The Washington Outsider Newsletter - Vol. 137

May 26, 2025

International Media

• My latest article for Mujhar analyzes the likely impact and risks of lifting the Caesar Sanctions, just as EU is removing its own sanctions framework in a bid for relevance and influence.
  
  Syria’s no longer the poster child of Arab Spring hellfire, but don’t pop the champagne just yet. We’ve swapped out Assad for President Ahmed Al-Sharaa—a more PR-friendly face, sure, but he’s still juggling a country held together with duct tape, donor fatigue, and backroom diplomacy. The West, particularly Europe, is doing its best impression of a cautious optimist, slowly easing sanctions while pretending it still has leverage. Spoiler alert: Russia and China are already redecorating Damascus with their flags.
  
  On the other side of the Atlantic, Trump’s back and he’s doing what Trump does best—treating Syria like a distressed asset in need of a quick flip. The Caesar sanctions? Too “yesterday.” His team is floating waivers, backchannels, and investment bait faster than you can say “OFAC.” But there’s a catch: every softening of sanctions risks turning Syria into a Turkish client state or an Iranian side hustle. Erdogan’s licking his chops, and Tehran’s already unpacking in border zones.
  
  Meanwhile, Europe’s playing a long game—easing pressure just enough to get a foot back in the reconstruction door, but not so much that human rights groups riot in Brussels. Brussels wants contracts, refugees to go home, and leverage before Beijing and Rosneft buy the whole show. Conditionality is the name of the game—ease here, tighten there, and pray Syria doesn’t implode again.
  
  Al-Sharaa? He’s strutting onto the UN stage like a man reborn, but beneath the tailored suits and reformist whispers, Syria’s economy is still gasping for air, and half the country’s infrastructure runs on duct tape and Gulf subsidies.
  
  So what’s next? If the West overplays its hand, Syria could slide back into chaos, and the Golan will light up like Times Square. But if everyone plays this just right—careful diplomacy, strategic investments, and no blank checks—Syria might just stumble into something resembling stability. Might.

Full translation below:

Syria at the Crossroads: Europe’s Calculated Pivot, Trump’s Risky Gambit, and Turkey’s Expanding Shadow

By Irina Tsukerman

Navigating the Tightrope: Europe, the U.S., and the Future of a Fragmented Syria

The winds of change are sweeping through Syria, but what they carry is anything but straightforward. Europe’s cautious yet determined move to ease sanctions signals more than mere diplomacy—it’s a strategic recalibration shaped by decades of conflict, shifting alliances, and mounting humanitarian urgency. At the same time, the Trump administration’s accelerated push to unlock investment opportunities threatens to unsettle an already fragile equilibrium, inadvertently bolstering Ankara’s regional ambitions and complicating the delicate dance of power in the Levant.

Overseeing this fraught transition is President Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s unity government, a symbol of cautious optimism after years of turmoil and the departure of the Assad era. Yet beneath the surface, the specter of renewed civil conflict looms, echoed in warnings from voices like Secretary of State Rubio, who claims Syria teeters on the edge of collapse. Whether hyperbole or grim reality, this threat underscores the precariousness of the moment—where economic revival, political reconciliation, and regional rivalries collide.

Caesar Sanctions and the Post-Assad Puzzle — A Deep Dive into U.S.-Syria Policy under Trump’s 47th Presidency

What Are the Caesar Sanctions?

The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act — colloquially the Caesar sanctions — has long been wielded like a geopolitical crowbar, prying open the ugly truths of Syria’s civil war and slamming shut the doors to international rehabilitation. Originally passed in 2019 during Trump’s first term, the legislation was inspired by a defector codenamed "Caesar" who leaked tens of thousands of photos showing torture, abuse, and death in Syrian detention centers. That ghastly imagery turned stomachs across Washington and led to one of the most sweeping sanctions regimes in modern U.S. foreign policy. But here’s the twist: the law was never just about Assad. It was structured to punish anyone involved in aiding the Syrian government’s abuses — from Iranian militias and Russian oligarchs to Lebanese banks and Chinese investors.

Fast forward to today: Assad is long gone, ousted through a complex cocktail of military attrition, elite betrayal, and international maneuvering. Yet the sanctions endure. Why? Because they were built not just to target individuals but to wrap the entire Syrian economic ecosystem in razor wire. That includes critical sectors like energy, telecoms, construction, aviation, and banking. No international actor can touch post-war Syria without triggering potential secondary sanctions — even if their intention is reconstruction, not repression. It’s economic house arrest with no clear expiration date.

And the scope is extraordinary. Want to rebuild a school in Aleppo? You’d better make sure the contractor hasn’t supplied concrete to a military base. Want to invest in Syria’s power grid? If the company also has business ties to Hezbollah or the IRGC, it’s a no-go. Even NGOs are spooked. Humanitarian corridors are clogged with paperwork, and medicine often sits in limbo while lawyers parse OFAC licenses.

As Syria’s new provisional government tries to steer out of the abyss, the Caesar sanctions — once a moral cudgel — now risk becoming a bludgeon to reform. The intention was righteous. The reality, post-Assad, is a bureaucratic booby trap that could prevent recovery, alienate regional allies, and push Damascus toward geopolitical predators like Iran and China.

Who Has the Authority to Remove Them?

In theory, Trump holds the executive authority to modify, waive, or suspend aspects of the Caesar sanctions. But theory, as always, collides with Washington reality. The sanctions themselves are codified in law, meaning permanent removal or repeal would require Congressional approval — no simple feat when Congress is still stacked with members who treat Caesar like sacred text.

The President can, however, direct the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to issue general or specific licenses, carveouts, or temporary waivers. That’s where the political maneuvering gets spicy. Trump, who has already shown signs of cooling on his previous promises of unconditional support for Israel and Gaza aid cutbacks, might choose to play fast and loose with these mechanisms to negotiate backchannel deals, pressure allies, or even advance his broader anti-China agenda.

Meanwhile, Vice President JD Vance, who postponed his controversial trip to Israel amid rumors of internal tensions and donor blowback, could emerge as a wildcard on the Caesar issue. His libertarian instincts and focus on disentangling from “forever wars” might push him to favor pragmatic relief — but his growing alignment with populist isolationists makes him unpredictable.

The legislative road, however, is littered with landmines. Any attempt to repeal or overhaul the Caesar Act would likely trigger fierce opposition from entrenched bipartisan coalitions, human rights NGOs, and diaspora groups. Remember: the law wasn’t just about punishing Assad; it was a symbolic assertion of American values. Unraveling that takes more than a pen — it takes a political earthquake.

What Will the Process Be Like?

Imagine a swamp filled with red tape, inter-agency turf wars, and ideological grenades. That’s the process of lifting or softening Caesar. It’s not a matter of “flip the switch” diplomacy. First, Trump would need to assemble a task force capable of assessing the current conditions in Syria, vetting new government structures, and mapping out economic and political interests. That means deep dives into Syria’s new technocratic cabinet, tribal alignments, and remaining militia influences.

OFAC, always risk-averse, will drag its feet unless the White House throws its full weight behind a political justification. The State Department’s regional experts — many holdovers from earlier administrations — will issue dire warnings about Iran and Hezbollah filling the vacuum. The Pentagon will worry about Russian radar bases and airspace leverage.

To make any meaningful headway, the administration will need a phased strategy: first, humanitarian carveouts and pilot projects in areas outside IRGC control; then, limited sectoral exemptions (say, agriculture and health infrastructure); finally, political benchmarking linked to transitional justice or elections. This approach might appease Congress enough to delay retaliation — but only if the messaging is airtight.

Meanwhile, Gulf actors like the UAE and Saudi Arabia will be lobbying hard behind the scenes. The UAE wants to jumpstart construction contracts. Saudi Arabia — war-weary but strategically ambitious — sees Syrian reintegration into the Arab League as a counterweight to Iran. Both are pressuring Trump to act, dangling business deals and military basing rights as incentives.

What Are the Likely Challenges?

Let’s start with the obvious: the optics. Trump, already criticized for his backpedal on Israel support and increased Gaza aid, would face even more heat for seeming to “reward” Syria. The right-wing media complex will scream betrayal. The neocons will quote Caesar’s defector testimony on loop. And Democrats will accuse Trump of undermining human rights — again.

Then there’s Israel. Netanyahu, increasingly isolated after clashes with the Trump administration and facing regional unease over Gaza, has publicly signaled discontent with even “minimal” aid to Syria. He views any U.S. softening as an open door for Iranian and Hezbollah re-entrenchment. Israel’s security establishment, already skittish over U.S. disengagement from Yemen and the Houthis, will likely leak intel to sabotage Caesar relief plans.

Within the U.S., factionalism is surging. On one side: isolationist MAGA Republicans, eager to cut losses, slash aid, and open up Syria as a “new frontier” for American private sector investment. On the other: traditional security hawks and evangelical Zionists, who see Syria as a frontline in the battle against Iran and a litmus test for loyalty to Israel.

Trump will try to sell Caesar relief as a jobs-creating, China-thwarting, deal-making masterstroke. But unless he can prove that lifting sanctions serves American workers and punishes Iran, he’ll be walking a rhetorical tightrope in quicksand boots.

What Can We Expect to See from U.S.-Syria Talks?

This will be less Camp David, more Vegas backroom. Trump isn’t interested in Geneva-style diplomacy or UN fanfare. Instead, talks will unfold via triangulation: Gulf intermediaries like Qatar or Oman relaying proposals, Jordan facilitating logistics, and private-sector liaisons scoping out reconstruction contracts.

Expect to hear terms like “reform benchmarks,” “stability guarantees,” and “regional alignment.” Translation? The U.S. wants to know that Syria’s new leaders won’t hand Damascus to Tehran, give Latakia’s ports to Beijing, or offer Tartus as a Russian naval Disneyland.

Washington’s initial asks will include anti-terrorism coordination, oil infrastructure access, and protection for Christian and Kurdish minorities. Syria’s counter-demands will center on phased relief, repatriation support for refugees, and a massive influx of foreign capital.

But negotiations won’t exist in a vacuum. Turkey’s role looms large. Erdogan, burned by years of Syrian quagmire, is playing both sides — threatening military incursions while courting Russian favors. Iraq remains a wildcard, with PMF militias watching closely for cues on U.S. resolve. Lebanon, meanwhile, is crumbling economically and may try to ride Syria’s coattails into reconstruction deals.

Geopolitical Maneuvering in the Shadows

Syria today is less a nation-state than a prize in a regional contest. Every actor — from Qatar to Russia to Iran to Israel — is maneuvering to claim a slice of the post-Assad vacuum.

Qatar’s playbook is subtle but ambitious. It’s presenting itself as the region’s indispensable humanitarian actor, funneling aid into areas neglected by Western NGOs and building relationships with Syria’s new local authorities. But the real goal is control over telecom networks, infrastructure projects, and political narrative. With Turkey distracted and the UAE slow to commit, Doha sees a golden opportunity.

Meanwhile, Iran is retooling its proxy strategies. Without Assad as a patron, Tehran is embedding technocrats, clerics, and financial operatives into local governance bodies. If the U.S. eases Caesar restrictions without fencing off IRGC-controlled areas, Iran will surge forward — not just militarily, but commercially.

China is another silent player, whispering about Belt and Road expansions and offering post-war loans with far fewer strings than the IMF. Trump’s team knows that if the U.S. dithers, Beijing will pave the roads, wire the networks, and build the factories that tie Syria’s future to Chinese banks.

And let’s not forget Europe. Britain is suddenly posturing as the moral voice of Gaza but has its eyes on Mediterranean stability. France, once bitten by its failed Syria policy, is now angling for cultural and energy influence. Any misstep by Washington could see European actors pushing ahead with their own Syria ententes.

In short, the game is afoot. And while Trump may fancy himself the master of deals, the pieces on this board move quickly — and not always at his command.

Europe’s Syria Sanctions U-Turn and Its Wider Implications

When the European Union announced its decision to ease sanctions on Syria, many observers shrugged it off as Europe meekly trailing Washington’s lead—like a kid trying to avoid getting left out of the playground game. But scratch beneath the surface, and you find a sophisticated, high-stakes geopolitical maneuver that’s less about mimicry and more about self-preservation, strategic repositioning, and hedging bets amid a turbulent regional chessboard.

Unlike the Caesar sanctions, which are the U.S.’s iron fist designed to cripple Syria’s economy wholesale—targeting anyone doing business with Damascus under threat of secondary sanctions—the EU’s sanctions regime has traditionally been more surgical and political in tone. These European sanctions have focused on individuals linked to the regime, specific economic sectors, and symbolic restrictions meant to express disapproval while retaining room for diplomatic engagement. So when the EU moves to relax these measures, it’s not just flipping a switch; it’s recalibrating a complex legal and diplomatic apparatus that reflects Europe’s unique sensibilities, internal politics, and diverse member-state interests.

This recalibration is steeped in history. European sanctions on Syria have evolved through cycles of escalation and partial relief, reflecting shifting political winds—from the Arab Spring to the rise and fall of extremist groups, from chemical weapon accusations to regional power plays. Each phase saw Europe balancing punitive measures with pragmatic engagement attempts, often under the shadow of U.S. policy but also driven by Europe’s own strategic interests and humanitarian concerns.

Case Study: The Libya Precedent

Europe’s approach draws lessons from Libya’s post-2011 sanctions experience. Initially severe EU sanctions devastated Libya’s economy but ultimately failed to prevent internal chaos or rebuild state institutions. A slow, conditional easing of sanctions, linked to political milestones, helped restore limited international engagement. Syria’s trajectory is watched closely against this benchmark, as Brussels seeks to avoid Libya’s pitfalls—fragmentation, uncontrolled militias, and lack of transparency—while maintaining leverage.

Why now? Europe finds itself caught between Scylla and Charybdis. Maintaining draconian sanctions indefinitely risks pushing Syria further into the orbit of Russia and China, who have shown zero hesitation in filling the void with reconstruction loans, infrastructure projects, and political support—often with fewer strings attached. This threatens to freeze Europe out of Syria’s economic future entirely, forfeiting lucrative contracts, political influence, and a say in the post-conflict order.

But there is more nuance. Europe also faces internal pressures: public fatigue over endless Middle Eastern conflicts, the burden of hosting millions of Syrian refugees, and economic considerations amid global inflation and energy crises. Prolonged sanctions that perpetuate Syria’s economic collapse risk triggering more displacement, regional instability, and humanitarian crises that reverberate back into Europe’s own neighborhoods. This calculus drives Brussels to seek a delicate exit hatch—gradually loosening sanctions to encourage reconstruction and stability without appearing to reward authoritarianism.

Economic Data Insight

Syria’s GDP contracted by over 60% during the conflict years, with the World Bank estimating over 80% of the population living in poverty. Sanctions have exacerbated currency collapse, inflation (exceeding 200% in some years), and food insecurity. The EU’s recalibration seeks to halt this downward spiral by reintroducing humanitarian aid channels and opening limited trade flows, aiming to stimulate microeconomic recovery while monitoring regime compliance.

Yet easing sanctions without meaningful reforms risks alienating powerful constituencies within Europe itself—human rights organizations, Syrian diaspora communities, and segments of the European Parliament. The memory of atrocities committed during Syria’s long conflict is fresh, and many Europeans view any quick thaw as a betrayal of principles and justice. The EU thus walks a tightrope, trying to juggle pragmatism with principles.

This delicate balance explains why the EU’s approach is incremental and conditional rather than wholesale. Brussels is likely to demand verifiable human rights improvements, governance reforms, and anti-corruption measures before unshackling funds or opening trade gates. They want to ensure that aid and investments do not enrich corrupt elites or perpetuate authoritarian abuses. Given Syria’s notorious history of opaque governance, this is no small ask. Europe’s insistence on transparency mechanisms aims to create a firewall against graft and misappropriation—a lesson painfully learned from years of failed reconstruction efforts in post-conflict zones worldwide.

Justice and reconciliation also feature prominently in the EU’s calculus. Europe insists that easing sanctions must be linked with tangible efforts toward accountability for war crimes and human rights violations, or at least credible steps toward national reconciliation. This is a thorny issue; Damascus fears international scrutiny and international tribunals, while many victims demand justice as a prerequisite for peace. Europe’s position seeks to avoid a political reset that erases accountability, thereby maintaining its moral standing.

The EU will also likely pursue a sector-by-sector approach to lifting restrictions. Instead of opening all floodgates at once, areas like humanitarian aid, agriculture, and civilian infrastructure—fields less directly linked to regime power—could see earlier relief. This cautious unbundling allows for monitoring compliance and adjusting policies dynamically, avoiding the risk of a premature “all-clear” that emboldens bad actors.

Regional diplomacy is another pillar. The EU understands that Syria’s stability is intertwined with its neighbors. Brussels will push Damascus to improve ties with Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, hoping to reduce cross-border tensions, control refugee flows, and curb smuggling networks that destabilize the broader Levant. However, this regional entanglement adds complexity: neighbors themselves have divergent interests, alliances, and rivalries that could either help stabilize or exacerbate tensions.

Regional Diplomatic Profile: Lebanon and Jordan

Lebanon, struggling with its own economic crisis and political paralysis, views Syria’s stability as critical to halting refugee inflows and cross-border militias. Jordan, hosting millions of refugees and wary of extremist spillover, seeks assurances that reconstruction funds won’t empower hostile groups or disrupt fragile domestic security. Both countries act as gatekeepers, influencing EU and Syrian engagement dynamics.

Within the EU, member states diverge sharply. France and Germany, with large Syrian diaspora populations and vocal human rights advocates, lean toward a tougher stance, wary of appearing lenient on a regime accused of brutal repression. Meanwhile, other states with economic interests in the Middle East push for engagement and reopening. The European Parliament acts as an ideological watchdog, threatening to scuttle softening moves perceived as too indulgent. This fragmentation forces the EU into a delicate diplomatic ballet, balancing competing priorities and attempting to maintain a united front while managing internal dissent.

Across the Atlantic, the U.S. picture is equally turbulent. The Biden administration is long out of office, replaced by Donald Trump, the 47th president, whose administration signals a rollback of earlier unconditional support for Syria-related issues and Middle East allies. Trump’s team appears to be pulling back on prior pledges, including promises to restore humanitarian aid to Gaza—initially cut—setting a precedent unique in the region’s aid landscape. This inconsistent U.S. policy injects uncertainty into Europe’s calculations, forcing Brussels to hedge its bets and pursue an approach less reliant on Washington’s direction.

The Trump administration’s pressure tactics on Syria and Israel, combined with internal factionalism in Washington around Middle East policy, mean that Europe must navigate not only Damascus but a fractured transatlantic alliance. U.S. moves to link aid with broader regional agreements—such as with Iran or the Houthis—complicate Europe’s ability to push its own timeline and conditions, creating an intricate diplomatic dance.

Regionally, Qatar’s role has emerged as a critical factor. Doha’s mediation efforts, economic muscle, and unique relationships with Iran, the Houthis, and Gulf neighbors position it as a key broker. Qatar’s posture influences Western calculations, particularly as the U.S. contemplates delicate withdrawals from Yemen and negotiations around Gaza and Israel. This regional dynamic feeds into Western concerns about how aid, sanctions, and diplomacy interplay, complicating any neat solution.

Europe watches this Gulf balancing act carefully, understanding that Syria’s future is tied into broader Middle Eastern power struggles. Brussels is likely to coordinate closely with regional partners to avoid triggering new instability while encouraging Damascus to move toward responsible reconstruction.

Looking ahead, expect a slow, incremental easing of sanctions rather than a dramatic lifting. Diplomacy will be fraught with horse-trading between EU capitals, Washington, regional powers, and Syria itself. The race for lucrative reconstruction contracts will intensify, and domestic politics within EU countries will remain a wildcard, as governments balance pragmatic engagement with public and parliamentary pressures.

From a risk perspective, Europe’s gamble could backfire if sanctions relief emboldens the regime to deepen authoritarian controls or if funds fuel corruption rather than reconstruction. Conversely, holding sanctions too long risks surrendering influence to Russia and China for generations. Europe’s best bet lies in enforcing tough, transparent conditionality, engaging regionally, and preparing to reverse course if progress stalls.

Russia’s Reaction: The Patient Power Broker Cementing Its Foothold

Russia’s posture on Syria’s sanctions relaxation is anything but passive. The Kremlin has spent the last decade turning Syria into its strategic foothold in the Middle East, deploying military assets, building alliances, and embedding itself economically. The lifting of Western sanctions is viewed through Moscow’s lens as both a challenge and an opportunity—one to affirm Russia’s indispensability while countering Western influence.

Russia’s investments in Syria are massive and multifaceted: naval bases on the Mediterranean, military airfields, arms sales, and critical infrastructure projects designed to secure its presence for decades. From Moscow’s perspective, Western sanctions were designed not just to punish Syria but to weaken Russian leverage. So any thaw in sanctions is a tacit admission of Russia’s staying power, which it will exploit mercilessly.

Case Study: Russian Energy Dominance in Syria

Russia’s state energy giant Rosneft quietly secured control over Syrian oil fields, gas production, and distribution networks—allowing Moscow to dictate terms of Syria’s energy recovery and economic rebound. This control feeds into Russia’s wider strategy of leveraging energy as a geopolitical tool, not just in Europe but now increasingly in the Levant.

Russia’s approach is pragmatic: encouraging limited Western engagement to avoid isolating Syria entirely but positioning itself as the ultimate arbiter of the country’s future. Moscow promotes reconstruction projects with Russian firms, securing contracts that blend economic returns with political loyalty.

Putin’s team is already working behind the scenes to ensure that any European re-engagement with Syria runs through Russian-approved channels. Russian state-linked contractors, banks, and logistics firms are quietly preparing to scale up operations, secure subcontracting deals, and cement their dominance over Syria’s reconstruction apparatus. Russia is particularly focused on energy infrastructure, port facilities, and phosphate mining—sectors that bring long-term strategic and financial returns. Moscow’s calculation is simple: if the West returns, it should pay a toll to the gatekeeper.

Diplomatically, Russia also uses Europe’s pivot as proof of its own narrative—that Western attempts to isolate allies through sanctions are doomed to fail. Russian media and foreign ministry officials have already begun spinning the EU’s recalibration as a reluctant climbdown, portraying it as yet another example of Moscow outlasting its adversaries. This narrative reinforces Russia’s global messaging campaign, especially in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America, where it seeks to present itself as a bulwark against Western coercion.

But Russia’s role is not purely passive or opportunistic—it’s increasingly proactive. Russian intelligence and diplomatic channels are reportedly exerting pressure on Damascus to be more flexible with Europe—not because Putin suddenly favors reform, but because economic stability ensures a stable foothold for Russian interests. Russian advisers are embedded across Syrian ministries and intelligence agencies, helping craft legislation and investment frameworks tailored to long-term dependency. In a sense, the relaxation of EU sanctions could become the grease that enables Russia to tighten its grip even further, albeit behind a veil of international cooperation.

At the same time, Moscow is wary of overreach. Russian elites remember how Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan spiraled once foreign actors overcommitted. Russia wants Syria to be stable enough to host troops and extract value—but not so independent that it reorients toward the West. This is why Russia will welcome EU investment in non-sensitive sectors like agriculture or education while guarding its turf in energy, security, and military infrastructure. It’s a calibrated dance of engagement and containment—classic Kremlin strategy.

The Kremlin is wary, however. It knows that easing sanctions could invite Western companies back, diluting its grip. Hence, Russia pushes for a multipolar reconstruction framework that guarantees a leading Russian role while accommodating limited Western involvement under Moscow’s watchful eye.

Diplomatically, Russia works closely with Iran and Turkey to manage the complex Syrian puzzle, leveraging tensions to maximize gains. Moscow’s messaging is consistent: Syria’s sovereignty must be respected, Western interference minimized, and any sanctions relief must acknowledge Russia’s role as an indispensable partner.

This assertive posture creates friction with the EU and U.S., which seek to link reconstruction aid to governance reforms. Russia counters with its own narrative—highlighting Western hypocrisy, selective interventions, and the failures of regime change policies in the region.

Risk for Russia lies in overextending: balancing military commitments, economic investments, and diplomatic pressure across a volatile theater is expensive and politically sensitive. Moreover, deteriorating security conditions or renewed hostilities could jeopardize Moscow’s gains.

Recommendation for Russia is to consolidate its gains by deepening economic ties, leveraging energy and reconstruction contracts as geopolitical tools, and using diplomatic channels to fragment Western coalitions. By maintaining a flexible stance that allows incremental Western involvement—under strict Russian terms—Moscow can strengthen its foothold without sparking an outright confrontation.

China’s Ambitions: The Quiet Giant Betting on Long-Term Influence

China’s involvement in Syria has been low-profile but steadily growing, fitting Beijing’s global strategy of economic expansion without overt political entanglements. Unlike Russia, China prefers to wield influence through financial muscle, infrastructure projects, and a strict policy of non-interference that appeals to authoritarian regimes seeking economic relief without Western-style political conditions.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) extends into the Middle East, and Syria represents a potential corridor linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. Reconstruction contracts for roads, railways, ports, and telecommunications are not only profitable but strategic investments in connectivity. Chinese firms offer competitive pricing and financing packages—often bundled with loans from Chinese state banks—which are highly attractive to Damascus, facing severe budget gaps due to sanctions and economic collapse.

More than just business, China’s non-interference policy builds trust with Syria and others, avoiding Western-style demands for governance reforms, human rights improvements, or transparency. This hands-off stance preserves regime autonomy and offers Damascus a lifeline at a time when Western aid comes shackled with conditions. It’s a pragmatic alternative attractive to Syrian leadership seeking to maintain control.

Beijing’s ambitions go beyond economics. By embedding itself through trade and investment, China seeks to gain diplomatic leverage and political goodwill in a strategically important region that has traditionally been outside its direct sphere. It is a slow but steady insertion into Middle Eastern geopolitics, using soft power, infrastructure, and finance rather than military might.

Challenges abound, though. Syria’s volatile security landscape, factional divisions, and fragile governance create risk for Chinese projects. The policy of non-interference limits China’s ability to influence Syria’s internal politics or mediate conflicts, requiring careful navigation and coordination with Russia and regional powers.

Moreover, China sees Syria as a testbed for a broader challenge to Western-dominated development models. If Beijing can help rebuild Syria and demonstrate results—new highways, power plants, tech parks—without democratic reforms or governance overhauls, it will sell that formula across the Global South. The EU’s policy elite understands this threat, but bureaucratic constraints and internal divisions make it hard to mount a counteroffensive with comparable speed or flexibility.

What worries Brussels most is that easing sanctions too slowly hands Beijing first-mover advantage in key sectors—real estate, transport, logistics—that shape not just Syria’s economy but its geopolitical alignment for decades to come. If Europe’s strategy is overly cautious, it risks becoming a second-tier player in a country it once helped shape diplomatically.

High Stakes, Uneven Leverage, and a Murky Road Ahead

Europe’s Syria sanctions U-turn is less a clean pivot than a series of calculated stutter-steps—each choreographed to avoid backlash, preserve leverage, and maintain moral standing, all while catching up to the new geopolitical tempo set by Washington’s erratic policy, Russia’s military patience, and China’s economic creep.

The road ahead is foggy. Best-case scenario: Europe orchestrates a gradual normalization that rewards incremental reforms, nudges Syria toward regional reintegration, and stakes out a meaningful economic presence that aligns reconstruction with human rights benchmarks. Worst-case: sanctions relief fuels a corrupt, entrenched elite; foreign powers carve up influence zones; and Europe is left footing the humanitarian bill for a conflict it no longer controls.

What’s clear is this: the EU no longer has the luxury of symbolic sanctions. In a multipolar world, every delay, every half-measure, every moralistic press release creates a vacuum that someone else will fill—usually with fewer scruples and sharper elbows. Europe must either wield its economic power with strategic discipline or watch its relevance in Syria erode, one backroom deal at a time.

This isn’t just about Syria—it’s a litmus test for whether Brussels can adapt its idealism to a rougher, realpolitik world. Whether it can stop being merely a donor and become a shaper. Whether it’s ready to play the game—or just write the checks.

Europe’s Strategic Chessboard: Maneuvering Amid Syria’s Sanctions Shift

When the European Union chose to ease sanctions on Syria, many dismissed it as mere copycatting of Washington’s lead. But this couldn’t be further from the truth. Brussels isn’t just trailing the U.S.; it’s navigating a tangled geopolitical labyrinth where pragmatism, principle, and regional realities collide in a high-stakes game of chess. Europe’s approach reflects deep internal calculations about its economic interests, security concerns, humanitarian responsibilities, and its long-term influence in a region fraught with competing powers.

Europe’s sanctions have always been more surgical and nuanced than the U.S.’s Caesar sanctions—targeted at specific individuals and sectors rather than a wholesale economic chokehold. Now, with Washington’s own Syria policy muddled under President Trump’s 47th administration—marked by inconsistent humanitarian aid and shifting alliances—Europe finds itself forced to recalibrate. It cannot afford to be a passive player; the cost of staying sidelined is too high.

Syria’s economy is in shambles. With GDP contracted by over 60%, inflation spiking beyond 200% in some years, and widespread poverty, the sanctions-induced economic collapse has fed a black market that fuels corruption and instability. Refugee flows into Europe’s neighborhoods continue to strain resources and political tolerance. Brussels faces mounting pressure to shift gears—to stabilize Syria’s economy and stem the humanitarian fallout without endorsing authoritarianism.

This is where Europe’s geopolitical maneuvering truly shines. Brussels is playing a long game: it wants a seat at the reconstruction table before Russia and China lock in their influence through military bases, arms deals, and infrastructure loans. Moscow, having embedded itself in Syria over the past decade, views Western sanctions relief as a tacit concession of its foothold. Meanwhile, Beijing’s quiet investments are designed to cement long-term economic control. Europe’s strategy is to regain influence, hedge against U.S. unpredictability, and carefully balance principles with pragmatism.

The regional context further complicates this. Lebanon’s fragile economy and political paralysis make Syria’s stability crucial to preventing another crisis. Jordan, balancing domestic security and refugee burdens, demands that any reconstruction aid avoids empowering hostile factions. Qatar, meanwhile, has emerged as a key regional broker, leveraging its ties to Iran, the Houthis, and Gulf neighbors to shape outcomes in ways that European capitals must carefully consider.

Within the EU, member states are split. France and Germany push for a tougher line, mindful of human rights and the regime’s brutal past. Other states eye the economic benefits of reconstruction contracts. The European Parliament keeps Brussels honest, ready to oppose any perceived softness on authoritarian abuses. This internal fragmentation demands delicate diplomatic balancing to present a united front.

Amid this intricate web, Europe’s move to ease sanctions is not a blanket forgiveness but a calibrated, conditional approach. Humanitarian aid, agriculture, and civilian infrastructure sectors will likely see earlier relief, monitored closely for compliance. The EU insists on governance reforms, transparency, and verifiable human rights improvements before unlocking full economic engagement. Lessons from Libya’s chaotic post-sanctions experience loom large—Europe wants to avoid funding corruption and factional fragmentation.

The risk calculus is razor-thin. Too much leniency risks emboldening Syria’s authoritarian regime and feeding corruption. Too little, and Europe cedes influence to Moscow and Beijing, losing out on economic opportunities and diplomatic leverage for decades. Moreover, the public in Europe remains deeply skeptical—many view any thaw as a betrayal of justice for Syrian victims. Europe must thread the needle, balancing domestic politics, moral imperatives, and strategic necessity.

To manage these risks, Europe must:

Enforce strict, transparent oversight of reconstruction funds, working through trusted multilateral institutions and NGOs.

Maintain strong conditions linking sanctions relief to credible human rights progress, governance reform, and accountability initiatives.

Deepen regional diplomacy with Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq to stabilize borders, manage refugee flows, and combat smuggling networks.

Act swiftly to reclaim economic ground before Russia and China deepen their hold, particularly in civilian sectors where European firms can compete.

Coordinate multilaterally with the U.S., Gulf states (notably Qatar), and international bodies to align conditions and amplify diplomatic leverage.

Craft clear public messaging to explain the pragmatic yet principled rationale behind easing sanctions, involving civil society and diaspora groups to foster legitimacy.

This geopolitical dance is delicate and complex—Europe is neither naïve nor reckless. It’s a calculated effort to safeguard influence, promote regional stability, and manage an evolving Middle East where old alliances shift and new power centers rise.

Across the Atlantic, Washington’s wavering policies inject uncertainty. The Trump administration’s inconsistent humanitarian aid to Gaza, combined with internal factional divides over Middle East strategy, means Europe must hedge and sometimes lead on its own terms. Meanwhile, Moscow and Beijing watch keenly, ready to exploit any hesitation.

In this charged environment, Europe’s strategic maneuvering around Syria sanctions is a testament to realpolitik: blending hard-nosed pragmatism with principled diplomacy, regional sensitivity with global ambition. It’s a slow, cautious dance — but one where losing the rhythm risks losing the future of Middle Eastern influence altogether.

The Lightning-Fast Normalization of Ahmad al-Sharaa: A Case Study in Realpolitik and Geopolitical Recalibration

The emergence of Ahmad al-Sharaa as a figure poised to re-enter the international diplomatic arena at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly marks a watershed moment in the ongoing saga of Syria’s reintegration into global diplomacy. This development is striking not only because of al-Sharaa’s controversial past and the U.S. bounty once placed on his head but also due to what it reveals about the evolving calculus among regional and global powers regarding Syria’s future.

Historical and Political Background: Al-Sharaa’s Complex Profile

Ahmad al-Sharaa’s political trajectory is deeply intertwined with Syria’s turbulent history over the past decades. A veteran fighter, from an Ba’athist family background, and once prominently used by members of the Assad regime’s inner circle against the Druze, al-Sharaa was widely viewed in Western capitals and among Syrian opposition groups as a hardliner responsible for policies that contributed to repression and the exacerbation of sectarian tensions. His radical past and close association with authoritarian governance made him a natural target for sanctions, most notably the U.S. Treasury’s designation which included a financial reward aimed at isolating him internationally.

Despite this, al-Sharaa maintained considerable influence within Syria’s political and security apparatus. His networks extend beyond Damascus into neighboring Lebanon, where he has cultivated ties with various political factions, and into parts of the Gulf, particularly Qatar, which has positioned itself as a key mediator in regional conflicts. This extensive web of connections underscores why sidelining al-Sharaa has proved increasingly untenable for actors seeking durable solutions in Syria.

The Geopolitical Drivers of Normalization

The sudden acceleration of al-Sharaa’s normalization stems from a confluence of strategic pressures and shifting diplomatic priorities. Foremost among these is the pragmatic recognition by European powers and the United Nations that sustainable engagement with Syria’s power structures necessitates involving influential regime figures—even those previously shunned.

Europe, grappling with the enormous socio-economic burdens imposed by the Syrian refugee crisis, seeks to stabilize the region and foster conditions conducive to refugee returns. The inclusion of figures like al-Sharaa is seen as a practical step toward opening dialogue channels essential for negotiating reconstruction frameworks and political compromises. In this sense, al-Sharaa’s presence at the UN is emblematic of Europe’s evolving strategy: a move away from maximalist isolation toward calibrated engagement that prioritizes stability and incremental reforms.

At the same time, Qatar’s diplomatic outreach has been instrumental in facilitating this transition. Doha’s mediation efforts, bolstered by its neutral yet influential positioning in Gulf politics, have paved the way for the reintegration of controversial Syrian figures. Qatar’s role is particularly significant given its unique relationships with Iran, the Houthis, and other regional actors, which afford it leverage in shaping outcomes favorable to regional de-escalation and economic reopening.

Parallel to this, shifts in U.S. policy under the Trump “47th” presidency have created a less hostile environment for Syria’s re-engagement with the international community. The administration’s more transactional approach to Middle East policy, including a marked deprioritization of Syria in favor of great power competition with China and Russia, has softened Washington’s stance, thereby indirectly enabling European and UN initiatives to progress without American obstruction.

Economic and Diplomatic Ramifications

The normalization of al-Sharaa signals potential openings for reestablishing international aid flows and investment in Syria—critical steps given the country’s shattered economy. Sanctions and isolation have contributed to a GDP contraction exceeding 60%, hyperinflation, and widespread humanitarian crises. Reintegrating key regime actors who can influence reconstruction contracts, broker deals, and coordinate with regional partners may unlock previously inaccessible resources.

However, this also raises the stakes for conditionality. International actors must ensure that economic revival efforts do not simply entrench corruption or reward authoritarian entrenchment. Syria’s opaque governance structures and history of elite capture necessitate robust oversight mechanisms to accompany any easing of sanctions or funding pledges.

Diplomatically, al-Sharaa’s presence may facilitate more substantive negotiations on contentious issues such as refugee repatriation, regional security cooperation, and cross-border trade. His established relationships with Lebanon and Jordan—two countries deeply affected by Syrian instability—could prove pivotal in crafting policies that address humanitarian concerns and border management. Nonetheless, these diplomatic gains remain fragile, as domestic opposition groups and civil society actors continue to resist legitimization of regime elements with questionable human rights records.

Risks and Challenges: Navigating a Fraught Terrain

Despite the potential benefits of engagement, the rapid normalization of a figure like al-Sharaa is fraught with risks. It risks alienating Syrian opposition factions and diaspora communities who view such moves as undermining justice and accountability. The absence of credible transitional justice mechanisms means that inclusion of former regime elites may be perceived as impunity, complicating reconciliation prospects.

Furthermore, relaxing sanctions for high-profile individuals challenges the integrity of international legal frameworks aimed at deterring human rights abuses. This could weaken the credibility of sanctions regimes and embolden hardliners within Syria who oppose reform.

Regionally, divergent interests among neighboring states complicate the diplomatic environment. While Lebanon and Jordan may welcome stabilization efforts, other Gulf countries remain wary of any reconciliation that strengthens Iran’s influence via Syria. These conflicting agendas require careful diplomatic balancing to avoid exacerbating sectarian tensions or reigniting proxy conflicts.

A Test Case in Realpolitik and Diplomacy

Ahmad al-Sharaa’s accelerated normalization and anticipated attendance at the UN General Assembly encapsulate the complexities of Syria’s reintegration into international diplomacy. His case highlights how geopolitical pragmatism, regional mediation, and shifting global priorities can override past ideological divides and sanctions-based ostracism.

For policymakers, this development is both an opportunity and a challenge. It offers a pragmatic avenue for engagement and potential stabilization but demands rigorous safeguards to ensure that such inclusion does not undermine accountability or entrench authoritarianism. Managing this balance will be a litmus test for the international community’s ability to navigate Syria’s fractured political landscape and shape a viable path toward peace and reconstruction.

Assessing Secretary of State Rubio’s Warning Amid Syria’s New Political Reality Under President Ahmed Al-Sharaa: Economic Fragility, Regional Dynamics, and Rhetorical Strategy

Syria’s post-Assad era under President Ahmed Al-Sharaa marks a significant inflection point in the country’s long trajectory of conflict, fragmentation, and tentative recovery. Al-Sharaa’s emergence as head of the Syrian unity government, coupled with his recent historic attendance at the United Nations General Assembly, signals a critical pivot toward international rehabilitation and domestic consolidation. His leadership has garnered generally positive reception, symbolizing a break from the isolation and authoritarianism that defined the previous regime. Yet Secretary of State Rubio’s stark proclamations warning of an imminent state collapse and civil war within weeks present a sharp contrast, raising questions about the empirical basis and strategic intent behind such warnings.

A deep dive into Syria’s economic reality reveals a nation still grappling with immense structural challenges, yet not on the precipice of immediate collapse. After a protracted contraction of over 60 percent in GDP during years of devastating conflict and economic paralysis, the Syrian economy showed tentative signs of stabilization and modest growth starting in 2023 and into 2024. Current growth estimates hover in the low single digits—around two to three percent—which, while modest, mark a departure from the previous trend of steep decline. This growth has been driven largely by reconstruction activities financed by Gulf states keen to regain influence, as well as a rebound in agricultural output as displaced populations slowly return to rural livelihoods.

However, this fragile economic upswing masks deep vulnerabilities. Inflation, while reduced from hyperinflationary peaks, remains elevated in the 25 to 30 percent annual range, squeezing household purchasing power and exacerbating food insecurity. Inflationary pressures are particularly acute in essential commodities, including wheat, sugar, cooking oil, and fuel—goods critical to daily survival and industrial activity. The relative stabilization of the Syrian pound, trading at approximately 4,000 to 4,200 against the U.S. dollar, owes much to the influx of remittances from the Syrian diaspora and some limited foreign currency inflows tied to reconstruction contracts. Nevertheless, these inflows are irregular and subject to geopolitical flux, particularly as sanctions regimes and regional politics shift unpredictably.

Unemployment remains alarmingly high, estimated at or above 50 percent, reflecting the destruction of Syria’s industrial base, the closure of key manufacturing facilities, and a dysfunctional formal labor market. The informal economy, encompassing agriculture, small-scale trading, and remittances-funded microenterprises, remains the principal source of livelihood for most Syrians, but it lacks stability and productivity growth. Poverty afflicts over 80 percent of the population, a staggering figure underscoring widespread deprivation and vulnerability. Despite these hardships, social cohesion has, remarkably, not unraveled into widespread unrest. Local community networks, tribal affiliations, and informal social safety nets have absorbed much of the pressure, preventing large-scale protests or social upheaval thus far. This resilience reflects both the population’s wariness borne of years of conflict and a collective endurance that sustains fragile stability.

Public services illustrate a similarly mixed picture of incremental progress and persistent fragility. Electricity supply, a critical infrastructure indicator, has improved, with urban centers experiencing eight to ten hours of power per day compared to the near-total blackouts of earlier years. This improvement, however, is uneven and heavily reliant on subsidies and external fuel imports, rendering it vulnerable to future shocks. Water provision and sanitation services lag significantly behind, with many regions facing intermittent access and contamination issues that threaten public health. Healthcare infrastructure, battered by years of war and brain drain, is slowly being rebuilt but remains overstretched and under-resourced, with critical shortages of medicines and trained personnel persisting.

On the governance and security front, the Al-Sharaa government has succeeded in consolidating control over the majority of Syrian territory, estimated at roughly 70 to 80 percent, including key urban centers and main transport arteries. This represents a notable improvement from the fragmentation and contested sovereignty that characterized much of the civil war. Nevertheless, Syria remains de facto partitioned in several areas. Kurdish-led administrations govern large parts of the northeast, Turkish-backed militias dominate border regions in the northwest, and Islamist factions retain footholds in pockets of the country. These divisions create ongoing security flashpoints but have not yet escalated into broader conflict, reflecting a tentative, uneasy balance of power.

Politically, Al-Sharaa’s leadership has introduced a more inclusive and pragmatic approach to governance, seeking to bridge sectarian and ethnic divides through coalition-building and power-sharing arrangements. Refugee returns, although still limited by security concerns and economic hardship, are beginning to restore demographic normalcy in some areas. This political moderation and outreach have improved Syria’s legitimacy in the eyes of regional actors and the international community, helping pave the way for renewed diplomatic engagement and reconstruction investment. Early governance reforms have targeted institutional capacity-building, anti-corruption measures, and incremental judicial independence. Although these reforms remain constrained by entrenched interests and the enduring influence of security services, they lay critical groundwork for more sustainable state-building.

The broader regional geopolitical environment further complicates Syria’s fragile stability and recovery prospects. Iran maintains a strategic foothold in Syria through its network of proxy militias, military advisers, and economic ties, viewing Syria as a vital corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon and a bulwark against Israeli and Western influence. While Iran supports Al-Sharaa’s government pragmatically, it remains wary of reforms that could erode its influence, continuing to operate militias along border zones in ways that challenge Damascus’s sovereignty and complicate governance.

Russia, having decisively altered Syria’s conflict trajectory through its 2015 military intervention, now plays a dual role as security guarantor and political broker. Moscow aims to secure its military assets in Syria, maintain regional influence, and facilitate reconstruction efforts that bolster the unity government. This posture requires balancing its interests with calls for sanctions relief and political stability, constraining the pace and scope of reforms Syria can pursue.

Turkey’s presence in northern Syria reflects Ankara’s security concerns over Kurdish militias, which it regards as terrorist affiliates. Turkish-backed forces control several contested areas, preventing the Al-Sharaa government from exercising full authority and perpetuating territorial fragmentation. This situation injects chronic volatility into the northern border regions and complicates Syria’s path to full sovereignty.

Meanwhile, Gulf states—including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—have cautiously resumed engagement with Syria, driven by shifting regional power calculations and economic interests in reconstruction contracts. Their financial backing, while limited relative to Syria’s vast needs, introduces competitive dynamics with Iran and Russia and provides critical capital for infrastructure projects and humanitarian programs. However, their involvement also risks politicizing reconstruction efforts and fueling rivalry.

Israel remains vigilant toward Iranian entrenchment in Syria, conducting intermittent airstrikes against Iranian and Hezbollah targets. These strikes threaten to destabilize sensitive security balances and exacerbate tensions, reinforcing Syria’s precarious geopolitical tightrope.

Against this intricate tableau, Secretary Rubio’s warnings of imminent collapse and civil war reflect a complex interplay of genuine concerns and calculated diplomatic signaling. His rhetoric underscores the persistent risks inherent in Syria’s fragile recovery, serving to maintain Western pressure for political reforms and human rights improvements while cautioning against premature sanctions relief. This strategic hyperbole seeks to keep international stakeholders aligned around a cautious, conditional approach to normalization.

Yet evidence suggests that while Syria’s vulnerabilities are acute, an immediate collapse scenario is not inevitable. The absence of mass urban unrest, the steady albeit fragile economic improvements, and the government’s consolidation of territory and political inclusion all argue against a near-term breakdown. Rubio’s warnings, therefore, appear calibrated to influence diplomatic leverage rather than describe an unavoidable fate.

Should state failure occur, it would most likely result from a confluence of factors. A sudden cutoff of diaspora remittances or international funding could trigger an economic shock with cascading effects on poverty, food security, and public services. Security vacuums in contested border zones could enable militant groups to expand influence, reigniting violence and undermining government authority. Political stagnation or setbacks in governance reforms risk alienating key societal groups and fracturing the fragile unity achieved under Al-Sharaa. Moreover, regional rivalries involving Iran, Russia, Turkey, Gulf states, and Israel create an ever-present risk of proxy conflicts and external intervention that could destabilize the delicate equilibrium.

In light of these realities, the international community faces the challenge of balancing cautious engagement with rigorous monitoring and conditionality. Gradual easing of sanctions tied to verifiable governance and human rights progress, alongside robust humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, are essential to support Syria’s recovery trajectory while mitigating relapse risks. Regional diplomacy must seek to manage competing interests and promote security cooperation to prevent escalation. Sustained economic stabilization efforts should prioritize food security, inflation control, and job creation to bolster social resilience.

Ultimately, President Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s leadership offers a rare opportunity to break Syria’s cycle of conflict and isolation. His pragmatic governance, coupled with growing regional and international engagement, provides a foundation for cautious optimism. Secretary Rubio’s warnings serve as a necessary reminder of the risks ahead, but the data and developments suggest Syria is not doomed to collapse imminently. Instead, Syria stands at a fragile crossroads where sustained commitment, strategic diplomacy, and patient reform could gradually restore stability, sovereignty, and prosperity.

If Syria were to spiral back into civil war or outright state failure even as Western and international sanctions are incrementally lifted, the ramifications would be catastrophic and multifaceted, plunging the region into renewed instability with far-reaching global consequences.

Humanitarian Catastrophe and Refugee Crisis

The humanitarian fallout would be among the most immediate and severe impacts. Syria’s population, already devastated by over a decade of conflict, displacement, and economic deprivation, would bear the brunt of renewed violence. Vital infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, water and sanitation systems, and electricity grids—many of which remain fragile or partially rebuilt—would be destroyed or rendered non-functional once more. The civilian population would face acute shortages of food, clean water, medicine, and shelter, exacerbating malnutrition, disease outbreaks, and mortality rates.

The internal displacement within Syria would swell dramatically, with millions forced to flee newly contested zones, overwhelmed by the inability of international humanitarian agencies to operate safely or at scale in active conflict zones. Moreover, neighboring countries, especially Lebanon and Jordan—already burdened with hosting the largest per capita refugee populations globally—and Turkey, would face renewed mass inflows. Given their own economic and political challenges, these host states could experience severe social tensions, heightened security concerns, and political destabilization, potentially sparking unrest or the rise of extremist elements within their borders.

For Europe and the broader international community, a new wave of refugees and asylum seekers would once again test the limits of immigration policies, border controls, and humanitarian aid frameworks. Politically, this would fuel domestic backlashes in many EU countries, strengthening nationalist and anti-immigrant movements, complicating diplomatic cohesion, and threatening the fragile consensus around Middle East policy.

Security Vacuum and Extremist Resurgence

From a security standpoint, Syria’s collapse would recreate the chaotic conditions that originally allowed extremist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates to take root. The disintegration of state authority would empower various militias, tribal factions, and jihadist organizations to carve out autonomous territories, potentially reigniting insurgencies and cross-border terrorism. These groups could exploit porous borders to launch attacks on neighboring countries and disrupt regional stability.

Neighboring states such as Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and the Gulf monarchies would be forced to bolster border security and military readiness, possibly engaging in cross-border operations or proxy conflicts, further inflaming regional tensions. Turkey’s already fraught involvement in northern Syria might deepen, complicating its relations with Kurdish groups and Russia.

Russia and Iran, the two principal external backers of Syria’s current government, would face a strategic dilemma. With Syria’s collapse, Moscow risks losing its Mediterranean naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Khmeimim, which are vital for Russia’s power projection in the Middle East and beyond. Tehran, heavily invested economically and militarily in Syria, would also risk losing a critical corridor for its regional influence extending through Iraq to Lebanon and the Hezbollah alliance.

To prevent complete loss of influence, both Russia and Iran might escalate military engagement, deploy more resources, or support proxy militias, intensifying the conflict and raising the risk of direct confrontations with Western or regional powers. This escalation could aggravate great power rivalries, heightening the stakes well beyond Syria itself.

Political Fragmentation and Diplomatic Fallout

Politically, the collapse would undermine nascent efforts at reconciliation and the legitimacy of the current unity government under President Ahmed Al-Sharaa. Despite his positive reception and reformist image, renewed civil war would severely weaken his ability to govern effectively, forcing internal divisions, loss of control over key regions, or fragmentation of authority along sectarian or ethnic lines.

International diplomatic initiatives—led by the UN, the EU, and regional actors—would likely be suspended or rendered ineffective. Confidence-building measures, refugee return plans, and reconstruction efforts would stall. European and Gulf states might become reluctant to engage or invest, fearing their resources would be wasted or captured by warlords.

Moreover, the EU’s carefully calibrated strategy of conditional sanction relief to incentivize reforms and reconciliation would be derailed. The reimposition of sanctions or escalation of punitive measures could follow, but with diminishing returns, as the fractured state would be less able to comply or negotiate.

Economic Collapse and Reconstruction Challenges

Economically, Syria would sink deeper into crisis. Reconstruction efforts already face monumental hurdles: destroyed infrastructure, capital flight, banking sector collapse, sanctions-related restrictions, and pervasive corruption. Renewed conflict would halt any nascent recovery, destroy rehabilitated assets, and destroy the fragile confidence needed for foreign and domestic investment.

Inflation, which has already surpassed several hundred percent at times, would soar uncontrollably. The Syrian pound would likely face a severe freefall, pushing millions further below the poverty line. Unemployment—already above 50%—would spike, especially among youth, further fueling social unrest and recruitment into militias or extremist groups.

International companies and donors, spooked by insecurity and political instability, would withdraw or delay investments, creating a vicious cycle of underdevelopment and dependency on humanitarian aid. This economic despair would feed into grievances, perpetuating the cycle of conflict.

Sanctions and U.S. Political Messaging

Secretary Rubio’s warnings about Syria’s imminent collapse could be interpreted through multiple lenses. On one hand, the deteriorating socio-economic indicators—mass displacement, breakdown of services, rising militancy—lend credibility to the dire scenario. On the other hand, his rhetoric may contain an element of strategic hyperbole aimed at galvanizing U.S. and international support for accelerated sanction relief or increased diplomatic pressure on Damascus and its backers.

If Rubio’s warnings are genuine, they highlight the urgency of preventing collapse through calibrated policy interventions—sanctions relief tied to governance improvements, increased humanitarian assistance, and regional diplomatic engagement. However, if such warnings serve primarily as political leverage, there is a risk they distort policymaking and encourage rushed decisions that overlook on-the-ground realities.

Either way, the risk of state failure complicates the timing and scope of sanctions relief. Premature easing risks providing resources to spoilers who could deepen the conflict; yet maintaining harsh sanctions too long risks economic devastation that also undermines stability. The challenge for Europe and the international community is to strike a balance—using sanctions as a tool for leverage while avoiding unintended consequences that exacerbate fragility.

A collapse of Syria into renewed civil war or failed state status, despite or even triggered by sanctions easing, would unleash a devastating humanitarian crisis, intensify regional security threats, shatter political progress, and shunt the country back into economic abyss. The geopolitical stakes are profound, forcing all actors—Europe, the U.S., Russia, Iran, China, and regional neighbors—to recalibrate strategies amidst a landscape of uncertainty and heightened risk. The situation demands nuanced, flexible diplomacy, vigilant monitoring, and robust international coordination to manage the delicate transition from conflict toward sustainable peace and reconstruction.

If the most dire predictions about lifting sanctions on Syria materialize—where investors ultimately lose their capital and a radicalized, failed state arises along Israel’s border—the regional and international consequences would be nothing short of catastrophic. The reverberations would be felt across economic, political, and security spheres, unraveling fragile balances painstakingly maintained over years.

To begin with, investor confidence in Syria’s reconstruction would be utterly shattered. Despite tentative commitments by sovereign wealth funds, Gulf financiers, and international consortia eager to capitalize on reconstruction contracts, the risk environment remains extraordinarily hostile. Prolonged instability, rampant corruption, weak institutions, and the omnipresent threat of renewed conflict would lead to catastrophic losses. These would not be abstract financial risks but concrete drains on capitals that many Gulf states and European firms have already allocated, expecting returns predicated on at least minimal stability and rule of law. The failure of these investments would reverberate back into investor capitals, sowing mistrust and skepticism that could freeze new projects for decades. Europe’s ambitions to leverage economic engagement as a tool for influence and soft power in Syria’s future would be severely undermined, diminishing Brussels’ strategic position in the Levant. The Gulf states, especially Qatar and the UAE—who have also placed high political stakes on Syria’s reconstruction—would find their diplomatic capital eroded, their reputations tarnished, and their strategic interests imperiled.

On the ground, the emergence of a radicalized, failed Syrian state adjacent to Israel would dramatically escalate regional insecurity. The collapse of central authority would unleash a chaotic power vacuum exploited by extremist militias, jihadist factions, and entrenched militant proxies hostile to Israel and moderate Arab neighbors alike. Areas like the Golan Heights and Israel’s northern border would become flashpoints for cross-border rocket fire, guerrilla incursions, and terrorist operations. Israel, ever vigilant about existential threats on its doorstep, would almost certainly intensify military preemptive strikes and covert operations to neutralize these threats. Such escalations would risk sparking broader military confrontations and draw in regional and global powers with conflicting interests, threatening to ignite a wider conflagration in an already volatile region.

In this context, Turkey’s role as a regional actor becomes pivotal—and fraught with complexity. Ankara has historically pursued an aggressive policy in northern Syria, motivated by security concerns over Kurdish militias, border stability, and ambitions to expand its regional footprint. Should Syria slide into chaos, Turkey would almost certainly intervene militarily, presenting itself as a stabilizer tasked with securing its borders, curbing militant threats, and managing refugee flows. But this intervention would go far beyond mere border security. Turkey would seek to establish buffer zones, control key infrastructure and resource-rich areas such as oil fields, and impose political influence over governance structures in northern Syria. Such moves would constitute a strategic expansion of Turkish hegemony in the Levant.

The timing and extent of Turkey’s intervention would depend on several interlocking factors. A rapid deterioration of security conditions on its southern frontier, escalating militant attacks within its territory, or an unmanageable surge of refugees would trigger Ankara’s decisive military response. Domestic Turkish politics, particularly nationalist pressures, demand robust action against perceived existential threats, though economic constraints and war fatigue might temper long-term engagements. On the diplomatic front, Turkey would gauge international reactions carefully; tacit support or at least acquiescence from Washington and Moscow would embolden Ankara, while international condemnation or sanctions might impose significant costs and limit Ankara’s ambitions.

However, Turkey’s intervention risks intensifying the regional quagmire. While Ankara’s forces might impose a measure of order, prolonged occupation or military presence could provoke fierce resistance from local populations, Kurdish groups, and rival factions. This would likely fuel insurgencies, sectarian tensions, and intercommunal violence, undermining the very stability Turkey seeks to establish. Additionally, Turkey’s efforts to extend political and territorial control would clash with the interests of Iran, Russia, and Syrian nationalist forces, risking proxy confrontations and a deepening regional conflict. The risk of turning northern Syria into a battleground among competing regional hegemonies would increase substantially, further destabilizing the Levant.

The broader implications for Middle Eastern geopolitics are profound. Israel would face intensified security challenges and might feel compelled to expand its military footprint, potentially coordinating covertly or overtly with other regional actors, including Gulf states, to counter Turkish and Iranian influence. Lebanon and Jordan would continue to bear immense pressures from refugee influxes and destabilization spillover. Gulf monarchies, already embroiled in complex rivalry and realignment, would find their Syria policies tested as they balance economic interests, sectarian concerns, and alliances. Russia and Iran, entrenched in Syria’s political and military matrix, would view Turkey’s intervention as a challenge to their dominance, potentially hardening their positions and complicating any prospects for diplomatic resolution.

The economic backdrop to this scenario is equally stark. Syria’s war-ravaged economy remains in freefall: GDP has plummeted to a fraction of pre-war levels, unemployment and poverty rates are staggering, and inflationary pressures—exacerbated by currency depreciation—have pushed millions below the subsistence line. Public infrastructure is decimated; healthcare, education, water, and electricity services operate at minimal capacity. Basic food security is precarious, with millions dependent on international humanitarian aid. The reconstruction costs run into the tens of billions of dollars, but financing this in a context of political instability and sanctions remains an uphill battle. The anticipated easing of sanctions is designed to unlock this investment, but premature or poorly managed relief risks funneling money into corrupt networks and militia coffers rather than reconstruction projects.

The risk of a failed sanctions regime exacerbates the humanitarian catastrophe. With economic collapse continuing, more Syrians would be internally displaced or forced to seek refuge abroad, putting further strain on neighboring countries and Europe. Refugee flows risk destabilizing politically fragile states like Lebanon and Jordan, feeding social tensions and sectarian divides. Humanitarian agencies face immense challenges delivering aid in insecure environments; any renewed conflict would likely lead to access restrictions and further suffering.

Against this backdrop, the debate over the timing and scope of sanctions relief is highly contentious. On one hand, perpetuating sanctions prolongs economic misery, undermines reconstruction prospects, and fuels grievances that feed militancy and instability. On the other, lifting sanctions without robust governance reforms, security improvements, and accountability mechanisms risks reinforcing authoritarianism, enabling corruption, and fueling further conflict. Europe, balancing principles and pragmatism, faces internal divisions among member states between advocates of engagement and proponents of a hardline stance, while also navigating a complex relationship with the U.S., which under President Trump’s administration adopts a more transactional and unpredictable Middle East policy.

Ultimately, the failure to execute a calibrated, conditional, and regionally coordinated approach to sanctions relief risks plunging Syria into deeper chaos, with consequences that extend well beyond its borders. Turkey’s likely intervention as a stabilizing force would come at the price of an expanded Turkish footprint and increased regional tension, complicating efforts to build a lasting peace or stable governance. The broader Middle East could face a new era of multipolar proxy conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and fractured state structures, undermining security for Israel, the Gulf, and the West alike.

The stakes could hardly be higher. Syria’s fate remains a linchpin of regional order. How the international community, regional powers, and Syria itself navigate this fraught moment will shape the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East for decades to come.

The Trump administration’s approach to accelerating sanctions relief and opening investment opportunities in Syria is a double-edged sword that plays directly into the intricate and often contentious geopolitical web of the region—most notably into Turkey’s longstanding strategic ambitions. This aggressive timeline for economic engagement comes amid an evolving Syrian landscape, where political stability remains fragile and local power dynamics are fluid, making premature moves a risky gamble.

Turkey’s interests in northern Syria are multifaceted and deeply entrenched. Since the onset of the Syrian conflict, Ankara has sought to establish a buffer zone along its southern border to prevent the consolidation of Kurdish groups like the YPG, which it associates with the PKK insurgency inside Turkey. Beyond security, Turkey aims to expand its sphere of influence by promoting Turkish-backed militias and political structures, controlling key border crossings, securing critical infrastructure such as water and energy supplies, and gaining leverage in Syria’s eventual reconstruction process. This territorial and political expansion is not merely defensive; it represents a calculated bid for regional hegemony, positioning Turkey as an indispensable actor in Levantine affairs.

The Trump administration’s haste to unlock economic channels—often framed as “investment bait”—can inadvertently strengthen Turkey’s hand by injecting capital into a volatile environment without first resolving the underlying political and security disputes. With sanctions easing, Turkish-backed entities are poised to gain economic footholds that translate into political legitimacy and enhanced control over local governance. Reconstruction funds could flow into areas under Turkish influence, reinforcing Ankara’s de facto authority and embedding its presence long-term.

This trajectory aligns with Turkey’s urgency. Internally, Ankara faces significant challenges: rising nationalist pressures demand strong action to “secure” Syria’s border; economic difficulties at home necessitate stabilizing its external environment; and domestic politics require visible successes abroad. Consequently, Turkey is motivated to capitalize quickly on any openings presented by Western policy shifts. Early investment flows and reconstruction contracts could become a strategic tool for Ankara to institutionalize its gains, normalize its presence, and assert influence over Syria’s future political and economic architecture.

From Washington’s perspective, the Trump administration’s expedited sanctions relief is rooted in a transactional and business-oriented worldview. The emphasis is on quick results: catalyzing economic recovery to prevent further humanitarian collapse, curtailing Iran’s expanding footprint by supporting alternative power brokers, and encouraging private sector-led development to sidestep the pitfalls of prolonged state dependency. This approach sees economic incentives as a lever for stability and a counterbalance to Russian and Iranian dominance. However, by prioritizing speed and market mechanisms over comprehensive political solutions and local stakeholder negotiations, it risks sidelining key actors and failing to account for Syria’s complex power mosaics.

Critically, the Trump administration’s strategy underestimates the risk that premature economic engagement may entrench fragmentation. Instead of fostering national reconciliation and centralized governance, the influx of investment capital could empower fragmented Turkish-aligned militias and local power brokers, exacerbating divisions and potentially sparking new conflicts. Such fragmentation could inflame regional tensions, prompting Russian and Iranian forces to respond aggressively to protect their interests, thereby increasing the risk of proxy clashes.

Moreover, sidelining Kurdish groups—who played a pivotal role in counterterrorism and the defeat of ISIS—could fuel resentment and destabilization in northern Syria, potentially reigniting insurgencies and cross-border violence. Turkey’s campaign to suppress Kurdish autonomy, bolstered indirectly by Western economic engagement in Turkish-controlled areas, complicates efforts toward an inclusive political settlement.

However, proponents of the administration’s approach argue that indefinite sanctions and isolation have only prolonged Syria’s humanitarian crisis and economic disintegration, creating fertile ground for extremist resurgence and regional instability. They contend that ignoring Turkey’s undeniable presence and influence in northern Syria is unrealistic. Hence, engaging economically, even with imperfect political conditions, might stabilize volatile areas and provide leverage over Ankara’s actions by drawing it into formal reconstruction frameworks and international oversight.

Yet, this pragmatic calculation carries risks of its own. By facilitating Turkey’s consolidation in Syria, the Trump administration may be inadvertently endorsing Ankara’s expansionist agenda, undermining the prospects for Syrian sovereignty and a balanced regional order. This could alienate U.S. allies, complicate NATO dynamics (given Turkey’s membership), and provoke diplomatic friction with Russia and Iran, who view Turkish incursions warily.

Furthermore, the rushed approach may backfire economically. Investors drawn by early openings might find themselves exposed to insecure environments, shifting frontlines, and governance vacuums, jeopardizing returns and slowing reconstruction progress. The resulting economic failures could exacerbate local grievances, feed instability, and erode international credibility.

The Trump administration’s accelerated sanctions relief and investment push, while ostensibly aimed at promoting stability and economic recovery, align closely with Turkey’s strategic goals in Syria. This alignment risks deepening regional fragmentation, heightening geopolitical tensions, and undermining efforts toward a sustainable and inclusive Syrian political settlement. A more calibrated, politically informed approach that balances economic incentives with robust conflict resolution and stakeholder engagement might better serve long-term stability.

Between Hope and Havoc: Steering Syria’s Future Amid Global Power Plays

Syria stands at a crossroads, where the promise of reconstruction and normalization contends with the perils of fragmentation and renewed violence. Europe’s measured easing of sanctions reflects a pragmatic attempt to regain influence and promote stability, but it walks a fine line between engagement and enabling authoritarian resilience. The Trump administration’s rush to unleash economic incentives risks tipping the balance further, unintentionally empowering Turkey’s expanding hegemony and deepening the fractures within Syria.

President Al-Sharaa’s leadership injects a rare note of cautious optimism, yet the road ahead remains perilous, shadowed by economic hardship, security challenges, and the unresolved scars of war. Should the worst predictions materialize—a collapse into chaos or a failed state adjacent to Israel—the consequences would ripple far beyond Syria’s borders, drawing regional powers into an even more volatile spiral.

The international community’s challenge is clear: to foster a stable, inclusive Syria that resists extremism and fragmentation without sacrificing principles or regional security. This requires not just economic incentives but nuanced diplomacy, rigorous conditionality, and coordinated regional engagement. In the balance lies not only Syria’s future but the broader stability of the Middle East—and the strategic interests of Europe, the U.S., and their partners in an ever-shifting geopolitical landscape.

• https://www.masrtimes.com/539234 - In an interview with Vernas Hefzy in مصر تايمز - Masr Times, I explain what’s behind London’s position on Gaza, the shift from threats and rhetoric to the suspension of the UK-Israel free trade treaty, and what overarching European sanctions on key economic sectors could mean for Israel. However, I also underscored the differences among various European countries on these issues, as well as the political infighting over Gaza in the US, as Trump is pressuring Israel to wrap up operations among a move towards a more independent and isolationist foreign policy.
  
  

• https://nghiencuuchienluoc.org/toan-canh-cuoc-dua-tri-tue-nhan-tao-my-trung-va-mot-so-ham-y-doi-voi-viet-nam/ - Quoted in Thi Thi’s article in Vietnam’s @Strategic Research think tank on the impact of the US-China AI race on the military preparedness, economy, natural resource acquisition, and developing countries. Let’s not sugarcoat it—this U.S.–China AI race isn’t just a tech sprint; it’s a full-blown geopolitical brawl dressed up in neural networks and silicon chips. Both sides are throwing everything into it: talent, semiconductors, patents, ideology—you name it. The U.S. leads in generative AI and open innovation, while China is playing the long game with centralized strategy and deep pockets. And yes, I said it: the U.S. may have the edge for now, but our enforcement record is a joke. If we don’t tighten our tech transfer and IP controls, China will catch up—and maybe surpass us. Why? Because unlike Washington’s whiplash politics, Beijing plans decades ahead. I give them that. Still, China’s censorship-heavy model will hit a ceiling unless it starts training AI on something other than propaganda. The global stakes? Massive—economically, militarily, ethically. And for countries like Vietnam? Time to pay attention or risk becoming tech collateral. But the whole article is worth the read for a great overview on the state of this strategic rivalry.
  
  

• https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-14734365/How-West-faces-defeat-hands-China-press-button-Experts-warn-potential-vulnerabilities-imported-defence-healthcare-Beijings-energy-kill-switches-revealed.html - Quoted among various sources in Daily Mail’s article on energy security - the discovery of "mysterious" potential track or interference devices in exported solar panels and other renewable energy equipment from China in UK and the US.

As I pointed out, China’s hidden "kill switches" in Western energy infrastructure aren’t just a theoretical concern—they’re a ticking time bomb. Beijing could remotely manipulate solar inverters, triggering localized outages that escalate into full-scale grid instability. The public sees solar power as clean and sustainable, but beneath the surface lies a digital landmine waiting to detonate.

A hostile shutdown wouldn’t require missiles—just a quiet command baked into our systems years ago. While officials scramble to fix "technical issues," the real damage would already be done: public confidence shaken, military readiness compromised, and our energy grid exposed as fragile theater. If we don’t audit and secure these systems now, it’s only a matter of time before the consequences become undeniable.

• Quoted along with Giovanni Giacalone in Yasser Khalil’s article in Annahar Newspaper | جريدة النهار on whether Donald Trump’s recent praise for Ahmed Al-Sharaa is contributing to the revival of the MuslimBrotherhood in the MENA region. The article and commentators make very good points, such as that the meeting was more of an endorsement of generalized authoritarianism and self-aggrandizement by Trump than an endorsement of Islamism. I, however, do believe that the Islamists will use any such comments for propaganda value regardless of the original intent; that said, Trump has not shown any particular preference for Islamism or any other ideology; and has been by far all about functionality and transactionalism, which distinguishes it from his predecessors.
  

• I had a very important interview with Manar Ibrahem in تلفزيون الموقع - almawq3 tv in the aftermath of the murder of the two Israeli embassy staffers in Washington DC. I raised these important points: 1. That US support for Israel is based on strategic interests and security concerns, not the identity of any particular Prime Minister 2. The rhetoric of Netanyahu’s coalition partners has contributed to a climate of hatred, but the differences between Netanyahu and Trump are both about politics and policies, not just the tone and 3. Regardless of comments by members of the ISraeli government, the attack was antisemitic in nature, and networks of entrench antisemitism and anti-Western hatred exist globally regardless of the type of coalition in sitting in Israel’s government.

U.S. Media

• Sharing an extremely timely interview I did with Scott Jacobsen for The Good Men Project. Earlier, I shared an article by the inimitable Pekka Kallioniemi (The "Vatnik Soup" guy on X) about how and why the West is losing the information war. I tackle the same subject from a somewhat different angle focusing, not just on political and resilience failures and shortcomings, but on the role of intelligence and Counterintelligence.

Irina Tsukerman is a New York-based human rights and national security lawyer and Scarab Rising, Inc. president. She specializes in information warfare, national security, and geopolitical analysis, focusing on MENA, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. In an extensive interview, she explains how the West is losing the information war due to weakened public diplomacy, internal targeting, and the rise of hostile state-sponsored narratives. She argues that modern information warfare is non-lethal but strategically disruptive, eroding trust and empowering adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran. Tsukerman highlights the evolution of hybrid warfare, noting Ukraine’s innovative counter-disinformation strategies despite Russia’s sheer volume and persistence. She also examines absurd and dangerous dynamics in intelligence circles, including propaganda tools like Jackson Hinkle, and stresses that real intelligence work is far more mundane than Hollywood’s portrayals. On prisoner exchanges and economic warfare, she critiques both U.S. and Russian short-termism compared to China and Iran’s long-term strategies. She emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity, the rise of cyber militias, and ideological hacker collectives. Finally, she underscores how volatile governance and declining institutional awareness—especially in the U.S.—have created vulnerabilities in intelligence, counterintelligence, and strategic policymaking in a new era of digital-age conflict.

TV Appearances, Videos, and Podcasts

• Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the call with his US counterpart, Donald Trump, held on Monday, was "meaningful, frank and very useful." Putin added that the conversation with Trump lasted more than two hours, during which he thanked Trump for his support for continuing the negotiations, according to the Russian news agency "TASS." More details: Republican Party member Irina Tsukerman and Dr. Said Salam, director of the Vision Center for Strategic Studies, join us on the TwentyThird program . I joined ققناة الغد Alghad TV to discuss the latest development.

  
  When I was asked to comment on the Trump-Putin call, it was immediately clear to me that we’re not witnessing diplomacy—we’re watching performance art. Two hours on the phone, and what do we get? Putin walks away calling it “useful,” while Trump practically hands over the keys to future U.S.-Russia trade, dangling carrots with no sign of a stick. What’s missing? Oh, just everything that gives peace talks substance—justice, deterrence, consequences, even a hint of strategic clarity.
  
  I pointed out during the segment that the so-called negotiations Trump references were already underway long before he stepped into this picture. From Istanbul to Riyadh, Ukraine has been engaging in meaningful dialogue—talks rooted in sovereignty, law, and actual ceasefire conditions. Trump’s suggestion that this is somehow his initiative is not just inaccurate—it’s a disservice to those risking everything for a just peace.
  
  And the ceasefire? It’s vanished. Trump’s own prior demands, weak as they were, have been discarded without explanation. There’s no pressure on Russia to soften its demands, no condemnation for the recent wave of civilian bombings. Instead, we get vague chatter about trade—about rebuilding—with Putin painted as a partner, not a perpetrator.
  
  What worries me most is the message this sends. By abandoning the Paris peace framework and offering incentives without accountability, Trump’s approach rewards aggression. It teaches bad actors that they can invade, escalate, and stall—and still be welcomed to the table with open arms and open contracts.
  
  Zelenskyy’s response was measured but unmistakably clear: Ukraine is not the problem here. Kyiv is ready for talks. But Trump’s bypassing of Ukraine’s priorities—and his failure to coordinate with European allies—risks fracturing the very unity that’s kept Russia in check.
  
  So yes, the call was “frank” and “useful”—for Putin. For the rest of us? It was a warning sign, not a breakthrough. Peace without principles isn’t peace. It’s capitulation dressed up as diplomacy. And no amount of trade deals can whitewash that.

• I joined Qnews ThinkTank with Hany Seif for a round 3 rematch with Dr. Sergei Markov. We discussed the assessment of the hectic phone diplomacy between Trump, Putin, and Zelensky.

  
  Here’s a summary of my comments:

Let me be blunt: Trump’s so-called diplomacy looks less like peacemaking and more like deal-hawking in a warzone. His postwar trade incentives? Window dressing. They don’t change the facts on the ground, and certainly don’t address the root of this war. He’s not a neutral broker — he’s an interested party with a self-marketing agenda and a Rolodex full of vested interests.

Let’s break it down. First, offering economic deals as a path to peace assumes the parties are desperate for trade crumbs. They’re not. Putin’s calculus is geopolitical and imperial — not transactional. He wants buffer zones, strategic depth, and Western submission, not Trump Hotels and tariff holidays. Ukraine, on the other hand, isn’t bartering away sovereignty for construction contracts and handshake promises.

Second, Trump’s erratic deal history — headline-first, substance-later — makes this “peace plan” look more like a business ploy than a serious initiative. His big talk about trade doesn’t come with frameworks, enforceable mechanisms, or even European consultation. That undermines the real tool the West still has: sanctions. Weakening collective pressure plays straight into Moscow’s hands.

Third, dangling trade to entice peace risks becoming a Trojan horse. The Kremlin can point to Trump’s openness as a fracture in the West — exploiting it to divide NATO and chip away at unified deterrence. It’s déjà vu from 2018, only now it’s not just cozy summits — it’s shaping ceasefire terms.

And Europe? They’re not amused. Their reaction to any deal that compromises Ukrainian sovereignty would be swift, sharp, and public. Countries like Poland, the Baltics, and even Germany are doubling down on defense and solidarity with Kyiv. Undermining Ukraine now risks not only diplomatic fallout, but the unraveling of transatlantic trust.

Let’s also not forget that Trump floated backing away entirely — claiming this is “a European issue.” Translation? He’ll take credit if things go well, but bail when it gets complicated.

In short, this isn’t diplomacy — it’s brand management. And if anyone thinks dangling a few trade carrots can tame Putin or strong-arm Ukraine into submission, they’re either naïve or selling something. Probably both.

• https://www.ndtv.com/video/us-deportations-indian-student-priya-saxena-wins-case-against-trump-admin-941938google_vignette - US Deportations | Indian Student Priya Saxena Wins Case Against Trump Admin

4:38 Published On: May 20, 2025

In today’s episode of India Global, Priya Saxena, an Indian PhD student at a university in South Dakota, whom the Trump administration has been attempting to deport from the United States, has won a legal reprieve from a federal court, allowing her to stay in America. The 28-year-old who recently received a doctorate in chemical and biological engineering from the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology faced deportation after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) unexpectedly revoked her F-1 student visa in April over a minor traffic violation. NDTV’s Gaurie Dwivedi speaks with international immigration lawyer Irina Tsukerman to discuss this and more. I joined NDTV to discuss whether this case will put an end to the Trump administration’s pursuit of deportation based on minor infractions, and the likely impact of the legal precedent.

- “Ceasefires may cool tensions, but global risks are heating up. In this video, top geopolitical analyst and national security lawyer Irina Tsukerman breaks down the India-Pakistan truce, inside details of Trump’s two-hour call with Putin, and Israel’s escalating Gaza crisis. With exclusive insight into backdoor diplomacy, disinformation wars, and shifting power blocs, Irina delivers hard-hitting analysis on the crises shaping tomorrow’s headlines.” I joined Khudania Ajay on KAJ Masterclass LIVE to discuss in-depth the multitude of hot-button issues which have accumulated over the past couple of weeks.

The conversation covered critical geopolitical flashpoints, and I didn’t hold back in calling out the players behind the chaos.

Let’s start with the India-Pakistan ceasefire. Did anyone “win”? Hardly. The combat may have stopped, but the real game is still in play. India wrapped up a spy ring of 12 Pakistani operatives, reinforcing that Pakistan wasn’t acting alone. There’s deep state involvement, not just from ISI, but from China, Turkey, and Qatar—each with their own agenda, whether supplying weapons, training soldiers, or bankrolling chaos. China’s fingerprints are all over this, from logistical planning to arms supply. Turkey’s cozy military ties with Pakistan—and whispers of nuclear cooperation—are setting off alarm bells, while Qatar is financing the Islamist narrative. This isn’t just a skirmish; it’s a strategic reshuffling in South Asia.

Meanwhile, Trump’s two-hour chat with Putin was heavy on… well, what, exactly? Trade deals that benefit Moscow while avoiding meaningful pressure over the Ukraine war. The fact that Russia is mapping out escalations into NATO territory should’ve been front and center, yet Trump mostly parroted Kremlin-friendly rhetoric. Not a great look. His approach to China isn’t much better—escalating tariffs, then backtracking, all while berating Apple for shifting operations to India. Mixed signals much?

And speaking of bad ideas, Trump’s plan to relocate Palestinians to Libya is laughably impractical. Libya is already a powder keg, drowning in militia warfare—why import another crisis? Meanwhile, Israel’s offensive in Gaza is heating up, but international condemnation is piling on. The US is subtly distancing itself, leading Europe to follow suit with trade restrictions and political rebukes. Hamas, unsurprisingly, is celebrating all this chaos.

Bottom line? These global fault lines aren’t just shifting—they’re being actively manipulated. From backdoor energy sabotage to international betrayals, the world isn’t getting less complicated. And if you’re not keeping up with who’s playing who, well… you’re already behind.

• https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan/kan-reka/p-9904/ - I appeared on KAN REKA - КАН РЭКА on 05/22 to discuss the heinous antisemitic terrorist murder of the two Israeli embassy staffers at the AJC - American Jewish Committee reception for Young Diplomats in Washington DC.

I see the murder of two Israeli embassy staffers in Washington, D.C., as a clear act of terrorism—and a deeply political statement. But let’s be honest about what kind of politics this was. It wasn’t a calculated response to any specific action by the Israeli government. It wasn’t about Gaza policy, or Netanyahu, or even the broader debate on the conflict. This attack was fueled by deep-seated antisemitism, by hatred of Israel’s very existence, and by a radical ideology that sees Jews—any Jews, anywhere—as legitimate targets.

One of the victims wasn’t even Israeli-born. He was an American citizen, serving in a low-level administrative role. He wasn’t making strategic decisions. But that didn’t matter to the attacker, Elias Rodriguez, whose affiliation with the Party for Socialism and Liberation (PSL) paints a much darker picture. The PSL isn’t just a fringe political group—it’s a radical organization that has aligned itself with authoritarian regimes like China, Russia, and Iran, and has openly supported Hamas and other terrorist entities. For them, antisemitic violence isn’t collateral—it’s the objective.

In fact, I’ve been closely following a disturbing uptick in online incitement, especially from Europe. In Italy, pro-Hamas and far-left accounts have issued threats against pro-Israel diplomats, circulating their names, addresses, and veiled death wishes. These digital campaigns aren’t just toxic—they’re dangerous. They’re part of a growing ecosystem of ideological warfare that merges hard-left revolutionary rhetoric with militant Islamist goals, all amplified by the state-sponsored propaganda machines of Iran and Qatar.

Yes, the Trump administration condemned the attack quickly and unequivocally—but let’s not pat ourselves on the back just yet. This incident represents a serious security failure. The threat wasn’t invisible. It was broadcasting itself in plain sight. Social media was ablaze with warning signs. Intelligence agencies had tracked radical PSL activities before. And yet somehow, two embassy staffers were left vulnerable to an ideologically motivated killer—right in the heart of the capital.

Now we’re seeing renewed funding initiatives for Jewish communal security. Increased money for synagogue protection, private security firms, and surveillance systems. I support these moves, but they’re not enough. You can’t guard your way out of a terrorist threat that’s ideological in nature. Without dismantling the extremist networks behind the incitement, without shutting down the foreign influence pipelines feeding this hatred, we’re just putting a bandage on a bullet wound.

We need aggressive interagency coordination. We need to identify, monitor, and expose the groups—like PSL—that serve as domestic conduits for foreign terrorist propaganda. And we need to stop pretending that this kind of rhetoric is just a “fringe opinion.” It’s fueling violence, and now it has blood on its hands.

So yes, this was political. But it wasn't a protest—it was persecution. It was terrorism, pure and simple, targeting Jews under the cover of anti-Israel activism. If we fail to call that what it is, we’re not just missing the point—we’re enabling the next attack.

• - Joined REUC for a fantastic video discussion on an assortment of global concerns. In this compelling interview, Irina Tsukerman—a US national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, and Board Member of The Washington Outsider Centre for Information Warfare—shares her insights on the current state of global diplomacy and the major geopolitical escalations shaping the world.

Following the release of her 50-page study in REUC Digital Magazine, Irina joins this live discussion to provide an in-depth analysis of conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, the power dynamics between the US, EU, and Russia, and the growing challenges in international diplomacy. With her sharp expertise, she offers a strategic outlook on how global actors are navigating today’s complex political landscape.

Watch as we uncover the hidden forces behind diplomatic stagnation, the impact of information warfare, and the key trends defining the future of international relations.

Please find her study named: "A Decline in Power and Principles: The End of the Transatlantic Relationship, or Just a New Chapter?" at www.reuc.eu digital magazine - "Guest journalist" category, and her official website: www.scarabrising.com.

Interview host: Saša Dobrijević - diplomatic international journalist.

In this interview, I covered more geopolitical ground than a Russian troll farm in an election year. We started with Gaza, where I debunked the usual propaganda: no, Israel is not starving the population. Hundreds of aid trucks have gone in. The problem? Hamas. They loot the aid, dress like civilians, and game the system—so now, Israel’s working with U.S.-backed private firms to bypass them. Is it perfect? No. But let’s stop pretending Hamas isn’t the one weaponizing hunger.

Israel’s latest military campaign—Gideon’s Chariots—is meant to finish off Hamas leadership after killing another one of the Sva brothers. But the bigger problem? No one has a clue what comes after. There’s talk of forcing Gazans out, rumors about shipping a million Palestinians to Libya (seriously?), and zero clarity from the Trump team. JDW even canceled his trip to avoid looking like he endorsed this mess. Classic mixed signals.

Then we zoomed out to U.S.-EU relations, and spoiler alert: they’re not great. The Trump administration’s whisper campaign about pulling troops from Europe while flirting with pro-Russia peace plans leaves NATO shaky and allies guessing. Even the UK deal is a glorified freeze frame—no real movement, just delaying tariffs and awkward glances across the Channel.

We touched on China, where Trump talks tough but keeps TikTok alive, treating Beijing more like a business rival than a national security threat. Russia and China may not trust each other, but they’re united in their goal to watch the West implode from internal dysfunction—and we’re giving them a front-row seat.

The kicker? A full-blown leadership vacuum. Europe reacts instead of plans, the U.S. swings wildly from isolationist to interventionist, and no one’s thinking long-term. Whether it’s AI, energy, or diplomacy, we’re stuck in echo chambers and losing public trust fast.

My bottom line: without strategic clarity, leadership with spine, and a reset in political discourse, we’ll keep lurching between extremes—Trump today, radical left tomorrow—while our adversaries eat our lunch and call it foreign policy.

• - I joined a panel on القاهرة الإخبارية AlQahera News (which included Dr. Sergei Markov!) to discuss the prospects of success for DonaldTrump’s proposed Gold Dome project. To summarize my perspective:

So, when I got asked to weigh in on Trump’s shiny new brainchild—the so-called Golden Dome—I knew we weren’t just talking about another bloated defense contract or some Star Wars sequel with a patriotic twist. No, this was Trump being Trump: loud, dramatic, and itching to etch his name into missile defense history. The Golden Dome isn’t just a defense system—it’s a billboard for the Trump Doctrine, where optics matter more than feasibility and swagger outweighs substance.

Now don’t get me wrong, there’s a strategic logic here—sort of. With whispers (and shouts) about space warfare and satellite skirmishes, the idea of beefing up U.S. defenses against everything from hypersonics to orbital threats isn’t crazy. What’s crazy is thinking you can pull it off in three years with no feasibility study, no Pentagon endorsement, and a price tag that jumps from $175 billion to half a trillion faster than a campaign promise at a rally.

From my seat in New York, I said it straight: Trump isn’t just selling defense—he’s selling deterrence theater. He knows the real battlefield is perception. Announce something huge, get the media storm, and look “presidential” while the actual logistics, engineering, and global diplomacy unravel in the background. And let’s not even get started on Canada. Trump’s not exactly known for diplomacy north of the border, and building a dome without Canadian airspace cooperation is like installing a front door with no walls.

I also flagged the real risk: when you build something this ambitious and this vague, it starts to smell less like defense and more like strategic blackmail. You don’t need to launch anything—you just need the world to think you might. That changes the geopolitical equation, especially for China and Russia, who are watching this like hawks with hypersonic missiles.

Bottom line? The Golden Dome isn’t about protecting America from missiles. It’s about shielding Trump from irrelevance—at least until the next election cycle.

• I joined Qnews “Think Tank” panel to discuss the impact of DonaldTrump’s threat to impose a 50% tariff on all goods from the EU on transatlantic relations.

Look, when Trump threatened to slap a 50% tariff on every EU import like he was ordering off a menu, I knew we weren’t in normal trade territory—we were in full-blown economic theater. I said it straight: this wasn’t a policy adjustment, it was political performance art. Trump wasn’t trying to negotiate; he was issuing an ultimatum with a bullhorn and a red tie. The man doesn’t do nuance. He does spectacle, and the EU just got front-row seats.

From my perspective, this was less about deficits and more about dominance. Trump sees the EU not as an ally, but as a competitor that got too comfortable under the U.S. umbrella. So now, he’s yanking the umbrella away mid-storm and calling it a test of independence. The problem? The EU isn’t a monolith—it’s a choir of nervous soloists. And Trump knows exactly how to play them off one another. Germany worries about autos, France about wine, Italy about leather—he’s throwing one grenade and watching everyone scramble.

But I made sure to stress: the fallout won’t stop at economics. When your so-called ally threatens your industries, it poisons the whole relationship—trade, security, tech, you name it. NATO won’t be immune. Intelligence sharing starts to erode, defense procurement slows down, and suddenly the “strategic autonomy” crowd in Brussels sounds a lot more reasonable. This is how alliances unravel—not with a bang, but with a tariff.

And let’s talk about hypocrisy. Trump cries foul over EU trade barriers while threatening the most protectionist move in decades. He claims to stand up for American workers while destabilizing supply chains and raising consumer prices. Meanwhile, the EU is quietly exploring trade deals with Latin America, Africa, and yes—even China. Trump’s isolationism is accelerating exactly what he fears: a multipolar trade system where America is just one vendor among many, not the rule-setter.

Bottom line? Trump isn’t just risking a trade war—he’s handing the EU every excuse to cut their dependency on Washington. And when that happens, don’t expect them to come running when the next global crisis hits. They’ll remember the tariffs—and the tone.

The Washington Outsider

• State Police in Milan caught a university student from Egypt with materials for making bombs and ISIS propaganda. Stefano Piazza tells the story... While many could be tempted to write this incident off as yet another instance of a self-radicalized “lone wolf”, the agitprop on hand points to the opposite conclusion.

The Washington Outsider Substack

• How serious is the latest rift between Israel, the Trump administration, and Europe? I explore in depth in my latest article.

Ah, the tangled web of geopolitical friendships—when alliances turn into battlegrounds and humanitarian crises morph into PR nightmares. Welcome to the Gaza saga, where the so-called Western camp is playing an excruciating game of diplomatic dodgeball, hurling leaks, sanctions, and ill-timed suspensions at each other with the finesse of a middle school cafeteria brawl.

Let’s start with the elephant in the room: the U.S.-Israel fallout. What once seemed like an ironclad partnership is now fraying at the edges. Trump, caught between his base and swing-state optics, is increasingly irritated with Israel’s blunt-force military tactics.

Netanyahu, meanwhile, sees Washington’s strategic recalibration as an existential threat, fearing the U.S. might shove a Gulf-led post-war "solution" down his throat. The result? A slow-motion dis-alignment that could reshape Republican foreign policy and embolden Israel’s rivals.

And speaking of rivals, the Gulf states are watching this dysfunction like chess masters waiting for their moment. They don’t particularly love Hamas, but they see an opening—if Trump drifts away from Netanyahu, they can push for a regional settlement that trims Israeli control over Gaza’s future. Cue the delicate dance of Saudi and Emirati maneuvering: "Sure, we’ll help stabilize Gaza, but only on our terms."

Meanwhile, Europe, in its infinite wisdom, has chosen the worst way to make a point—hardline aid oversight so rigid that it’s unintentionally propping up Hamas and radicalizing Israeli hardliners. By stalling humanitarian efforts and slapping punitive measures on Israel, they’re playing right into extremist narratives while simultaneously paralyzing diplomatic avenues. Bravo.

And if this mess weren’t enough, let’s add a little Russian and Chinese disinformation into the mix—just to ensure that Western discord hits peak dysfunctionality. The Kremlin and Beijing are happily amplifying every misstep, stoking outrage, and exploiting divides to chip away at U.S. influence in the Middle East.

The moral of the story? Fractured friends and fiery frontlines make for a dangerous brew. Without a strategic reset, this diplomatic implosion risks setting new precedents—and none of them bode well for stability, credibility, or long-term alliances.

• In my article, I explore the recent announcement of the joint French-Saudi push to disarm Hamas, while allowing to keep it a “limited political power”, following an Arab ministerial meeting on Gaza in Paris.

Saudi Arabia is the true power behind the push to disarm Hamas—France is just the glossy European front. The article lays bare how Riyadh engineered the entire plan, using its deep pockets, intelligence networks, and regional influence to shape the strategy and pick France as the diplomatic poster child. Saudi Arabia bankrolls key Gaza stabilization efforts, supplies critical counterterrorism intel, and dictates who gets a seat at the reconstruction table, all while sidelining Iran-backed groups and curbing Qatari sway.

But disarming Hamas? That’s a thorny beast. Hamas is deeply entrenched in Gaza’s social, political, and military fabric, backed by Iran and embedded in complex local networks. Riyadh’s approach relies on France and other allies to push a narrative of peace and reconstruction, but on the ground, the group’s roots make any straightforward disarmament near-impossible. Riyadh’s hope is that by combining financial muscle with strategic isolation, Hamas can be weakened or marginalized—but it’s a high-stakes gamble.

Meanwhile, France’s shaky domestic scene complicates the picture. Its intelligence services are fragmented, Islamist radicalization is rising at home, and public trust is fragile. Macron’s government leans heavily on Saudi intelligence and funding, but also tries to appear as a neutral broker—a tricky balancing act that risks unraveling if the plan falters.

The article also points out that without broad regional buy-in—particularly from Egypt and Israel—Riyadh’s plan faces roadblocks. The vacuum created by sidelining Hamas could backfire, leading to greater instability or empowering even more extreme groups.

Bottom line: Saudi Arabia is steering the ship, and France is paddling hard to keep up. Disarming Hamas under Riyadh’s watchful eye is a complex, fraught mission with no easy exit—one that could reshape regional power dynamics or explode in everyone’s face.