alienating Brotherhood-aligned actors in conflict zones like Libya and Yemen, where U.S. counterterrorism efforts sometimes intersected with local Islamists who opposed ISIS and al-Qaeda. This institutional compartmentalization effectively paralyzed efforts to construct a unified legal case for designation.

Compounding this paralysis was the growing influence of Sebastian Gorka, who initially entered the White House as Deputy Assistant to the President and a vocal opponent of political Islam. Gorka had previously characterized the Brotherhood as part of a "global jihadist movement," citing their role in ideological indoctrination, social penetration, and organizational infrastructure for jihadist groups. However, Gorka’s position began to shift around 2019 as he became increasingly drawn to a realist school of thought that viewed non-violent Islamist groups as potential tools of strategic containment against Salafi-jihadist entities. He began framing elements of the Brotherhood—notably the Tunisian Ennahda movement and certain Jordanian clerics—as ideological buffers capable of absorbing radical sentiment before it morphed into violence. This view mirrored the logic advanced by British, German, and even certain U.S. intelligence analysts who argued that the Brotherhood could act as a “pressure release valve” for Muslim grievances, allowing for political engagement without resort to arms.

This repositioning came despite persistent intelligence that Brotherhood-aligned networks in the U.S. had engaged in legal warfare, disinformation, and radicalization activities. CAIR, for example, had not only publicly defended Hamas on multiple occasions but also led a decade-long campaign to undermine U.S. counterterrorism training by branding law enforcement programs as “Islamophobic.” Internal FBI communications, as revealed by whistleblowers, described CAIR as a front organization whose outreach efforts masked deeper agenda-setting operations aimed at normalizing Brotherhood ideology in American civic discourse. Nevertheless, under both Sessions and Barr, the Justice Department refused to revisit CAIR’s status as an unindicted co-conspirator. Nihad Awad, despite his documented attendance at the 1993 Philadelphia meeting of Hamas supporters—revealed in FBI surveillance tapes during the HLF trial—was never charged with material support, conspiracy, or obstruction.

Instead of legal confrontation, the Trump administration defaulted to rhetorical isolation. Public statements by Trump, Pompeo, and Robert O'Brien condemned radical Islam and often named Hamas as a terrorist actor. But these statements were carefully worded to avoid directly implicating Brotherhood-affiliated domestic organizations. Even after Hamas carried out its October 7, 2023 massacre in Israel—an event that triggered unprecedented scrutiny of Brotherhood activity worldwide—Trump’s team avoided reactivating the HLF file or reopening investigations into CAIR. Internal memos suggest this was in part due to fears of triggering constitutional litigation over First Amendment rights, as well as concern that targeting CAIR would mobilize a coordinated media, legal, and NGO backlash. Advisers also warned that any formal crackdown could complicate regional diplomacy with Qatar, which remains one of the Brotherhood’s primary benefactors and a strategic U.S. base host.

Qatar’s influence, particularly through lobbying and think tank funding in Washington, further constrained the Trump administration’s options. Doha-based networks like Al Jazeera and the Qatar Foundation invested heavily in political outreach to both progressive and libertarian elements in the U.S., shaping discourse in ways that made direct confrontation with Brotherhood-linked groups politically costly. Moreover, Trump’s White House—especially under Jared Kushner—relied on Qatari channels to manage delicate negotiations in Gaza and Afghanistan, where Brotherhood-adjacent intermediaries often played indispensable roles. Designating the Brotherhood as a terrorist group would have jeopardized these backchannel arrangements and likely derailed diplomatic progress in several theaters.

Finally, Trump’s own political instincts favored ambiguity. While he capitalized on anti-Islamist sentiment to galvanize his base, he also resisted policies that could entangle him in lengthy legal fights or provoke establishment backlash. By leaving CAIR legally untouched and avoiding a formal FTO designation of the Brotherhood, Trump maintained the appearance of ideological toughness while avoiding operational risk. This calculated incoherence allowed him to continue branding himself as an enemy of radical Islam without challenging the embedded influence structures that enabled its normalization within American institutions.

To this day, Trump’s Justice Department has taken no steps to prosecute Nihad Awad, who in recent years has become increasingly vocal in anti-Israel campaigns and has been recorded praising Hamas’s “resistance.” Nor has CAIR’s nonprofit status been reviewed by the IRS despite mounting evidence of political activity that may violate 501(c)(3) regulations. While Republicans in Congress periodically revive the call to designate the Brotherhood or investigate CAIR’s foreign ties, the executive branch has thus far maintained the status quo.

Brotherhood Without Consequence: The Unresolved Islamist Threat

Despite Donald Trump's rhetorical bravado and his 2017 executive order calling for a review of foreign terrorist organizations, his first term ultimately failed to deliver on one of the most consequential national security promises: the formal designation of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a terrorist organization. This failure was not simply a matter of bureaucratic inertia or interagency resistance; it was the product of a deeper strategic ambiguity within Trump’s own national security team and a pragmatic political calculation that neutralized pressure from conservative lawmakers and Middle Eastern allies.

The Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational Sunni Islamist movement founded in Egypt in 1928, has long served as an ideological incubator for groups like Hamas, which the United States officially designates as a terrorist organization. Countries such as Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have outlawed the Brotherhood, citing its links to terrorism, subversion, and political destabilization. These regimes repeatedly lobbied the Trump administration to follow suit, hoping to establish a unified front against the Brotherhood’s influence throughout the region. Senator Ted Cruz, a persistent advocate for designation, initially introduced the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act (MBTA) in 2015 and revived it in 2017 and again in 2020. His efforts found renewed urgency following Hamas’ October 7 massacre and growing public scrutiny of Brotherhood-affiliated groups operating within the United States.

In June 2025, Cruz once again reintroduced a "modernized" version of the MBTA, emphasizing the Brotherhood’s ideological and operational links to violent jihadist organizations. Citing the Brotherhood's documented ties to the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), which was convicted in 2008 for funneling money to Hamas, Cruz renewed calls to designate MB a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), enabling travel bans, asset freezes, and material support prosecutions. He argued that this designation would align U.S. policy with those of Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, and close dangerous legal loopholes exploited by MB-affiliated front groups inside the United States. Representative Mario Diaz-Balart co-sponsored the House version, signaling a coordinated legislative push amid rising domestic extremism.

Nevertheless, even at the peak of Trump’s first-term political dominance, the White House failed to act. Key figures within the administration, particularly at the State Department and the Pentagon, resisted the move. They argued the Brotherhood was not monolithic—pointing to branches that participate in elections in Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco. Intelligence agencies raised concerns about the operational complexity of targeting an ideology that functions both overtly and covertly. Moreover, interagency legal teams warned that the designation could face constitutional challenges in U.S. courts, particularly with regard to groups like the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), whose co-founder Nihad Awad was listed as an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF trial. Any prosecution of Awad or CAIR would likely trigger a civil rights firestorm, with accusations of religious profiling and First Amendment violations.

This legal hesitation persisted even as Trump’s senior counterterrorism advisor in his second term, Sebastian Gorka, dramatically softened his position on the Brotherhood. Once an outspoken critic, Gorka began arguing that MB-aligned groups could serve as a buffer against more violent jihadist movements like ISIS and al-Qaeda. This shift aligned with a broader realpolitik recalibration, wherein the Trump administration appeared to accept the Brotherhood's presence as a manageable political force in select contexts. Particularly in theaters like Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia, U.S. forces and diplomats had to navigate complex alliances where MB-aligned actors were often embedded in fragile political coalitions or civil society.

Despite repeated calls for action—both after the 2008 Holy Land Foundation verdict and after Hamas’ October 7 assault—CAIR and Nihad Awad remain untouched by federal prosecution. Legal experts suggest that the Justice Department continues to lack sufficient evidence for criminal charges, despite mounting public scrutiny and Cruz’s assertions that the administration has "enough open-source evidence" to act. Political considerations also weigh heavily: Qatar, a key U.S. ally and host of American military bases, remains the Brotherhood’s chief patron. A direct legal assault on CAIR or affiliated groups would almost certainly draw retaliation in the form of diplomatic and economic pressure from Doha.

In effect, what Trump’s opponents call strategic ambiguity has calcified into strategic inertia. The administration continues to speak about the threat posed by Islamist networks, but refuses to target their most entrenched domestic nodes. The Brotherhood’s U.S.-based influence operations remain active, benefiting from legal permissiveness and political caution. Meanwhile, the ideological infrastructure that gave rise to Hamas, ISIS, and al-Qaeda continues to operate through community organizations, media platforms, and advocacy networks without meaningful accountability.

Thus, even as Cruz renews his legislative offensive in 2025, Trump’s national security apparatus appears committed not to confrontation, but to management. The result is an uneasy truce with the very ideology that fuels the most enduring threat to regional peace and domestic security: an Islamism that adapts, embeds, and outmaneuvers every attempt to constrain it.

From Crusader to Custodian: Gorka’s Retreat from the Brotherhood Red Line

Sebastian Gorka’s evolving stance on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) illustrates the complexities and contradictions that have characterized the Trump administration’s counterterrorism policy, particularly in its later years. When Gorka first emerged as a prominent figure in Trump’s national security team during the early days of the administration, his position on the MB was unequivocal and uncompromising. Known for his strident anti-Islamist rhetoric, Gorka openly called for the Muslim Brotherhood to be designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), framing it as the ideological root of global jihadism and a direct threat to American national security. Drawing from his background in political science and his connections to far-right Hungarian nationalist circles, Gorka portrayed the Brotherhood not merely as a political movement, but as a subversive entity committed to the Islamization of the West through stealthy infiltration and ideological warfare. He argued that the MB’s so-called “moderate” branches were a smokescreen for a broader strategy of societal domination, and therefore deserved the same legal and punitive measures as groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS.

This early hardline stance found resonance among many conservative and nationalist elements within and outside the Trump administration, who viewed the MB as a malign force behind Islamist terrorism, including the Hamas insurgency in Gaza and other proxy wars across the Middle East. Gorka frequently appeared in conservative media to articulate this viewpoint, framing the Brotherhood as a clear and present danger to Western civilization. He aligned himself with lawmakers like Senator Ted Cruz, who sought to criminalize the MB’s activities domestically and internationally through legislative initiatives such as the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act (MBTA). For a time, Gorka seemed poised to become the administration’s chief architect in a new “War on Political Islam,” aiming to decimate the Brotherhood’s global network.

However, as Trump entered his second term, Gorka’s posture toward the Brotherhood underwent a noticeable transformation that reflected broader strategic recalibrations within the administration. Appointed as senior director for counterterrorism policy on the National Security Council, Gorka adopted a more pragmatic, if less vocally militant, approach. His rhetoric softened, and he began to publicly acknowledge the internal diversity of the Brotherhood’s various regional chapters. Rather than seeing the MB as a monolithic terrorist enterprise, Gorka now framed it as a fragmented movement with some factions operating as legitimate political actors or civil society participants—especially in transitional and fragile states such as Tunisia, Libya, Jordan, and Morocco. This shift was partly driven by on-the-ground realities: U.S. military and diplomatic officials reported that in some theaters, MB-aligned parties had become vital players in political settlements and were effective counterweights to more violent Salafi-jihadist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Gorka’s shift also reflected concerns raised by intelligence and defense officials about the operational consequences of a blanket designation. Senior Pentagon advisors warned that labeling the Brotherhood an FTO could alienate key Sunni allies, complicate counterterrorism cooperation, and risk driving moderate Islamist actors into the arms of extremist groups. Moreover, there were legal and constitutional complications in pursuing such a designation domestically, given the MB’s decentralized structure and the existence of front organizations operating openly within the U.S., including the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). Gorka reportedly received frequent briefings highlighting these complexities, which influenced his more nuanced policy recommendations. Instead of wholesale criminalization, he favored increased surveillance, intelligence sharing, and efforts to expose financial flows linked to Hamas and other violent factions without triggering large-scale legal battles over religious freedom.

This pragmatic recalibration drew criticism and confusion among Trump’s original base of hardline supporters. Conservative media commentators accused Gorka of backtracking and watering down his principles under bureaucratic pressure. Some suggested that his pivot reflected influence from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states like Qatar and Turkey, which remained key patrons of different Brotherhood factions and had strong ties to the U.S. military and diplomatic apparatus. Others speculated that Gorka’s willingness to tolerate the Brotherhood’s presence was a tactical move within an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape, where the binary good-versus-evil framework no longer held.

The practical consequences of Gorka’s evolving stance were significant. Throughout Trump’s second term and into the present day, the administration maintained a policy of “strategic tolerance” toward Brotherhood-affiliated groups in the U.S. and abroad. Despite the October 7 massacre by Hamas, which reignited calls for aggressive action against the MB network, no new prosecutions or designations have targeted CAIR, Nihad Awad, or other Brotherhood-linked organizations. Gorka’s position effectively allowed these groups to continue operating in a legal gray zone—subject to monitoring but largely shielded from prosecution or sanctions. His framing of the Brotherhood as a “manageable adversary” rather than an existential threat became institutional orthodoxy within the Trump NSC by 2024, embodying a shift away from the “War on Political Islam” rhetoric of 2016 toward a policy of containment and engagement.

Sebastian Gorka’s journey from ardent foe to cautious custodian of the Muslim Brotherhood underscores the tangled intersection of ideology, realpolitik, legal constraints, and geopolitical exigencies that have shaped the Trump administration’s approach to Islamist extremism. While initially poised to dismantle the Brotherhood’s influence decisively, Gorka ultimately embraced a policy that tacitly accepted the Brotherhood’s persistence—balancing concerns over jihadist threats with the pragmatic demands of diplomacy and domestic legal complexities. This evolution has contributed to an unresolved paradox: a U.S. counterterrorism framework that condemns Islamist violence rhetorically but tolerates the ideological infrastructure that sustains it, leaving the Brotherhood’s transnational networks largely intact and influential.

Puppet Masters of U.S. Ambivalence: How Qatar and Turkey Shield the Muslim Brotherhood from Justice

Qatar and Turkey’s pivotal roles in shaping the United States’ restrained and conflicted stance toward designating the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a terrorist organization stem from deeply intertwined geopolitical, ideological, and operational factors that place Washington in an enduring bind. The relationship between these two regional power players and the MB is neither incidental nor marginal; rather, it reflects a conscious, long-term strategy by Doha and Ankara to utilize the Brotherhood’s transnational Islamist network as a means to extend their influence across the Middle East and beyond. Their patronage, financial backing, and political protection have allowed the Brotherhood to survive repeated crackdowns, political delegitimization, and international pressure. This reality significantly complicates U.S. efforts to adopt a decisive, unequivocal policy toward the MB, exposing the contradictions in America’s Middle East strategy, where counterterrorism objectives clash with pragmatic alliance management.

Qatar’s Role and Influence

Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood traces back decades but became most conspicuous during and after the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, when Doha emerged as the primary Gulf sponsor of the Brotherhood and allied Islamist movements. This support is multidimensional, encompassing direct financial aid, political asylum, media amplification, and facilitation of global fundraising networks. One key instrument of Qatari influence has been the funding of the Brotherhood’s affiliated media outlets, especially Al Jazeera. Launched in 1996 and funded by the Qatari government, Al Jazeera rapidly became a dominant voice promoting political Islam and legitimizing the Brotherhood’s political ambitions. Its Arabic channel in particular amplified Brotherhood narratives during the Egyptian revolution of 2011, casting the MB as champions of democracy and reform, while downplaying or ignoring reports of violence, extremism, or human rights abuses linked to Brotherhood factions.

In practical terms, Qatar has provided sanctuary to Brotherhood leaders forced into exile following Egypt’s military coup in 2013, which brutally suppressed the group and designated it a terrorist organization. Figures such as Mohamed Morsi’s close associates and senior Brotherhood operatives have found refuge in Doha, using it as a hub for political coordination and fundraising. The Qatari government’s willingness to shield these leaders from prosecution or extradition has been a major obstacle to international efforts to hold the Brotherhood accountable. Moreover, Qatar has financially supported a network of charitable organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) linked to the Brotherhood across the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. These entities often operate under the guise of humanitarian aid but have been repeatedly accused of channeling funds to extremist groups, including Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood.

The strategic importance of Qatar to the United States further complicates this dynamic. The Al Udeid Air Base, located near Doha, is the largest U.S. military installation in the Middle East and a vital node for American operations across Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It hosts the headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and is the launch point for drone strikes and intelligence-gathering missions critical to American counterterrorism efforts. Any direct punitive action against Qatar for its Brotherhood support risks jeopardizing these military assets and the broader operational flexibility of U.S. forces in the region. This reality has forced American policymakers into a form of realpolitik, balancing counterterrorism imperatives against strategic military necessity.

Despite international pressure from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain—which culminated in the 2017 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) blockade of Qatar—Doha has remained steadfast in its support for the Brotherhood. The blockade, which accused Qatar of funding terrorism and supporting destabilizing Islamist movements, failed to force Doha to abandon its patronage. Instead, Qatar doubled down, intensifying its diplomatic outreach and seeking to solidify ties with Turkey and Iran as counterweights to Gulf Arab pressure. This resilience has ensured that the Brotherhood’s global networks remain active and shielded from decisive disruption.

Turkey’s Role and Influence

Turkey’s role as a protector and promoter of the Muslim Brotherhood is equally consequential and driven by Erdoğan’s Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) political ideology. Erdoğan and the AKP share an affinity with the Brotherhood’s vision of political Islam as a legitimate vehicle for governance, framing their support in terms of religious solidarity and democratic rights. Since the ousting of Egypt’s first democratically elected MB president Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Turkey has provided both refuge and vocal political support for the Brotherhood, denouncing the Egyptian military government’s crackdown as authoritarian repression.

Beyond rhetoric, Ankara has materially supported Brotherhood-affiliated groups in key regional theaters. In Libya, Turkish backing of Islamist militias linked to the Brotherhood has helped tip the balance of power in the ongoing civil conflict, often in opposition to Egypt and the UAE, who support rival factions. Similarly, Turkey’s support for Hamas in Gaza—widely recognized as an offshoot of the Brotherhood—has provided the organization with critical financial and political backing. Turkey’s control of key sea routes and military deployments in northern Syria also facilitates logistical support to Islamist groups connected to the Brotherhood’s ideological network.

Turkey’s status as a NATO member and strategic partner for the United States complicates Washington’s ability to confront Ankara over its MB patronage. While the U.S. and Turkey cooperate on intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and military operations, Ankara’s support for the Brotherhood and its sometimes adversarial posture—such as its conflicts with U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in Syria—introduce tensions. The U.S. faces a dilemma: alienating Turkey risks fracturing NATO cohesion and limiting American influence in a critical region adjacent to Russia and Iran, yet acquiescing to Ankara’s support for the Brotherhood undermines counterterrorism objectives and regional stability.

Narrative Control and Lobbying Influence

Both Qatar and Turkey exert significant influence over the international narrative framing the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly within Western political and academic circles. Media outlets like Al Jazeera and Anadolu Agency actively project the Brotherhood as a moderate, reformist movement wrongfully persecuted by authoritarian regimes. This framing appeals to segments of the U.S. political establishment and policy community that prioritize pluralism and political inclusion over hardline security designations, complicating bipartisan consensus for terrorist designations.

Within the United States, lobbying by groups linked directly or indirectly to the Brotherhood—such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and allied Muslim-American organizations—has helped shield the Brotherhood’s American affiliates from prosecution or designation. Despite documented links between CAIR co-founder Nihad Awad and the Holy Land Foundation, which was convicted of funneling money to Hamas, neither CAIR nor Awad have faced prosecution, underscoring the political sensitivity surrounding Brotherhood-linked organizations in the U.S. This reluctance is symptomatic of broader tensions between civil rights advocacy, counterterrorism law enforcement, and geopolitical imperatives.

Legislative Efforts and Policy Ambiguity

Efforts to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization have encountered persistent roadblocks. Senator Ted Cruz’s resubmission of the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act (MBTA) underscores ongoing congressional frustration, yet the bill has struggled to gain sufficient traction. The reluctance of executive agencies to act decisively reflects not only the geopolitical imperatives involving Qatar and Turkey but also operational challenges in proving the MB’s direct involvement in terrorist acts under U.S. legal standards.

Senior Trump administration officials, such as Sebastian Gorka, have expressed ambivalence toward the MB, viewing certain Brotherhood factions as potential moderates and useful bulwarks against jihadist extremists. This perspective, shared by some in the administration’s counterterrorism circles, further diluted pressure for a hardline designation. For all the rhetoric about confronting Islamist extremism, Washington’s position has been characterized by “strategic ambiguity”—publicly condemning violent extremism while tacitly tolerating or even cooperating with Brotherhood-linked actors deemed politically useful or ideologically moderate.

Qatar and Turkey’s financial backing, political protection, media influence, and strategic alliances have created a protective shield around the Muslim Brotherhood, enabling it to operate transnationally with relative impunity. Their indispensable military and diplomatic ties with the United States have forced Washington into a cautious and conflicted approach, prioritizing alliance management over unequivocal counterterrorism measures. Until this complex geopolitical calculus shifts—whether through changes in regional power dynamics, U.S. strategic priorities, or Brotherhood behavior—the Muslim Brotherhood will remain a legally ambiguous, operationally resilient actor embedded within a network of state patronage, complicating U.S. efforts to decisively counter Islamist extremism at its ideological and organizational roots.

Strategic Communication: The Mixed Signals of Trump’s Ambiguity on the Muslim Brotherhood to the Muslim World

Donald Trump’s equivocal and often contradictory stance on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) delivers a nuanced and complex message to the Muslim world that has profound implications for U.S. influence, regional stability, and the ideological battle against violent extremism. His administration’s reluctance to unequivocally designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, coupled with selective rhetoric and policies that at times appear to accommodate or legitimize Brotherhood-affiliated actors, generates a strategic communication dilemma that shapes perceptions, alliances, and ideological contestation across Muslim-majority societies.

At its core, this ambiguity projects a narrative of strategic inconsistency. For many Muslim audiences—ranging from Islamist sympathizers to neutral observers—Trump’s refusal to impose a formal terrorist designation on the Brotherhood despite broad evidence and bipartisan congressional support signals a de facto legitimization or political tolerance of the group. The Brotherhood is thus implicitly framed less as a monolithic extremist organization and more as a diverse political movement with potential for moderation and political integration. This perception is reinforced by public statements from senior Trump officials like Sebastian Gorka, who praised certain Brotherhood elements as “moderates” and “a bulwark against jihadists,” thereby lending the Brotherhood an aura of acceptability.

This ambiguity provides ideological and operational breathing space for the Brotherhood’s transnational network, emboldening its political activism, charitable endeavors, and outreach across the Middle East, North Africa, and the global Muslim diaspora. For example, in Tunisia, where the Brotherhood’s affiliate Ennahda party remains a significant political force, Trump’s mixed signals have indirectly supported the group’s continued political legitimacy and electoral participation despite ongoing concerns about its commitment to democratic norms. Similarly, in Jordan, where the Muslim Brotherhood operates under severe restrictions, ambiguity from Washington complicates Amman’s efforts to suppress Brotherhood activities, as Brotherhood leaders can claim partial U.S. tolerance as a shield.

Moreover, the ambiguity has had practical consequences in the Palestinian territories, where Hamas—a Brotherhood offshoot—continues to receive material and ideological support from regional patrons like Qatar and Turkey. Trump’s administration’s refusal to designate Hamas fully as a terrorist group under the broader MB umbrella, despite Israel’s vehement calls, has contributed to the persistence of Hamas’s political and military presence in Gaza. This situation reinforces Hamas’s narrative of resistance and legitimizes its role as a governing authority, complicating prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Conversely, this perceived accommodation simultaneously alienates and frustrates key U.S. regional partners, notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, who regard the Brotherhood as an existential threat to their regimes and regional order. Following the 2013 military coup in Egypt that ousted the Brotherhood-affiliated Mohamed Morsi, the Egyptian government launched an uncompromising campaign to eradicate Brotherhood influence domestically and abroad. These states have aggressively cracked down on Brotherhood affiliates, branding the movement as a terrorist entity responsible for fomenting instability, political violence, and subversion. Trump’s equivocal stance risks eroding American credibility and trust among these critical allies. For instance, despite Egyptian requests, the Trump administration declined to list the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), a move that Cairo saw as undermining their counterterrorism efforts and emboldening Brotherhood sympathizers.

This tension undermines Washington’s strategic objective of fostering a united front against Islamist extremism. It complicates bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism intelligence sharing, joint military operations, and regional diplomatic initiatives aimed at curbing Brotherhood-linked influence. For example, the 2017 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis—where Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar citing its support for the Muslim Brotherhood—highlighted divergent U.S. positions. While the Trump administration vocally criticized Qatar’s alleged support for extremism, it hesitated to take definitive steps against Qatar, whose airbase hosts critical U.S. Central Command assets. This hesitance exposed rifts in the U.S. regional strategy and weakened the coherence of the anti-Brotherhood front.

Moreover, Trump’s ambiguous messaging feeds into the broader extremist propaganda ecosystem. Islamist militant groups and jihadist recruiters exploit U.S. inconsistencies as proof of Western double standards and hypocrisy. For example, ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates have repeatedly highlighted the U.S.’s failure to designate the Brotherhood as evidence that America selectively targets only the most violent extremists while tolerating groups that share their Islamist ideology. This undermines the moral legitimacy of counterterrorism campaigns and hampers efforts to win “hearts and minds” among populations vulnerable to radicalization.

In the media environment, Brotherhood-affiliated outlets such as Al Jazeera—backed by Qatar—and Turkish state media have amplified this narrative, framing the Brotherhood as victims of authoritarian repression and champions of democracy and political rights. These narratives resonate in public opinion across much of the Muslim world, where skepticism toward Western interventionism is widespread. For instance, Al Jazeera’s coverage of the Egyptian crackdown often highlights human rights abuses while downplaying Brotherhood-linked violence, portraying the movement as a legitimate political force unfairly targeted by authoritarian regimes. Trump’s lack of clear condemnation bolsters these portrayals, allowing the Brotherhood and its patrons to present themselves as defenders of political pluralism in opposition to oppressive regimes backed by the West.

This communication ambiguity also reflects the broader geopolitical constraints facing the Trump administration. The strategic importance of U.S. military bases in Qatar, alongside the political and military alliance with Turkey—both key Brotherhood patrons—creates a complex environment in which hardline counterterrorism policies risk jeopardizing critical operational capabilities and alliance cohesion. For example, the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is central to U.S. operations against ISIS and regional stability. Pressuring Qatar too harshly over the Brotherhood risks losing access or cooperation, thus limiting U.S. military options. Similarly, Turkey’s continued support for Brotherhood-linked groups in Syria and Libya complicates U.S.-Turkey relations, especially as Ankara positions itself as a regional power broker. Trump’s administration balanced these realities by choosing restraint over decisive action against the Brotherhood.

Domestically, Trump’s ambiguity serves to balance conflicting political constituencies. Hardline conservatives demand tough stances on Islamist extremism, while influential Muslim-American advocacy groups and civil rights organizations resist policies that could stigmatize Muslim communities or infringe on civil liberties. For example, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), often accused of having Brotherhood links, has remained unprosecuted despite accusations from some quarters and its designation as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation trials. Trump’s administration did not move aggressively against CAIR or its co-founder Nihad Awad, reflecting a cautious approach to avoid backlash from Muslim-American communities and civil rights groups.

In effect, Trump’s ambiguous position on the Muslim Brotherhood communicates a layered message to the Muslim world that complicates U.S. strategic objectives. It simultaneously offers political space and partial legitimacy to Brotherhood-affiliated actors, alienates important regional allies, feeds extremist propaganda narratives, and reflects the competing imperatives of geopolitics and domestic politics. This muddled messaging weakens U.S. soft power, undermines counterterrorism efforts, and perpetuates uncertainty about American resolve in confronting ideological roots of Islamist extremism.

Until Washington reconciles these contradictions by formulating a coherent, consistent policy on the Muslim Brotherhood that aligns its messaging with its strategic objectives and alliance commitments, the administration’s strategic communication will remain fractured and ineffective. This ongoing ambiguity hampers efforts to build trust, stabilize critical regions, and counter violent extremism in a way that is both principled and pragmatic.

Ignoring the Information Battlefield: How Neglecting Ideological Drivers Guarantees the Persistence of Hamas and Islamist Extremism

The failure of the Trump administration to engage meaningfully with the information space and ideological factors that underpin Islamist extremism risks allowing groups like Hamas—and their ideological kin—to persist indefinitely as powerful actors in their regions. This neglect is not a marginal policy gap but rather a fundamental strategic flaw that undermines all conventional counterterrorism measures and frustrates any hope for lasting peace.

Hamas’s endurance illustrates the centrality of ideology and narrative control in sustaining violent Islamist movements. Unlike purely militant organizations that rely solely on armed force or territorial control, Hamas operates as a hybrid political-military entity deeply embedded in its social fabric. Its Islamist ideology, inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood’s doctrine, provides a coherent worldview that justifies armed resistance against Israel, frames the conflict as a religious duty, and offers an alternative political vision to Palestinian society. The effectiveness of Hamas’s ideology is amplified through an extensive, well-coordinated information ecosystem that reaches far beyond military confrontation.

This ecosystem includes religious sermons in mosques, educational curricula in schools and religious institutions, charitable organizations providing social services, media outlets such as Al-Aqsa TV and affiliated social media platforms, and community centers. Through these channels, Hamas shapes public opinion, recruits fighters, and cultivates a sense of identity and purpose among Palestinians, especially youth who face economic hardship and political disenfranchisement. The movement’s portrayal of itself as a defender of Palestinian dignity and Islamic values resonates deeply in a population shaped by decades of occupation, displacement, and conflict.

If the Trump administration neglects to challenge this ideological narrative—either by strategic communication campaigns, engagement with moderate voices, or development assistance that addresses underlying grievances—it implicitly concedes the information battlefield to Hamas and similar Islamist groups. This forfeiture has several critical consequences:

Unchallenged Narrative Legitimacy: Hamas’s framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in religious and moralistic terms goes largely unopposed in the Palestinian public sphere. Absent credible alternative narratives that acknowledge Palestinian grievances while rejecting violent extremism, Hamas maintains a near-monopoly on political legitimacy. This stymies the emergence of moderate political actors capable of negotiating peace or fostering pluralism.

Recruitment and Radicalization: The ideological vacuum enables Hamas and other Islamist groups to recruit continuously, especially among disenfranchised youth. The lack of sustained counter-radicalization efforts—such as community outreach programs, educational reforms promoting critical thinking, and support for moderate Islamic scholars—means that vulnerable populations remain susceptible to extremist messaging.

Enduring Social Support Networks: Hamas’s social services, funded in part through donations and networks tied to the Muslim Brotherhood and regional patrons, generate significant grassroots support. This social embeddedness protects Hamas from being isolated or eradicated purely through military means. Without countervailing community investments that offer alternatives, Hamas’s social capital remains intact.

Operational Resilience: The ideological support and community integration that Hamas enjoys provide operational advantages. Public sympathy complicates intelligence gathering and undermines security efforts by encouraging local populations to conceal or tacitly support militant activities. The result is a self-perpetuating cycle in which military operations against Hamas provoke further radicalization and reinforce the group’s narrative of resistance.

Regional Spillover Effects: Hamas’s ideological narrative and organizational model inspire Islamist movements throughout the Middle East and beyond. Ignoring ideological factors allows similar groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and various Islamist factions in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, to sustain themselves and expand. This transnational spread complicates U.S. efforts to promote stability and counterterrorism across multiple theaters.

Erosion of U.S. Soft Power: The absence of coherent strategic communication to Muslim audiences about America’s commitment to countering extremism while respecting legitimate grievances weakens U.S. influence. Extremist propaganda exploits U.S. policy contradictions to portray America as biased, unjust, and hostile to Islam, fueling anti-American sentiment and recruitment.

Historically, other administrations have recognized the necessity of integrating ideological and information campaigns into counterterrorism strategies. The Obama administration, for instance, invested in “countering violent extremism” (CVE) initiatives that sought to empower moderate voices, disrupt extremist propaganda online, and support civil society organizations. Though these efforts had mixed results, they acknowledged the indispensable role of ideology in violent extremism’s lifecycle.

In contrast, the Trump administration’s limited engagement in this realm—often focusing overwhelmingly on military and law enforcement measures—undermines a holistic approach. For example, while conducting airstrikes against Hamas infrastructure or imposing sanctions, the administration failed to develop robust public diplomacy strategies to counter Hamas’s ideological appeal or support local partners promoting nonviolent political participation.

Additionally, Trump’s ambiguous stance on the Muslim Brotherhood and related groups—hesitating to designate them as terrorist organizations—further muddied the ideological clarity necessary to delegitimize Hamas. This ambiguity sent mixed signals to Muslim publics and regional allies, diluting the potency of counter-extremism narratives and emboldening Brotherhood-affiliated networks that underpin Hamas.

If these ideological and information-space dimensions continue to be sidelined, Hamas’s permanence is all but guaranteed. Military victories will be temporary and superficial, as the group’s deep-rooted ideological and social foundations enable regeneration and adaptation. Peace negotiations remain hostage to Hamas’s ability to mobilize mass support and reject compromise under the banner of religious and nationalist struggle.

Ultimately, ignoring ideology and the information environment sacrifices the “hearts and minds” battle, the decisive arena where long-term victories against violent Islamist extremism are won or lost. Without a comprehensive strategy that marries hard security measures with ideological contestation, support for moderate actors, and community empowerment, Hamas and similar organizations will remain indelible fixtures of the Middle East landscape—persisting, adapting, and perpetuating cycles of violence and instability.

Exploitation Strategies: How the Muslim Brotherhood and Extremist Groups Leverage U.S. Ambiguity and Restraint

The Muslim Brotherhood and allied Islamist extremist organizations have been quick to perceive the Trump administration’s ambiguous stance and restrained approach to designating and countering them not as mere policy inconsistencies, but as strategic openings to expand their influence and consolidate power both in the Middle East and within Muslim communities in the United States and beyond. This ambiguity has allowed them to rehabilitate their public image and operate with a degree of legitimacy that previous, firmer U.S. policies sought to deny. By avoiding a formal terrorist designation and refraining from prosecuting affiliated groups such as CAIR and its co-founder Nihad Awad, these organizations have been able to present themselves as moderate political actors and defenders of Muslim civil rights, effectively blunting scrutiny and enabling them to openly fundraise, lobby, and engage with communities without the legal or reputational constraints that accompany terrorist labeling.

This softening of U.S. policy has further empowered the Brotherhood’s extensive information ecosystem to flourish unchecked. Their narrative, which frames the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and broader regional struggles—as both a political and religious imperative, has gained ground unopposed in many Muslim-majority societies and diaspora communities. Through a sophisticated network of mosques, educational programs, media outlets like Al-Aqsa TV, and social media platforms, the Brotherhood crafts powerful stories of victimhood and resistance. These narratives resonate deeply among disenfranchised populations, particularly youth facing economic hardship and political exclusion, fueling radicalization and justifying violent resistance as a sacred duty.

At the grassroots level, Brotherhood-affiliated organizations continue to expand their social service provision, from charitable assistance to education and healthcare. This deeply embedded social infrastructure engenders community loyalty and political leverage, positioning the Brotherhood as an indispensable actor in the daily lives of millions. Such social capital not only sustains their political movements in countries across the Middle East and North Africa but also creates recruitment pipelines that feed into militant wings. In diaspora communities, similar patterns emerge, with Brotherhood-linked groups wielding influence over political mobilization and public opinion, often under the protective umbrella of U.S. civil liberties frameworks.

Compounding these dynamics is the strategic patronage the Brotherhood enjoys from regional powers like Qatar and Turkey. These countries view Islamist movements as instruments of geopolitical influence, providing funding, political cover, and safe havens that allow the Brotherhood to operate with relative impunity. The Trump administration’s reluctance to confront these patrons decisively has thus indirectly bolstered the Brotherhood’s capacity to maneuver regionally and internationally. The complex web of support sustains their organizational resilience, enabling them to navigate political challenges and expand their reach.

This environment of ambiguity and restrained U.S. action also undermines the efficacy of American and allied counterterrorism operations. By operating within legal and political gray zones, Brotherhood-affiliated groups complicate intelligence and law enforcement efforts to monitor and disrupt extremist networks. The divided approach within the U.S. government over how aggressively to address the Brotherhood creates policy incoherence, providing operational space for affiliated militant factions to plan and execute attacks with less risk of detection. The resulting fragmentation hampers a coherent and sustained campaign against violent Islamist extremism.

Domestically, the Brotherhood and its affiliates exploit rising social and political polarization, as well as grievances related to Islamophobia and discrimination in Western societies. By positioning themselves as champions against marginalization, they deepen their influence within Muslim minorities, cultivating environments conducive to radicalization. The lack of clear condemnation or decisive governmental action against these groups permits them to exploit protections under civil rights laws, effectively shielding activities that serve extremist ends.

Moreover, the Brotherhood’s messaging skillfully frames U.S. policies as hypocritical and hostile towards Muslims, eroding American credibility and soft power in the Islamic world. Highlighting military interventions, unwavering support for Israel, and failure to address Palestinian grievances, they portray the United States as an adversary to Islam itself. This narrative inflames anti-American sentiment and provides fertile ground for more radical groups to recruit and justify violence, presenting themselves as the authentic defenders of Muslim communities.

In essence, the Muslim Brotherhood and its allied extremist networks have turned the Trump administration’s policy ambiguity and ideological neglect into an opportunity to strengthen their ideological reach, social embeddedness, and operational capabilities. Their ability to exploit these openings not only secures their survival but also entrenches them as powerful, enduring actors in the Middle East and within Muslim diaspora communities worldwide. Without a robust, ideologically informed, and consistent U.S. strategy that addresses these underlying information and identity battles, the prospects for weakening Hamas and similar groups remain bleak, ensuring their persistence and continued challenge to regional and global security.

Policy Recommendations: Toward a Coherent, Ideologically Informed Counterterrorism Strategy

Addressing the complex challenge posed by the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated extremist organizations requires a holistic and strategically coherent policy framework that extends beyond conventional military and law enforcement measures. The Trump administration’s ambiguous stance and restrained approach toward these groups have inadvertently allowed them to exploit legal ambiguities, social service networks, and powerful ideological narratives. This situation highlights the urgent need for a recalibrated U.S. strategy grounded in clarity, consistency, and a deep understanding of ideological dimensions.

One critical step involves decisively advancing the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). While such a designation carries significant symbolic weight, its practical implications are even more consequential. It would empower American law enforcement agencies with enhanced legal tools to disrupt funding streams, freeze assets, and prosecute individuals and organizations that provide material support to Brotherhood-affiliated entities. Groups such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and others previously shielded by ambiguous policy frameworks could face more rigorous scrutiny and accountability. However, designating the Brotherhood is not a silver bullet; it should be paired with a sustained enforcement campaign to ensure that legal protections are not exploited to mask extremist activities under the cover of civil liberties or community advocacy.

Alongside legal designations, integrating a robust ideological dimension into counterterrorism efforts presents a vital opportunity to undercut the Brotherhood’s influence at its roots. The Brotherhood’s narratives—framing themselves as victims of oppression, defenders of Islam, and champions of resistance—have proven powerful tools for recruitment and legitimization. Developing and disseminating alternative religious and political narratives, in partnership with respected Muslim scholars, local religious leaders, and moderate civil society actors, could offer culturally resonant counterpoints that delegitimize violent jihadism and expose the Brotherhood’s political opportunism. Such efforts would ideally extend to educational curricula, media programming, and social media campaigns targeting populations vulnerable to radicalization, especially youth facing economic or social disenfranchisement.

On the diplomatic front, the United States benefits from reassessing its relationship with regional patrons that enable the Brotherhood’s operations. Countries such as Qatar and Turkey provide financial support, safe havens, and political cover to Brotherhood-linked groups, often leveraging these Islamist movements as instruments of regional influence. Sustained diplomatic engagement combined with calibrated pressure—ranging from economic incentives to security cooperation—could encourage these patrons to curb their support for extremist organizations. Integrating this approach into broader regional strategies involving allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, and other key partners enhances its effectiveness. Without addressing the external sponsorship and sanctuary that bolster Brotherhood networks, efforts to weaken their influence risk being undercut.

Within the United States, strengthening coordination among intelligence, law enforcement, and financial regulatory bodies holds significant promise for disrupting Brotherhood-linked networks domestically. This includes empowering interagency task forces to monitor suspicious financial flows, track extremist communications, and act promptly on credible threats. Crucially, these efforts need to balance aggressive enforcement with safeguarding civil liberties and maintaining community trust. Building partnerships with Muslim community organizations that reject extremist ideologies can facilitate intelligence sharing and reduce the social isolation that often drives radicalization.

Furthermore, investing in moderate Muslim voices and institutions can help create a societal environment resistant to extremist appeals. Funding for community development, leadership training, interfaith dialogue, and political participation platforms provides alternatives to the Brotherhood’s social services and political mobilization. These investments convey a long-term commitment to fostering pluralistic societies rooted in democratic values and human rights, thereby undercutting the appeal of Islamist movements that exploit grievances.

Increasing transparency and public awareness about the Brotherhood’s ideology and activities also plays a crucial role in shaping policy and public opinion. Congressional hearings, detailed reports from intelligence agencies, and open discussions in the media can educate both policymakers and the broader public about the complexities of Islamist extremist networks that masquerade as moderate political actors. Enhanced public understanding builds the political will necessary for sustained, effective counterterrorism efforts and reduces the risk of ideological confusion or misplaced sympathy.

Finally, the United States might explore multilateral coordination on these issues, working with international partners to share intelligence, harmonize legal frameworks, and develop joint strategies to counter Brotherhood-linked extremism globally. As the Brotherhood operates transnationally, isolated national approaches face limitations. A collaborative international posture strengthens enforcement capabilities and counters the ideological narratives that transcend borders.

Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood and similar extremist organizations benefits from an integrated and multi-dimensional strategy. Legal rigor, ideological engagement, diplomatic pressure on regional patrons, enhanced intelligence coordination, community partnerships, public education, and international collaboration collectively provide the best chance of closing the operational and ideological spaces these groups exploit. Such a comprehensive approach not only addresses immediate security concerns but also seeks to undermine the long-term appeal and resilience of Islamist extremism, contributing to regional stability and safeguarding American interests both at home and abroad.

Breaking the Cycle: Toward Clarity and Coherence in Countering Islamist Extremism

The persistent ambiguity in U.S. policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood risks perpetuating a cycle in which extremist ideologies find fertile ground to grow and metastasize, threatening regional security and domestic stability alike. A nuanced yet firm approach that combines legal clarity, ideological confrontation, diplomatic leverage, and community engagement offers the best path forward. This report underscores that piecemeal or inconsistent policies not only embolden extremist groups but also undermine U.S. credibility and influence in a volatile region. Breaking free from the ambiguity trap requires bold leadership, coordinated international efforts, and an unwavering commitment to confronting the ideological underpinnings of Islamist extremism. Only then can the United States hope to decisively shape the future of the Middle East and secure its own homeland against the evolving threats that the Muslim Brotherhood and similar organizations represent.