The Impact of a potential Islamic Republic Collapse on the Saudi Role in the Middle East
by Irina Tsukerman
Between Collapse and Control: Saudi Arabia’s Economic Strategy Amid Iran’s Disintegration
If the Islamic Republic of Iran collapses, Saudi Arabia’s economic role in the region would likely expand dramatically and take on a far more assertive, multidimensional character, transforming Riyadh from an energy hegemon into a regional economic orchestrator. This shift would be driven by both opportunity and necessity: the power vacuum left by Iran’s implosion would create space for Saudi influence, but also strategic pressure to stabilize neighboring economies and contain disorder that could threaten its Vision 2030 ambitions. The ensuing economic transformation would be characterized by four interwoven dynamics: Saudi Arabia’s emergence as a capital exporter and economic stabilizer, its expanded logistical and energy infrastructure influence, its monopolization of certain religious and cultural industries, and its increasingly prominent role in regional reconstruction diplomacy.
First, with the Iranian state in collapse, Saudi Arabia would likely assume the role of regional economic stabilizer, deploying its sovereign wealth through the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and other mechanisms to inject liquidity, reconstruct shattered economies, and influence political trajectories through investment. Much as the UAE has used strategic capital injections in Sudan, Egypt, and Libya to assert influence, Riyadh would likely aim to shape the post-Iran order by backing emerging political centers in former Iranian territories, as well as counterbalancing Turkish and Qatari influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The absence of Iranian patronage would create major vulnerabilities in those economies, particularly in Shi’a-majority or Shi’a-influenced areas, and Saudi Arabia could use financial stabilization to gain indirect control over formerly Tehran-aligned actors. This would not necessarily be done through overt economic hegemony but via a more subtle form of conditional economic engagement: investment in return for political moderation, disarmament of militias, or alignment with the Saudi-dominated Gulf consensus.
Second, Saudi Arabia would likely capitalize on Iran’s infrastructural disintegration to consolidate control over regional energy and logistics networks. With Iran’s export capacities crippled or inaccessible due to internal collapse, Saudi Arabia would further entrench itself as the undisputed supplier of crude and refined petroleum products to both regional and global markets. More significantly, it would seek to reorient regional energy transit corridors to bypass former Iranian routes. The Arab pipeline networks (e.g., the EastMed pipeline, or the Iraq-Jordan-Aqaba route) would receive accelerated Saudi investment, not just as transit hubs but as instruments of strategic dependence. Saudi firms could be positioned to dominate pipeline construction, energy marketing, and refinery development in formerly Iranian-influenced countries. Additionally, Riyadh would likely move to build or control overland trade corridors between the Gulf, Levant, and Central Asia—routes once contested by Iran’s "Axis of Resistance" land bridge strategy. Such initiatives would be seen as part of a broader attempt to remake the region’s economic geography in Saudi Arabia’s image.
Third, Saudi Arabia would likely dominate the religious, cultural, and tourism sectors that Iran once used for soft power projection. The collapse of the Islamic Republic would dismantle the infrastructure behind Shi’a pilgrimage circuits, religious scholarship, and cultural outreach, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Saudi Arabia, which has already been attempting to reinvent itself as a center of moderate Islam, could seize this moment to reassert Wahhabi-inspired Sunni orthodoxy and reclaim regional religious legitimacy. Economically, this would translate into massive investment in religious tourism not just to Mecca and Medina, but potentially into sites in Jordan and the Levant as part of a broader regional Islamic tourism market. Riyadh’s plans to rebrand itself as a global cultural hub would gain a new dimension: the use of Sunni identity as an economic and diplomatic multiplier in post-Iran regional environments.
Fourth, Saudi Arabia would position itself at the heart of a new post-conflict reconstruction diplomacy, particularly in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and possibly Iran itself. This would mirror and expand on the Saudi role in post-war Yemen, though in a much larger theater. The Kingdom would likely coordinate with the United States, Egypt, and possibly a post-Islamic Republic Iran to convene reconstruction conferences, establish funding mechanisms, and set political preconditions for investment. This would be both an economic and geopolitical maneuver. Riyadh would be able to steer reconstruction priorities in a way that marginalizes Turkish, Qatari, and Chinese competition, ensures the exclusion of resurgent Iranian factions, and promotes a Gulf-centric economic architecture.
However, the Saudi economic ascendancy in the absence of Iran would not be uncontested. Turkey would see the vacuum as an opportunity to expand its own economic and logistical reach, especially through northern Iraq and Syria. The UAE, while nominally aligned with Riyadh, would likely compete for control of strategic ports, digital infrastructure, and financial sectors in Lebanon and the Levant. Qatar would try to exert soft power through media and financial support to non-Gulf-aligned Islamist factions. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s own internal transformation remains fragile, and its ability to project sustained economic influence will depend on the stability of its domestic reforms and leadership continuity.
Ultimately, the collapse of the Islamic Republic would force Saudi Arabia to transition from a reactive energy superpower to a proactive architect of regional economic order. This would be an era-defining shift—one that could reshape the Middle East’s economic map for decades and redefine Saudi Arabia not only as the guardian of Mecca, but as the banker, builder, and broker of a post-Iranian regional future.
The prospect of Iran’s collapse—whether through internal revolution, elite fragmentation, or systemic economic implosion—opens not only vast economic opportunities for Saudi Arabia but also triggers the Kingdom’s most deeply embedded security anxieties. The strategic calculus in Riyadh revolves around an uncomfortable duality: the possibility of emerging as the architect of a new regional economic order collides with the looming threat that Iranian disintegration sends cascading instability across borders, into fragile Arab states, and ultimately toward the heart of Saudi territory itself. Thus, the Kingdom’s post-Iran economic posture is inseparable from its overarching goal of national preservation, regime continuity, and long-term geopolitical insulation.
The most immediate concern inside the Kingdom's national security establishment centers on the fragmentation of Iran into unstable zones. Iran is a multi-ethnic, semi-imperial state whose core political coherence has historically depended on strong coercive institutions, particularly the IRGC. The fall of the Islamic Republic dismantles that architecture, releasing long-suppressed ethnic and sectarian fault lines. In Khuzestan, Arab separatists may attempt to align with external actors and provoke unrest across the Gulf. In Iranian Kurdistan, cross-border insurgency threatens to reignite Kurdish separatism inside Iraq and Syria. In Baluchistan, an arc of lawlessness stretching from Pakistan through southeastern Iran risks becoming a haven for jihadist cells and narcotraffickers. Saudi Arabia, already on edge over the Yemeni front, sees the creation of new irregular militant theaters across the Gulf as a red-line threat to its national integrity. As a result, Riyadh dramatically scales up its border defense posture—deploying new forward-operating bases along the eastern coast, expanding naval surveillance of the Strait of Hormuz, and reinforcing the critical oil infrastructure in Dammam, Ras Tanura, and Jubail with layered air and missile defenses.
But the threat is not limited to irregular warfare or fragmentation. A collapsed Iran also releases thousands—possibly millions—of refugees and displaced persons. Saudi Arabia, despite its enormous wealth, is acutely aware that its social contract depends on careful demographic control and internal order. The possibility of absorbing refugee inflows across the Gulf or through proxy states like Iraq presents not just a humanitarian challenge but a security dilemma. In response, Saudi Arabia begins to construct a regional containment perimeter—using economic aid, refugee camp construction, and security assistance in neighboring states to hold displaced populations outside its direct borders while attempting to stabilize the host societies themselves. This approach mirrors Jordan’s role in the Syrian refugee crisis but on a far more ambitious and securitized scale.
Parallel to these hard security responses, Riyadh launches a preemptive economic offensive designed to seize control of the post-Iranian vacuum before more hostile or destabilizing actors can do so. The Public Investment Fund (PIF), backed by tens of billions in liquid reserves, opens special development offices for Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. In each case, Saudi Arabia offers to stabilize currencies, fund infrastructure repair, and integrate local economies into a new Gulf-centric trade system. In Iraq, this takes the form of deepening ties with the Sunni tribal leadership in Anbar and Salahaddin, funding agricultural projects and energy interconnectivity that bypass Iranian-backed networks in the south. In Syria, Saudi planners initiate talks with tribal confederations and former opposition groups in the eastern and southern regions to lay the groundwork for reconstruction corridors that deliberately exclude Iranian remnants and Hezbollah-aligned contractors. In Lebanon, Riyadh seeks to regain lost ground by backing non-Hezbollah-aligned banks and energy import schemes, tethering the country’s survival to Gulf financing under strict anti-corruption and demilitarization terms.
This economic assertiveness is not limited to Arab states. As chaos spreads within Iran, Saudi Arabia discreetly opens channels with newly empowered post-regime actors inside the country itself. Ethnic minorities, exiled opposition figures, technocratic enclaves, and even former IRGC defectors become potential intermediaries. The Kingdom does not aim to directly control a post-Islamic Republic Iran, but it does seek to shape its periphery, neutralize hostile factions, and ensure that no new ideological competitor can rise from Iran’s ashes. Saudi investments in information warfare, satellite media, and civil society capacity-building ramp up sharply. Arabic- and Farsi-language broadcasting frames the Kingdom as the sponsor of regional stability, contrasting its wealth and infrastructure with the ruins of the Iranian experiment.
Simultaneously, Riyadh moves to dominate key logistical chokepoints in the post-Iran era. As Iran’s ports fall into disuse or military chaos, Saudi Arabia proposes alternative transit routes for East-West trade, energy, and digital infrastructure. The Kingdom promotes the development of the “Middle Corridor” linking the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean via Iraq and Jordan, bypassing Iranian and Syrian terrain. Massive Saudi-led investments in pipeline duplication, fiber-optic networks, and smart logistics zones reconfigure the physical map of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia also begins negotiations with Central Asian states, long tethered to Iranian corridors, offering them preferential access to Gulf ports and energy markets in exchange for abandoning legacy alignments with Tehran.
Throughout this process, Riyadh faces the real threat of countermeasures from hostile non-state and state actors seeking to sabotage its ascendancy. Iran’s collapse does not automatically neutralize Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, or Yemeni Houthi cells. Many of these actors, now unanchored from their Iranian command structure, shift into autonomous or mercenary modes of operation. Saudi Arabia prepares for a spike in asymmetric warfare—missile strikes, drone attacks, cyber intrusions—intended to punish the Kingdom for perceived exploitation of Iran’s downfall. The lessons of the 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack drive a new emphasis on redundancy in critical infrastructure, the hardening of oil and gas facilities, and the decentralization of security decision-making.
As part of a long-term containment strategy, Saudi Arabia also deepens its cooperation with global partners. It seeks intelligence sharing with the United States, missile defense integration with Israel (often through quiet back channels), counter-terror coordination with Egypt, and economic burden-sharing with the European Union. The Kingdom positions itself as the linchpin of regional stabilization—a “paymaster of peace” that uses economic means to prevent the region from sliding into civil war or ungovernability. This framing also serves Riyadh’s broader goal: to rebrand the Kingdom not as an oil-rich autocracy but as a regional guarantor of order in the face of a generational rupture in Iran.
At its core, then, Saudi Arabia’s post-Iran economic strategy emerges not from triumphalism but from alarm. The collapse of the Islamic Republic is not seen as a final victory, but as the beginning of a volatile new era—one that threatens to drown the region in militant chaos unless it is immediately seized, structured, and stabilized. Through capital, connectivity, and coercive coordination, Saudi Arabia seeks to build a new Middle Eastern order in its image. But it does so from the shadow of fear: fear that the implosion of Iran may unleash dynamics beyond even Riyadh’s control.
Scenarios of Iranian Collapse: Saudi Arabia’s Economic Calculus and Strategic Repositioning
Saudi Arabia’s approach to a collapsing Iran is not confined to a singular trajectory, but rather modeled on a branching logic tree—an array of interconnected scenarios that carry their own geopolitical, economic, and reputational costs. The Kingdom's strategic calculus integrates oil market stabilization, Vision 2030 timelines, regional trade corridor control, and financial ecosystem protection. Riyadh's mitigation plans do not aim merely to weather Iran’s fall, but to convert each destabilizing juncture into a controlled opportunity for hegemony within the emerging Middle Eastern economic order.
Scenario 1: Popular Uprising Leading to Statelessness
A revolutionary collapse triggered by mass protests, desertion within the Basij and low-ranking IRGC units, and a refusal of key cities like Tabriz, Mashhad, and Shiraz to recognize Tehran’s authority, results in the practical disintegration of the state. No single actor seizes power, and various ethno-regional factions—Baluchis, Kurds, Arabs of Khuzestan—set up autonomous zones. Infrastructure is attacked, oil production halted, and food insecurity grows rapidly.
The economic shockwave is region-wide. Oil futures spike but volatility sets in, especially if refineries and export terminals in Kharg Island and Bandar Abbas are sabotaged or fall under militia control. Iranian tankers vanish from AIS (Automatic Identification Systems), as factions seek to smuggle oil independently, destabilizing pricing benchmarks. Saudi Arabia may experience initial windfalls from high prices, but broader investor confidence in the Gulf declines.
To contain this, Saudi Arabia would immediately invoke a coordinated response across OPEC+, proposing a temporary "Oil Stability Protocol" to preempt accusations of opportunism while keeping prices within an investable band. Riyadh may simultaneously offer conditional humanitarian aid to Kurdish and Arab groups, masking early-stage attempts to mold economic dependencies on Saudi logistics, electricity, and port access.
Scenario 2: Fragmentation of Security Apparatus and Warlordism
Rather than a popular uprising, Iran splinters from above as elite IRGC commanders feud over power. Mohajer drone factories fall into the hands of rogue militias, as do border crossing points and key fuel depots. The former Islamic Republic ceases to function as a coherent entity, but no ideological reform occurs. Instead, the country becomes a militarized archipelago of quasi-states, some aligned with Russia, others with Turkey, Pakistan, or even China.
Here, Saudi economic risk is deeply security-linked. The Iranian border with Iraq becomes a weapons bazaar, threatening Saudi-funded infrastructure in western Iraq. Proxy militias in Syria and Lebanon become unpredictable, no longer receiving centralized command-and-control but potentially engaging in extortion or smuggling as autonomous actors. Gulf maritime shipping lanes are harassed by former IRGC naval units acting independently.
Saudi Arabia would likely respond with multi-tiered measures. First, Riyadh would expand its military-industrial cooperation with Pakistan and Jordan to fortify land trade corridors westward. Simultaneously, it would fast-track the Red Sea economic corridor linking the Port of Jeddah to Egypt and onward into the eastern Mediterranean, as a redundancy mechanism bypassing Hormuz. Internally, Saudi banks would elevate risk exposure thresholds and de-risk Iranian-related portfolios across financial subsidiaries in Bahrain and Dubai, while the Public Investment Fund (PIF) would reallocate regional capital toward more stable economies like Oman and Azerbaijan.
Scenario 3: Political Coup and Technocratic Transitional Government
In this variant, senior figures in the Expediency Council, elements of the Foreign Ministry, and moderate military commanders depose the Supreme Leader and form a transitional technocratic government. This regime halts nuclear enrichment, begins negotiations with the U.S. and Europe, and seeks IMF and World Bank emergency loans. It offers regional cooperation while emphasizing Iranian nationalism over Shia revolutionary ideology.
Saudi Arabia faces a double-edged sword: the ideological threat is gone, but economic competition increases. A sanctions-free Iran regains global market share in oil and petrochemicals, undercuts Saudi Arabia in Asian markets, and begins offering investment incentives for China’s Belt and Road corridors, especially the Caspian Sea-Persian Gulf rail connection.
Riyadh’s economic mitigation strategy here would focus on containment through conditional engagement. Saudi economic technocrats would propose a “Phase-Linked Integration Plan,” whereby Iranian firms could access regional financial markets only after demonstrable milestones: disarmament of Hezbollah, dismantling of proxy training camps in Syria, and acceptance of maritime code-of-conduct standards in the Gulf.
Meanwhile, Vision 2030 would shift its narrative away from anti-Iranian securitization and toward competitive economic supremacy: clean energy leadership, green hydrogen exports, AI innovation clusters, and fintech dominance through Riyadh and NEOM. Rather than blocking Iran, Saudi Arabia would outpace it and lock in the region's allegiance through superior institutional connectivity.
Scenario 4: Sanctioned Regime Implosion Under Economic Strain
This slower collapse plays out over several years. U.S. sanctions remain in place. China and Russia reduce Iranian purchases due to reputational and compliance risks. Inflation spirals, real wages collapse, and state subsidies dry up. The IRGC continues to function but becomes a domestic enforcer more than a foreign policy tool. Ultimately, the state withers, unable to fund even basic services. A famine-like economic collapse forces cities to self-administer.
This scenario would mirror Venezuela’s economic entropy. Iran becomes a hollowed-out economy—desperately selling oil at discounts, struggling to maintain refinery operations, and unable to import enough food or medicine. In such a case, Iran poses little geopolitical threat, but its destabilization seeps across borders.
Saudi Arabia’s primary risk here is uncontrolled refugee outflow into Iraq, Pakistan, and possibly Kuwait. It also fears the emergence of regional black markets trading in arms, fuel, and drugs, undermining border security and customs controls critical to its logistics economy.
To respond, Riyadh would elevate the GCC as a regional economic firewall. It would establish a Gulf Stabilization Fund with conditional loans to bordering states for refugee absorption, deploy food banks via the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center to border towns, and conduct naval patrols with Egypt to suppress smuggling from Iranian ports. Saudi investors would avoid Iran entirely, and business ties would remain suspended, except for possibly non-binding humanitarian channels coordinated through third parties like Qatar or the UN.
Scenario 5: Ethno-Religious Balkanization of Iran
In this advanced stage collapse, Iran undergoes ethnic fracturing. Khuzestan declares itself as an independent Arab Republic, with funding and political support from rival actors. Iranian Kurdistan declares autonomy, possibly linking up with Iraqi Kurdistan. The Azeri corridor begins coordinating with Baku. Tehran loses authority entirely outside the Persian heartland.
Saudi Arabia sees both risks and a rare opportunity. If managed carefully, this Balkanization creates the conditions for Riyadh to recast regional trade through a post-Persian mosaic. However, the risks are immense: new borders, militias competing for oil infrastructure, and the danger of Turkey and Israel asserting their own influence across Kurdish and Azeri fronts.
To manage this, Saudi Arabia could initiate a bold regional initiative: the creation of a “Post-Iran Economic Compact,” incorporating surviving or emerging entities into Vision 2030 supply chains under a Saudi-led legal and financial framework. Investment in Khuzestan could bring Arab-majority areas into the orbit of Gulf customs zones. Saudi would push for regional free-trade pacts that deliberately exclude destabilizing actors and enforce harmonized tariffs, digital customs, and anticorruption standards.
This approach would also require Riyadh to deploy an unprecedented level of diplomatic agility—working with Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, and the Caucasus states to ensure no one actor monopolizes the political void. It would also likely involve discreet discussions with Israel and China over spheres of influence and infrastructural non-interference.
Business Ties and Regional Integration Outlook
Across all these scenarios, Saudi Arabia would need to recalibrate its business posture toward Iranian entities. In the short term, this means legal compartmentalization: establishing “red flag” tracking systems for Iranian-linked shell companies, banning dual-use tech exports to suspect regions, and enforcing anti-money laundering (AML) compliance across GCC financial nodes.
Longer-term, Saudi business re-engagement with Iran—if it happens—would be strictly conditional. It would be governed by a new regional compliance architecture codified through Vision 2030 institutions: trade insurance linked to behavioral benchmarks, blockchain-based audit trails for cross-border payments, and joint compliance task forces under GCC and Arab League supervision.
Saudi Arabia does not merely seek to contain the chaos of a collapsing Iran. It seeks to replace Iran—not only militarily or diplomatically, but structurally, as the region’s primary node for capital, logistics, energy transition, and rules-based economic integration.
Shaping the Periphery: Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Influence on Iran’s Transition
Saudi Arabia's ability to manage or guide Iran’s potential transition is constrained by historical antagonisms, ideological divides, and limited influence inside Iran’s domestic institutions. However, under certain strategic conditions and through indirect instruments, Riyadh could shape the regional environment around a transitioning Iran and gradually influence the internal balance of power. This would be less a process of direct intervention and more one of orchestrating geopolitical parameters that limit the emergence of hostile successors, incentivize pragmatic actors, and frame Iran’s post-collapse choices within a Saudi-preferred regional architecture.
First, it is essential to understand that Saudi Arabia lacks deep, trusted networks within the Iranian political, military, or clerical establishment. Unlike Iran's proxy networks in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, Riyadh has never successfully cultivated a comparable set of loyalist political structures inside Iran. The Shia-Sunni divide, compounded by decades of revolutionary propaganda from Tehran, has further eroded Saudi Arabia’s social credibility among Iran's traditionalist and even reformist factions. However, the Kingdom does maintain ties with Iranian exiles, certain Arab minorities in Ahwaz, and informal networks in the Iranian Baluch and Sunni communities. These are not decisive actors in Tehran, but in a scenario of institutional breakdown, they may serve as useful intermediaries.
Saudi Arabia’s most effective tool to “guide” Iran’s transition lies not inside Iran, but in the regional environment it can shape. Riyadh can use its economic, diplomatic, and security leverage to frame what kind of post-Islamic Republic order is rewarded or isolated. For instance, a technocratic, non-ideological Iranian transition team—especially one willing to abandon militant proxies and seek regional reintegration—might be quietly supported by Saudi Arabia through back-channel diplomacy, economic overtures, and possibly joint participation in regional forums like the Arab League’s observer mechanisms or GCC+ cooperation frameworks.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia would likely work multilaterally to influence Iran’s next phase. This includes coordination with key Gulf allies such as the UAE and Bahrain, but also with external powers like Egypt, Turkey, and even China. Riyadh may propose a “Post-Iran Stabilization Charter” with defined benchmarks for diplomatic recognition, investment access, and regional energy integration. If Iran's transitional authorities agree to dismantle IRGC-led shadow economies, suspend support for Hezbollah and Houthis, and abide by non-interference clauses in Gulf internal affairs, Saudi Arabia may open pathways to investment and economic normalization, modeled partly on conditional frameworks used during Iraq’s post-Baathist restructuring.
Still, this approach is not without risks. A miscalculated Saudi push—such as open support for separatist movements in Ahwaz or Baluchistan—could backfire, reinforcing Iranian nationalism and delegitimizing transitional moderates. Likewise, any overt Saudi attempt to dominate or “manage” Iranian transition processes could provoke counter-alliances, especially from actors like Turkey, which views the Caucasus and northern Iran as strategic spheres of influence. Saudi Arabia would need to tread carefully, acting less as a hegemon and more as a stabilizing regional guarantor, offering carrots (market access, energy partnerships, investment capital) in exchange for tangible behavioral change.
A more plausible scenario involves Saudi Arabia shaping regional integration mechanisms that gradually draw a transitioning Iran into a web of mutually reinforcing economic dependencies. Under Vision 2030, the Kingdom is investing in regional rail, port, and digital infrastructure that will define the region’s economic gravity. If Iran's transitional leadership desires access to these systems—and to the capital and trade flows they generate—it may be nudged into adopting Saudi-favored norms on governance, energy exports, and security cooperation.
Finally, Saudi Arabia may play a subtler ideological role: defining a new regional narrative that moves beyond the binary of Sunni vs. Shia or monarchy vs. revolution. Riyadh’s rebranding under Vision 2030, its soft power expansion into tech, culture, and education, and its growing partnerships with global East and West alike position it to project a compelling model of economic modernity without political subversion. If Iran’s new leaders—especially technocrats or business elites—seek to restore Iran’s global relevance without returning to clerical totalitarianism, Saudi Arabia’s model may serve less as a rival and more as an aspirational benchmark.
Saudi Arabia cannot directly manage Iran’s internal transition, but it can guide its regional context—setting red lines for proxy behavior, defining the economic rewards for moderation, and orchestrating multilateral alignment that shapes what kind of post-collapse Iran can thrive. In doing so, Riyadh transforms itself from a reactive actor into a regional system architect, indirectly influencing Iran’s options by defining the rules of the surrounding game.
Integrating a Post-Islamic Republic Iran into Vision 2030: Strategic Pathways and Constraints
If the Islamic Republic collapses, the vacuum it leaves behind opens not only questions of governance and regional security, but also unprecedented possibilities for Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 to reshape the region’s economic map—including the reintegration of Iran into a more cooperative, interconnected regional framework. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 is not merely a domestic reform agenda—it is an assertive geopolitical blueprint that positions the Kingdom as the nexus of trade, logistics, finance, and technology in a post-oil Gulf. For a transitioning Iran seeking economic stabilization, global reintegration, and legitimacy, aligning with this emerging Saudi-led economic ecosystem may become both desirable and necessary.
The extent and success of this integration, however, depends on which factions emerge dominant in a post-Islamic Republic Iran. A secular technocratic leadership aligned with business elites and diaspora networks may prove eager to normalize relations with Riyadh, particularly if such cooperation opens access to capital, Gulf trade corridors, and global markets via the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf. In contrast, if a nationalist-militarist faction, perhaps formed from elements of the IRGC or populist hardliners, manages the transition, Saudi-Iranian economic cooperation would be minimal or antagonistic, as these actors would view Vision 2030 as a tool of hegemonic encirclement rather than opportunity.
Assuming a pragmatic or moderate leadership takes hold, Riyadh would likely pursue integration through a tiered, conditional model. This would begin with economic confidence-building measures: reopening of embassies, restoration of civil aviation ties, and establishment of joint investment committees under neutral arbitration (possibly facilitated by Oman or China). Iran’s private sector—long strangled by sanctions and clerical state monopolies—would likely be eager to access Saudi capital markets, sovereign wealth fund investments, and joint ventures in tourism, construction, fintech, and healthcare.
Iran’s geographic position offers Saudi Arabia the opportunity to extend Vision 2030’s regional connectivity plans northward toward Central Asia and the Caucasus, bypassing unstable Iraqi corridors and the congested Strait of Hormuz. A post-Islamic Republic Iran that cooperates with Saudi rail, port, and fiber-optic expansion initiatives could serve as a crucial link in trans-continental supply chains envisioned by NEOM and the Gulf-Asia-Red Sea integration frameworks. In such a scenario, Iran may be invited to participate in multilateral projects such as the Gulf Railway extension, energy corridor harmonization, or even special economic zones stretching from the eastern Arabian coast through Ahwaz and into western Iran.
Saudi Arabia, for its part, would gain access to Iran’s large and diversified domestic market, highly educated labor pool, and advanced industrial base, particularly in pharmaceuticals, aerospace, and materials science. A gradual decoupling of Iran’s economy from its clerical-parastatal system would allow Saudi and Gulf corporations to enter Iran’s consumer markets, invest in its decaying infrastructure, and integrate its energy exports into cooperative OPEC+ frameworks.
Another key area of alignment could emerge around energy transition technologies. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 strategy prioritizes leadership in hydrogen, renewables, and green infrastructure. A post-clerical Iran struggling with environmental degradation, water shortages, and outdated refineries might seek joint projects or knowledge transfer in these fields, particularly if they include job creation and attract non-Western partners such as South Korea or Japan. In return, Saudi Arabia might push for joint transparency frameworks on emissions and energy pricing that stabilize regional markets and curb undercutting or price dumping.
To facilitate this economic integration, Riyadh may push for Iran’s entry—on a conditional basis—into regional institutional structures such as the Gulf Cooperation Council in an associate status, observer participation in the Arab League, or structured cooperation with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on development finance. Each stage would serve as a platform for both normalization and performance monitoring: proxy disengagement, domestic reform progress, and economic liberalization could be mapped to trade access, sovereign loan guarantees, and tech partnership rollouts.
However, several challenges remain. The collapse of the Islamic Republic may leave behind chaotic power structures, fragmented militias, or competing provisional governments. Riyadh must therefore avoid the perception of intervention or domination, lest it trigger nationalist backlash. Moreover, structural distrust, economic asymmetry, and unresolved territorial tensions—such as those in Ahwaz and over Gulf islands—could resurface as integration deepens. Finally, there is the question of how the broader international community, especially the U.S., China, and EU, would view Saudi Arabia’s role as an anchor for Iran’s reconstruction and reintegration—especially if Riyadh is seen as gatekeeping access to critical Gulf trade flows.
In essence, Vision 2030 offers a roadmap for peaceful regional consolidation, but only if Iran transitions into a state willing to reorient its foreign policy away from revolutionary export and toward pragmatic growth. If that occurs, Saudi Arabia stands poised to transform Iran from a destabilizing rival into a regional economic partner—one deeply embedded in a Saudi-defined order that values connectivity over ideology, and development over disruption.
Navigating the Dilemma: Salvage or Accelerate the Demise of Iran’s Regime Under Khamenei’s Successors
Given the reported appointment of both political and military successors by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the question facing Saudi Arabia is not merely whether the Islamic Republic of Iran can survive—rather, it is whether Riyadh should adopt a strategy of containment and managed détente with this continuity-based regime, or instead pivot toward deliberately hastening its collapse by exploiting internal fractures, economic instability, and external isolation. The decision is deeply consequential, and while the instinct to preserve regional stability might suggest salvaging the regime, a deeper strategic analysis—especially in light of Iran’s enduring ideological hostility—raises compelling arguments for Saudi Arabia to pursue a more assertive posture designed to bring about systemic change in Tehran.
At the heart of this debate lies the character of succession in Iran. Khamenei’s apparent appointments are not aimed at reform, pluralism, or stabilization of Iran’s external posture. Rather, they appear designed to preserve the revolutionary core of the Islamic Republic—anchored in the IRGC’s dominance, clerical absolutism, and resistance doctrine. Whether the succession proceeds through Khamenei’s son Mojtaba or through a military-religious triumvirate involving the IRGC, it signals regime hardening rather than moderation. In practical terms, this ensures that the hostility toward Saudi Arabia—rooted in ideological supremacy, regional hegemony, and sectarian confrontation—will not meaningfully diminish. It also undermines any illusion that Tehran might voluntarily abandon proxy warfare or normalize its foreign relations on Saudi terms.
From Riyadh’s perspective, preserving this regime in its current form means enabling a durable regional adversary that is institutionally incapable of compromise. Iran’s regional doctrine is not based on strategic miscalculations alone, but on the deliberate cultivation of destabilizing assets in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. These instruments—especially the Houthis, Hezbollah, and militias in Iraq—are not temporary tools; they are embedded into the Islamic Republic’s constitutional identity and strategic DNA. As such, Riyadh must assess whether any future Iranian leadership emerging from within this ecosystem can be trusted to dismantle these networks or to honor a new regional security compact.
Economically, salvaging the regime may appear to offer short-term benefits: reduced risk of war, potential de-escalation, and reopening of bilateral trade. However, such stability would be deceptive and fleeting. Sanctions relief would re-empower the IRGC’s economic arm, Khatam al-Anbiya, allowing it to resume financing its regional proxies with greater sophistication and reach. Partial normalization could increase Iranian covert activity in Ahwaz and among Shia communities in the Gulf under the cover of diplomacy. Worse still, it would legitimize a succession mechanism that entrenches hereditary clerical-military rule and removes any incentive for popular reform movements to emerge.
Thus, the alternative—actively undermining and hastening the regime’s collapse—becomes strategically coherent, albeit risky. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to pursue kinetic regime change. But Riyadh has increasing tools at its disposal to exacerbate existing fractures within the Islamic Republic. This includes intensifying economic competition through Vision 2030 regional integration that bypasses Iran, expanding support for Arab and Sunni minorities in Ahwaz and Baluchistan, deepening ties with the Iranian diaspora, and fostering information warfare that delegitimizes Tehran’s succession narrative. Riyadh may also work multilaterally—through GCC forums, Arab League partnerships, and even China or India—to isolate Iran diplomatically, frame it as the regional outlier, and gradually erode its legitimacy.
The geopolitical stakes are high. A collapsing Iran could produce regional instability—refugee flows, factional civil war, or proxy realignment. But Saudi Arabia has already begun preparing for such a scenario: securing its borders, investing in cross-border surveillance, upgrading missile defenses, and forging strong regional alliances with Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE. Additionally, Riyadh may be able to shape the trajectory of collapse to avoid the Syrian model of chaos, instead supporting technocratic or exile-led alternatives with plausible internal constituencies.
The final calculus must weigh strategic patience against long-term threat elimination. Salvaging the regime ensures a hostile but predictable Iran; undermining it offers the chance for structural transformation but carries inherent risk. Yet history shows that authoritarian regimes built on repression, ideological rigidity, and economic mismanagement tend to unravel under pressure. With the right sequencing—economic isolation, narrative warfare, and regional encirclement—Saudi Arabia can contribute to such an outcome while insulating itself from its most destabilizing effects.
Riyadh must not invest in preserving an adversarial structure merely for the illusion of stability. The Islamic Republic, especially under its planned successor structure, will remain intrinsically hostile to Saudi Arabia’s security, regional vision, and religious legitimacy. A strategy of calibrated pressure, designed to hasten the regime’s demise while preparing the region for its aftermath, now appears more strategically sound than the short-term temptation of salvaging a system that will not—and cannot—change.
The Perils of a Weakened Iran: When Hesitant U.S. Engagement Meets Saudi and Israeli Divergence
The current strategic landscape surrounding Iran’s future is fraught with complexity, shaped by divergent priorities and approaches among key regional and global players—most notably the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Former President Donald Trump’s vision for addressing the Iranian challenge aligns more closely with Israel’s hardline stance than with Saudi Arabia’s cautious pragmatism. Israel seeks to neutralize Iran’s regional influence through maximal pressure, covert operations, and preemptive strikes, aiming to prevent Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and degrade its proxy networks. Saudi Arabia, while sharing the goal of countering Iranian hegemony, remains deeply concerned about the consequences of aggressive destabilization on its own security environment. Trump’s reluctance to commit to direct military engagement with Iran introduces an element of strategic hesitation, resulting in a policy that simultaneously pressures Tehran yet stops short of decisive intervention.
This combination of strong pressure without direct military intervention creates a prolonged scenario of Iranian weakening marked by internal fractures and regional instability—a condition that many experts view as the worst of both worlds. The regime’s foundational structures do not collapse swiftly but rather erode slowly under the weight of sanctions, political dissent, and external covert actions. During this drawn-out weakening, Iran’s revolutionary government retains enough cohesion to continue its antagonistic policies toward Saudi Arabia and the broader Gulf, supporting proxy militias across Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. The regime’s survival depends on leveraging these asymmetric tools to maintain influence and deflect domestic pressures, intensifying Riyadh’s security concerns.
At the same time, the protracted crisis fractures Iran’s internal political landscape. Different factions, including hardline IRGC elements, pragmatic reformists, tribal leaders, and ethnic minorities—particularly in regions like Ahwaz—vie for power and resources. This fragmentation undermines centralized control, leading to a patchwork of semi-autonomous actors with diverging agendas. The result is heightened unpredictability, with intermittent local conflicts, sporadic violence, and the potential for spillover into neighboring countries, including Saudi Arabia. This fluid environment also complicates efforts to negotiate or reach stable agreements, as no single interlocutor in Tehran commands full authority.
Israel’s strategic calculus drives it toward maintaining relentless pressure, seeing Iran’s weakening as an opportunity to delay or derail its nuclear program and degrade proxy capabilities. Israeli intelligence and military actions—often carried out with tacit or explicit U.S. support—target Iranian supply lines, command centers, and nuclear facilities. However, the limits of U.S. engagement under Trump’s administration mean that these efforts lack full backing for large-scale military campaigns or regime change operations. The approach relies heavily on sanctions, covert actions, cyber operations, and diplomatic isolation rather than boots on the ground.
Saudi Arabia’s position is more complex and cautious. Riyadh fears that continued Iranian weakening without resolution could unleash a range of destabilizing consequences: a refugee crisis spilling into the Gulf; heightened sectarian violence emboldening Shia minorities in Saudi’s eastern provinces and Ahwaz; disruption of oil exports and critical infrastructure; and the emergence of ungoverned spaces along their shared borders. Saudi intelligence and military planning increasingly focus on border defense, missile interception, and counter-proxy measures, but these are reactive rather than preventive. Riyadh worries that the fragmented post-Islamic Republic Iran might be more dangerous than a unified adversary, as it could empower rogue actors less susceptible to diplomatic or military deterrence.
This divergence between Israeli assertiveness, U.S. hesitancy, and Saudi caution creates strategic friction that complicates regional security coordination. Intelligence sharing, joint military planning, and diplomatic efforts risk paralysis as each actor’s priorities diverge. Saudi Arabia’s desire for a stable, if adversarial, Iran contrasts with Israel’s push for regime collapse or substantial weakening. The U.S., caught between its Gulf alliances and domestic political constraints, struggles to present a coherent, unified strategy. This triad of competing interests risks perpetuating a cycle of proxy warfare, sporadic conflict, and missed diplomatic opportunities.
Moreover, the broader geopolitical context amplifies these challenges. China and Russia, increasingly active in the Middle East, view a destabilized Iran as both a potential leverage point and a risk to their regional investments. Their willingness to back Tehran diplomatically or militarily further complicates Saudi and Israeli efforts to shape outcomes. The European Union’s fragmented approach adds another layer of uncertainty, with some member states favoring engagement and others advocating sanctions.
Diplomatic Frameworks to Bridge Policy Divergences
To mitigate these risks, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States could pursue a calibrated, multilateral diplomatic framework emphasizing conflict de-escalation and regional stability. One possible mechanism involves expanding the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s mandate to incorporate formal security dialogues with Israel and indirect engagement with Iranian interlocutors through third-party states like Oman or Switzerland, which have maintained neutral diplomatic channels with Tehran. Such a forum would allow the major regional actors to negotiate confidence-building measures, address proxy conflicts, and establish communication hotlines to prevent unintended escalation.
Building on the Abraham Accords and their diplomatic momentum, Saudi Arabia and Israel could explore discreet security coordination focusing on shared threats rather than ideological disputes. This coordination might include joint intelligence sharing on proxy militias and border security, facilitated by U.S. oversight to ensure alignment and prevent unilateral escalations. Including the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt could broaden the coalition, enhancing regional legitimacy.
Additionally, the United States could encourage incremental economic engagement with Iran contingent on verifiable steps toward limiting proxy activities and halting nuclear advancements. Such incentives would empower pragmatic Iranian factions interested in economic modernization, offering them a stake in regional peace. This approach draws on the lessons of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) framework but adapts it to the fractured Iranian political environment by incorporating broader regional security guarantees.
Humanitarian channels should also be strengthened to mitigate civilian suffering and reduce anti-Saudi and anti-U.S. propaganda. Expanding support for minority groups in Ahwaz, Baluchistan, and Kurdish areas through cultural exchanges, development aid, and diaspora engagement can build grassroots constituencies favoring stability and dialogue.
Saudi Arabia’s Contingency Planning and Unilateral Security Measures
Recognizing the unpredictability of Iran’s trajectory and the limits of allied coordination, Saudi Arabia has intensified its unilateral security preparations. Riyadh has invested heavily in missile defense systems such as the U.S.-supplied Patriot batteries and the domestically developed Strategic Missile Defense Program, designed to counter ballistic and cruise missile threats from Houthi forces and Iranian proxies. These systems form part of a multilayered defense architecture that includes advanced radar networks and early-warning systems along the Kingdom’s eastern and southern borders.
Saudi intelligence agencies have expanded efforts to monitor and disrupt proxy networks operating near its territory. These operations combine cyber capabilities, HUMINT (human intelligence), and cooperation with local tribes and security forces in border areas to counter infiltration and arms smuggling. Riyadh also conducts periodic cross-border strikes targeting Houthi positions in Yemen and Iranian-backed militia bases in Iraq and Syria, signaling a willingness to respond proactively.
Strategically, Saudi Arabia is diversifying its military partnerships beyond the U.S. to include closer ties with France, the United Kingdom, and even Russia, hedging against potential American disengagement. These relationships provide access to advanced weaponry, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support in international forums.
Economically, Riyadh’s Vision 2030 not only aims to reduce dependence on oil revenues but also seeks to build resilience against regional shocks by expanding non-oil sectors and strengthening food security through strategic reserves and agricultural investments abroad. Such measures help insulate the Kingdom from supply disruptions caused by Iranian-instigated conflicts or sanctions-related embargoes.
Finally, Riyadh continues diplomatic engagement with regional actors such as Iraq and Turkey, promoting dialogue platforms that might stabilize shared border regions and reduce sectarian tensions. These efforts aim to create a buffer of friendly or neutral states around the Kingdom, mitigating direct Iranian influence.
Historical Parallels and Policy Recommendations
History offers instructive parallels. The gradual weakening of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, combined with deliberate U.S.-led diplomatic engagement and internal reform pressures, illustrates how a great power’s decline can be managed to avoid catastrophic collapse. Conversely, the post-2003 Iraq invasion shows the dangers of rapid regime change without sufficient stabilization planning, resulting in chaos and insurgency. Saudi Arabia and its allies must strive for a middle path—applying pressure on Iran’s hardline regime while fostering conditions for a controlled transition.
Policymakers should prioritize:
Establishing robust multilateral security dialogues involving Gulf states, Israel, and neutral third parties.
Implementing conditional economic incentives for Iranian factions that reduce proxy activity and comply with nuclear restrictions.
Enhancing intelligence cooperation focused on early warning of destabilizing activities along borders.
Investing in regional resilience through economic diversification and humanitarian support to vulnerable populations.
Preparing contingency military and cyber responses calibrated to avoid full-scale conflict but deter aggression.
This integrated approach, combining diplomatic innovation with strategic preparedness, offers the best prospect for managing Iran’s uncertain future while safeguarding Saudi Arabia’s security and regional ambitions.
Navigating Immediate Strategic Opportunities Amid Regional Uncertainty
At this critical juncture, Saudi Arabia stands at a crossroads defined by both challenges and significant openings. The ongoing uncertainty surrounding Iran’s future and the shifting geopolitical landscape in the Middle East create a unique moment for Riyadh to consolidate influence, strengthen security, and advance its broader regional vision. Rather than remaining reactive, Saudi Arabia adopts a proactive posture, seizing immediate opportunities that reinforce its leadership role and lay foundations for long-term stability and prosperity.
One of the foremost openings lies in the realm of regional security cooperation, particularly within the Gulf Cooperation Council framework. While the GCC has faced internal strains over the years, the shared threat emanating from Iran’s destabilizing activities—ranging from missile strikes to proxy warfare—rekindles interest in collective defense. Saudi Arabia, by assuming a leading role in bolstering joint security mechanisms, fosters unprecedented levels of military coordination, intelligence sharing, and rapid response readiness among Gulf states. These efforts not only improve the Kingdom’s immediate defense posture but also send a strong signal of unity and deterrence that complicates Iranian calculations. Strengthened cooperation serves as a force multiplier, allowing Saudi Arabia and its neighbors to pool resources and technological capabilities, enhancing resilience against asymmetric threats that have previously exploited regional fragmentation.
Concurrently, Riyadh expands its diplomatic engagement beyond traditional Western partners, recognizing that the global balance of power is evolving. With the United States recalibrating its Middle East strategy and exhibiting occasional hesitancy toward deep involvement, Saudi Arabia pursues a diversification of relationships. Engagement with European powers, which maintain an interest in regional stability and energy security, offers avenues for diplomatic and economic collaboration that complement Gulf initiatives. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia cautiously deepens ties with Russia and China, both of whom play increasingly influential roles in Middle Eastern affairs. This strategic balancing act enhances Riyadh’s leverage, allowing it to navigate a multipolar environment where no single power dominates. Through these diversified diplomatic channels, Saudi Arabia gains access to new markets, investment flows, and security partnerships, reducing vulnerability to fluctuations in U.S. policy and global economic shocks.
The momentum generated by the Abraham Accords and the normalization of relations between Israel and several Arab states creates another immediate opportunity, even if Riyadh has yet to formally join this framework. The gradual integration of Israel into regional diplomatic and economic networks opens space for discreet collaboration on shared security concerns, especially those relating to Iranian influence and proxy militias. Saudi Arabia quietly enhances intelligence sharing with Israeli counterparts, establishing pragmatic working relationships that circumvent longstanding ideological barriers. In doing so, Riyadh strengthens the regional coalition confronting Iran’s destabilizing activities while simultaneously positioning itself as a central player capable of bridging divides. Economic cooperation, while still limited, also presents openings for joint ventures in technology, energy, and infrastructure sectors, fostering interdependence that may ease political tensions over time.
Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia’s ambitious blueprint for economic transformation, remains a critical platform for immediate regional engagement. Beyond its domestic objectives, Vision 2030 facilitates deeper integration with neighboring economies through infrastructure projects, energy cooperation, and technology partnerships. Riyadh actively pursues joint initiatives with Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, cultivating interlinked supply chains and investment flows that help stabilize the broader region. These projects not only contribute to economic diversification and job creation within the Kingdom but also build interdependence that serves as a buffer against geopolitical shocks. The advancement of Vision 2030 fosters a more interconnected and resilient regional economy, wherein Saudi Arabia emerges as a hub for commerce, finance, and innovation—further solidifying its strategic importance.
In anticipation of potential crises stemming from conflict spillover or mass displacement, Saudi Arabia enhances its humanitarian preparedness. By strengthening border management and developing frameworks for refugee aid and migration control, Riyadh seeks to mitigate the destabilizing effects that regional turmoil can unleash. This dual approach—firm border security coupled with humanitarian engagement—positions Saudi Arabia as a responsible regional actor capable of managing complex humanitarian challenges. Such leadership enhances the Kingdom’s international standing and builds goodwill that may facilitate future diplomatic efforts.
Parallel to these external initiatives, Riyadh engages with internal and external Iranian opposition groups and ethnic minorities, particularly in the Ahwaz region. Through discreet diplomatic channels and third-party intermediaries, Saudi Arabia nurtures contacts with factions that represent potential political and social alternatives within Iran. Supporting nonviolent political movements and economic engagement alternatives allows Riyadh to cultivate influence in a post-Islamic Republic environment. This long-term strategy reflects a nuanced understanding that Iran’s future stability depends not only on regime dynamics but also on the aspirations of its diverse peoples. By investing in these relationships now, Saudi Arabia positions itself to shape the contours of any transition in ways that enhance Gulf security and regional cooperation.
Domestically, Saudi Arabia’s focus on strengthening internal resilience complements its external strategies. The Kingdom prioritizes stability in its eastern provinces, home to Shia populations that could become vulnerable to external influence amid regional upheaval. Through targeted investments in social infrastructure, economic opportunities, and security capabilities, Riyadh seeks to mitigate risks of unrest and infiltration. Additionally, the enhancement of cybersecurity defenses protects critical infrastructure against increasingly sophisticated Iranian-sponsored cyberattacks. These internal measures reinforce the Kingdom’s capacity to withstand external shocks and maintain national cohesion.
Finally, Riyadh advances regional dialogue initiatives through neutral venues such as Muscat and Kuwait City, which serve as important platforms for informal diplomacy. These venues facilitate backchannel communications among regional rivals, enabling exploratory conversations on confidence-building measures and conflict de-escalation. By sponsoring and participating in such dialogue, Saudi Arabia helps to reduce tensions incrementally and create openings for more formal negotiations on security and economic issues. These quiet diplomatic efforts complement Riyadh’s broader strategy of balancing deterrence with engagement.
Saudi Arabia’s immediate opportunities emerge from a sophisticated strategy that integrates enhanced regional security cooperation, diversified diplomacy, discreet collaboration with Israel, economic integration through Vision 2030, humanitarian leadership, engagement with Iranian opposition groups, internal resilience, and regional dialogue. This multifaceted approach acknowledges the complexity of Iran’s uncertain future while advancing Saudi Arabia’s long-term ambitions for stability, influence, and prosperity in the Middle East.
Reimagining Saudi Strategy Amid Iran’s Transformation: Balancing Preservation and Progress
The unfolding realities of Iran’s potential collapse or transformation prompt Saudi Arabia to reconsider the fundamental contours of its strategic vision. The Kingdom’s existing frameworks, epitomized by Vision 2030’s ambitious economic and social modernization plans, now face the challenge of accommodating profound uncertainties posed by the shifting political landscape across its eastern border. This moment presents not only a challenge but also an opportunity for Riyadh to recalibrate its regional approach—balancing the need for security, influence, and economic growth in a context where the traditional paradigm of Iranian antagonism may either dissolve or mutate unpredictably.
Saudi leadership confronts a pressing strategic dilemma: whether to invest resources and political capital in preserving any remaining structures of the Islamic Republic, or to pivot decisively toward facilitating its demise and the ensuing regional transition. The current regime in Tehran, led by entrenched hardliners and empowered by a fusion of revolutionary ideology and security apparatus control, has long pursued a confrontational agenda aimed squarely at destabilizing Saudi interests. Its support for proxy militias in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, as well as its missile development and cyber operations, consistently undermines Riyadh’s efforts to foster regional stability. In this light, clinging to the remnants of the regime risks perpetuating a source of persistent instability and conflict, blocking pathways toward cooperation and integration that Saudi Arabia envisions as vital for its future.
At the same time, Riyadh recognizes that the Islamic Republic, even in its weakened state, holds significant institutional and societal control. Its security services, religious institutions, and political networks create resilience against sudden disintegration. Attempts to preserve these elements might offer a buffer against the chaos of abrupt collapse, providing some continuity that could be leveraged for negotiation and conflict management. Yet this approach carries the inherent risk of empowering actors fundamentally opposed to Saudi interests, limiting Riyadh’s strategic maneuverability and maintaining a regional status quo defined by hostility and proxy warfare.
The broader regional implications of preserving or hastening the regime’s end extend beyond Riyadh’s immediate security concerns. Many neighboring countries, including Iraq and Lebanon, grapple with their own challenges of Iranian influence, often intertwined with sectarian divisions and political fragmentation. A Saudi strategy that tolerates or supports the regime’s endurance could alienate these partners, undermining efforts to build a cohesive regional bloc capable of confronting shared challenges. Conversely, a transition that reduces Tehran’s capacity to interfere politically and militarily in neighboring states opens doors for deeper regional integration, economic partnerships, and collective security arrangements—all central to Saudi Arabia’s long-term vision.
However, a precipitous regime collapse carries hazards that Riyadh cannot overlook. Power vacuums, rampant factional violence, and humanitarian crises in Iran’s border regions risk destabilizing Saudi Arabia’s own security environment. Spillover effects such as refugee flows and cross-border militant activity could severely strain Saudi resources and complicate domestic governance. The Kingdom thus weighs whether a managed, gradual transition might better safeguard its interests by minimizing chaos and enabling diplomatic engagement with emerging Iranian actors more amenable to cooperation.
This recognition fosters a nuanced Saudi strategy that seeks to neither wholly preserve the current regime nor expedite its total downfall. Instead, Riyadh may focus on enabling a controlled political evolution that marginalizes extremist hardliners while encouraging pragmatic governance and inclusion of moderate opposition groups. Saudi Arabia’s discreet but steady engagement with Iranian opposition factions, particularly those advocating peaceful political reforms, reflects this approach. By supporting nonviolent political actors and fostering economic ties where possible, Riyadh hopes to influence the post-Islamic Republic landscape to be more stable, pluralistic, and regionally cooperative.
Integral to this recalibrated strategy is Saudi Arabia’s ambition to emerge as a decisive architect of Iran’s future political order. The Kingdom’s capacity to shape the post-regime environment depends on its ability to balance firmness with openness—simultaneously deterring hostile actions and offering incentives for reform. This approach requires leveraging Riyadh’s extensive diplomatic networks, economic resources, and security capabilities to guide Iran’s transition in a direction that aligns with Gulf stability and Saudi interests. It also entails engaging with major external powers—Russia, China, and the United States—each of whom wields influence over Iran and the broader Middle East, to coordinate efforts that reduce the risks of ungoverned instability.
Moreover, the new strategic vision acknowledges the complexities of a multipolar international environment. The United States’ evolving posture in the region, marked by strategic recalibration and selective engagement, prompts Riyadh to diversify partnerships while maintaining core alliances. Russian and Chinese interests in Iran’s future create additional variables that Saudi diplomacy must address. Navigating these intricate dynamics calls for a flexible, multilateral approach that maximizes Saudi leverage without overreliance on any single actor.
At the economic level, this vision integrates deeply with the transformative goals of Vision 2030. The post-Islamic Republic Middle East offers opportunities for expanded trade, energy cooperation, and infrastructure development that Saudi Arabia can harness to reinforce its leadership and economic diversification. Engaging with a transitioning Iran on commercial terms—particularly if political conditions improve—could unlock new markets and investment flows, benefiting both countries and the broader region. This economic integration aligns with Riyadh’s ambition to position itself as a hub for innovation, finance, and connectivity bridging Asia, Europe, and Africa.
Simultaneously, Riyadh continues to strengthen its internal resilience in anticipation of the wider geopolitical shifts. Investments in social cohesion, particularly in eastern provinces with Shia populations such as Ahwaz, aim to prevent domestic vulnerabilities that could be exploited amid regional turmoil. Enhanced border security, counterterrorism capabilities, and cyber defenses further safeguard the Kingdom’s stability.
Ultimately, the pressures exerted by Iran’s uncertain trajectory catalyze a fundamental reimagining of Saudi Arabia’s strategic orientation. The Kingdom moves beyond binary choices of confrontation or accommodation, instead crafting a sophisticated framework that emphasizes proactive leadership, adaptive diplomacy, and regional economic integration. This evolving vision recognizes the dual imperatives of preserving stability and fostering progress—aware that clinging to a faltering status quo or precipitating uncontrollable collapse would both undermine Riyadh’s long-term security and influence.
Saudi Arabia’s future regional role depends on its ability to balance these complex considerations, guiding the transition in Iran in ways that minimize chaos while maximizing opportunities for cooperation. This approach demands patience, strategic foresight, and diplomatic dexterity but promises a more stable and prosperous Middle East anchored by Saudi leadership attuned to the realities of a new era.
Security Dynamics in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Provinces Amid Regional Turmoil
Saudi Arabia currently confronts a highly complex and volatile security environment that demands careful strategy regarding pro-Iranian networks operating within its eastern provinces, particularly in Ahwaz. These networks, historically linked to Tehran’s intelligence apparatus and regional proxies, function through a variety of covert means, including espionage, recruitment, dissemination of propaganda, and facilitation of militant activities. Their presence undermines Saudi sovereignty and fuels sectarian tensions that threaten the Kingdom’s long-term stability. In light of Iran’s domestic instability and the looming prospect of regime collapse or transition, Riyadh must evaluate not only if but how and when to intensify efforts to dismantle these groups.
Iran’s internal crisis amplifies the urgency. The regime’s weakening control over its own territory creates openings for Tehran’s proxies to assert greater autonomy or act independently, potentially increasing hostile operations against Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Iran’s desperation may drive it to escalate hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks, fomenting unrest, and sponsoring terrorism in Saudi Arabia as forms of asymmetric retaliation or distraction. Riyadh’s intelligence services have reportedly observed attempts to increase covert operations inside the Kingdom during moments of Iranian vulnerability, highlighting the need for preemptive action.
Nonetheless, the social fabric of the eastern provinces imposes significant constraints on how Riyadh can respond. The Shia minority population in Ahwaz and adjacent areas suffers from historical marginalization manifesting in limited political representation, economic underdevelopment, and restrictions on religious and cultural expression. These conditions create a fertile ground for Iranian-backed networks to recruit and radicalize segments of the population by exploiting grievances and portraying themselves as defenders of oppressed communities. Excessively forceful purges risk deepening alienation and driving cycles of resistance and repression that could destabilize the region further.
Moreover, the demographic complexity includes tribal affiliations, local power brokers, and economic stakeholders whose cooperation or opposition will heavily influence the outcome of any security operation. Riyadh’s security apparatus must navigate these networks delicately, ensuring operations minimize collateral damage and avoid antagonizing influential actors who could sway public sentiment. Balancing targeted counterintelligence work with community engagement programs is therefore critical to undermining Iranian influence without igniting sectarian conflict.
The wider regional context complicates Saudi decision-making. A sudden collapse of Iran’s regime could unleash waves of instability—refugee movements into Saudi territory, spillover of militias or weapons, disruptions in oil markets, and heightened proxy conflicts across the Gulf and Levant. Under such pressure, the Kingdom’s security and economic resilience will be tested, and the timing of aggressive internal purges becomes crucial. Acting too early risks unnecessary provocation and overstretching security resources; acting too late risks losing control over expanding Iranian proxy networks and weakening border security.
Saudi Arabia’s evolving alliances offer both a strategic buffer and operational advantage. Intelligence cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council members, particularly the UAE and Bahrain, which face similar Iranian threats, enables shared situational awareness and coordinated countermeasures. Western intelligence partnerships—especially with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—bring advanced surveillance, cyber defense capabilities, and counterterrorism expertise. These partnerships enhance Riyadh’s ability to conduct precise, surgical operations that minimize broader societal impact, thereby preserving delicate internal stability.
Economic initiatives aimed at integrating the Shia minority into Saudi Arabia’s broader Vision 2030 framework also intersect with security considerations. Programs that expand infrastructure investment, improve access to education and employment, and allow greater cultural expression contribute to reducing the appeal of radical Iranian proxies. When communities feel economically empowered and socially recognized, their susceptibility to external manipulation diminishes. Hence, Riyadh’s strategy involves not only security crackdowns but sustained socio-economic engagement designed to foster loyalty and resilience among eastern populations.
Politically, Riyadh’s messaging must carefully balance firmness with inclusion. Publicly framing pro-Iranian networks strictly as security threats without acknowledging legitimate local grievances risks pushing more citizens toward opposition. A nuanced narrative that differentiates between violent actors and peaceful dissenters, coupled with credible political reforms, could erode support for Iranian-backed factions. This approach could also improve Saudi Arabia’s international image, signaling a commitment to stability and human rights amid a turbulent regional environment.
Looking ahead, Riyadh’s path requires strategic patience and adaptability. The Kingdom must continuously assess intelligence, regional developments, and internal dynamics to calibrate the intensity and scope of purges against pro-Iranian networks. It should avoid large-scale crackdowns that could spark widespread unrest, instead favoring intelligence-led operations combined with parallel socio-economic reforms and regional diplomacy. Success depends on the ability to integrate security, political, and social strategies into a coherent policy that addresses the root causes of vulnerability to Iranian influence.
How Saudi Arabia manages these internal security challenges will significantly shape the Gulf’s future geopolitical balance. Effective containment of Iranian proxies enhances Riyadh’s regional leadership and supports broader efforts to counter Tehran’s destabilizing activities. Conversely, missteps risk exacerbating sectarian divisions and undermining the Kingdom’s stability during a period when regional cooperation and economic diversification are vital to its long-term prosperity. The stakes surrounding the timing and manner of purging pro-Iranian networks extend far beyond immediate security concerns, influencing the trajectory of the Middle East for decades to come.
Shaping the Future: Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads of Regional Transformation
As the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East undergoes profound shifts, Saudi Arabia stands at a pivotal crossroads defined by unprecedented challenges and strategic opportunities. The potential collapse or transformation of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents both risks of regional instability and openings for Riyadh to redefine its role as a stabilizing power and economic leader. Navigating this transition requires a delicate balance between assertive security measures—such as addressing pro-Iranian networks in its eastern provinces—and inclusive domestic policies that reduce sectarian tensions and foster social cohesion.
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 emerges as more than an economic modernization plan; it is a framework for regional integration and geopolitical repositioning. By leveraging economic diplomacy, strengthening alliances, and promoting internal reforms, the Kingdom seeks to mitigate the fallout from Iran’s uncertainty while positioning itself as a central actor in shaping a new regional order. The Kingdom’s capacity to adapt to unfolding scenarios—whether a sudden regime collapse, a prolonged fragmentation, or a managed transition in Iran—will determine the stability of the Gulf and the wider Middle East.
The urgency of these challenges coincides with immediate opportunities for Riyadh to assert leadership, consolidate its alliances, and invest in resilience. The choices made now regarding the timing of security crackdowns, community engagement, and diplomatic outreach will reverberate far beyond Saudi borders. Success lies in Saudi Arabia’s ability to integrate hard security tactics with long-term political and economic strategies that reinforce its sovereignty and regional influence.
At this crossroads, Saudi Arabia’s actions will not only shape its own future but also the trajectory of an entire region in flux. The coming years demand vision, prudence, and strategic agility—qualities that will define Riyadh’s legacy as a guardian of stability and a catalyst for transformation in the Middle East.